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ABSTRACT 
Some social and organizational behavior scientists measure resiliency through anecdotal 
qualitative research, i.e. personality analyses and stories of life experience. Empirical evidence 
remains limited for identifying measurable indicators of resiliency.  Therefore, a testable 
contingency model was needed to clarify resiliency factors pertinent to organizational 
performance. Two essential resiliency factors were: 1) a written plan and 2) affiliation with a 
disaster network. 
This contingency study demonstrated a quantifiable, correlational effect between 
organizational complexity, disaster plan adequacy and organizational resiliency. The unit of 
analysis, the skilled nursing facility proved vulnerable, therefore justifying the need for a written 
emergency management plan and affiliation with a disaster network.  
The main purpose of this research was to verify the significance of emergency 
management plans within a contingency framework of complexity theory, resource dependency, 
systems theory, and network theory.  Distinct sample moments quantified causal relationships 
between organizational complexity (A), plan adequacy (B) and resiliency (C).  Primary and 
secondary research data were collected from within the context of public health and emergency 
management sectors within the State of Florida.  
The research unit of analysis was the licensed skilled nursing facility specified as a 
nursing home (NH). Most units were affiliated with healthcare systems, while 19% of the sample 
were not affiliates.  The randomly selected sample population of 200 Florida NH administrators 
provided primary data through a self-administered survey of randomized questions related to the 
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staff’s comprehension of the facility’s disaster plan and disaster resource management 
procedures.  
Internal validity from social desirability bias was minimized in two ways: 1) by using 
secondary data retrieved from trusted sources:  CMS, MDS 3.0, and CASPER 2012 and 2) by 
using survey questions with a 5-point Likert scale to capture staff knowledge, skills and attitudes 
(KSAs). Distribution of the survey was during the end of hurricane season and the beginning of 
the annual plan approval cycle (November 4, 2014 until January 19, 2015).  
Definitions, calculations, and interpretations of the performance data varied among 
sources. This lack of clarity created two research challenges: 1) no clear definition of resiliency 
between healthcare providers and emergency management agencies and 2) no clear definition of 
organizational complexity. This lack of definition created a problem with utilizing customary 
performance indicators of organizational behavior within a Donabedian model of medical care: 
structure (A), process (B), and outcomes (C).   
The term resiliency was borrowed from the biological sciences as absorbing, coping and 
recovering from disruption of routine. In this study, the term resiliency represented disaster 
response and recovery capabilities for nursing homes that are derived from the complex internal 
system of patient care. According to Ashby, the state of complexity can be too complicated to 
quantify and organizational research projects determine component definitions (Ashby, 2007).  
In other words, complexity factors are identified by the research methodology. This study 
analyzed the adequacy of emergency plans designed for nursing home staff, some of the factors 
were strongly correlated, for example patient comorbidities and level of staffing. For this study, 
organizational complexity included: acuity indexes, ADL scores, staff hours, staff ratings and 
occupancy rates. Due to the large quantity of available data, organizational complexity data for 
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this research was reduced into three NH organizational components: patient acuity, workload and 
administrative strengths. 
These factors required three standardized measurement models to improve the accuracy 
of predicting organizational complexity influence upon plan adequacy and NH resiliency 
outcomes within the context of a disability centric environment.  
The primary finding from this research was the confirmation that disaster plans improve 
NH resiliency by 16%.  The endogenous construct, Plan Adequacy (B) demonstrated a 
significant resiliency effect of .8 within a scale of absolute 1.   
In summary, this empirical study offers strong proof for the contingency theory that NH 
resiliency is directly influenced by a well-written and exercised emergency plan. Even though 
the NH population remains vulnerable to emergencies from an organizational perspective, the 
results confirmed a strong contingency perspective for NH resiliency exists within four disaster 
plan areas: plan approval status; memorandums of agreement; disaster exercises; and network 
affiliations.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The problem statement for this research is: the complexity of an organization determines 
the adequacy of its emergency management plan and that plan determines the organization’s 
level of disaster resiliency. In other words, organizational resiliency is contingent upon 
organizational complexity and disaster plan adequacy.   
Another way of expressing the problem statement is in the form of a question:  Do NH 
emergency management plans adequately improve disaster resiliency for complex organizations?  
Complex organizations are vulnerable to inadequate planning as experienced by New Orleans in 
2005, during Hurricane Katrina. 
1.1. Research Goal 
The goal of this study was to prove the significance of emergency management plan 
adequacy in developing organizational resiliency.  
The three objectives were as follows:  
First, demonstrate the necessity for an adequate emergency management plan. Second, 
identify the most significant indicators for NH resiliency. Third and lastly, design a contingency 
model for disaster plans that overcomes the challenges inherent in organizational complexity and 
thus, enhances organizational resiliency.  
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1.2. Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework for this research focused on contingency theory that 
considered complexity, resource dependence, network, and systems learning. Theories were 
derived from the continuing conversations and ongoing research projects among organizational 
behaviorists and emergency management scholars.  
According to Louise Comfort of the University of Pittsburgh, there is a continued need 
for evaluation of human dependency upon nature and the risks associated with that 
interdependence (Comfort, 2012). Other organizational and public policy scientists attempt to 
incorporate this complex concept into a simple framework of contingency theories.  
Contingency theory research confirms that planning ahead and allocating resources ahead 
of a disaster allows for better responses and quicker recovery (ICMA, 2007).  In other words, 
contingency planning provides opportunities for an organization to be resilient. That is why, 
nursing home administrations are expected to include contingency strategies into a planning 
process that incorporates vulnerability assessments, resource management, and disaster 
procedures.  
The traditional Donabedian model (Structure→Process→Outcomes) used in measuring 
healthcare quality was modified to consider the context or complexity of an organization in lieu 
of its structure. This study’s modified Donabedian Logic Model provided the best option for 
demonstrating the contingency relationship of patient acuity, workload, and organizational 
strengths as the context for the planning process.  
Also, the modified model demonstrated the potential for a synergistic relationship.  In 
other words, the joint effects of organizational complexity (A) and plan adequacy (B) upon NH 
resiliency (C) were also evaluated through this framework.  For a diagram, see Figure 1 
Theoretical Framework. 
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Figure 1: Theoretical Framework 
 
Numerous emergency management studies in Louisiana, Texas, Central Florida, and 
Japan demonstrated that after natural disasters, multiple agencies work together to rebuild 
communities. These studies recognized the significance of collaboration among complex systems 
of resource distribution within public/private networks (Agranoff, 2003; Cutter, et al., 2008; 
Dosa, et al., 2010; HHS OIG, 2006; Kapucu & Demiroz, 2011; Rivera, 2012). In turn, this 
increased an organization’s capacity for resiliency as best practices were evaluated and shared 
among emergency management partners through disaster plans. Thus substantiating the concept 
of plan adequacy as a measureable best practice. 
Plan adequacy of the emergency management plan process (B) in this study, was 
measured within a systems learning concept based upon a contingency theoretical framework. 
Confidence and familiarity of the emergency management plan can be measured by NH staff 
knowledge, skills and attitudes (KSAs). The level of NH staff KSA’s are contingent upon how 
much sharing of information is done through inclusion of staff in planning and training exercises. 
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This concept of plan adequacy as a product of staff knowledge is proposed by Fiedler’s 
complexity theory that organizational behavior is contingent upon “the lowest common worker” 
and the feedback of staff experience into the organization’s operational system (Richardson, 
1991).  
Besides, the four contingency theories, this research framework was more specifically 
derived from the following list of resiliency questions:  
Q1. Does organizational complexity influence plan adequacy? 
Q2. Does disaster plan adequacy influence nursing home resiliency? 
Q3. Does organizational complexity influence nursing home resiliency? 
Q4. Do organizational complexity and plan adequacy collectively influence resiliency? 
These research questions considered three latent endogenous constructs within the 
Donabedian model as follows: NH organizational complexity (context, A) and plan adequacy 
(process, B) as staff knowledge and NH resiliency (outcomes C).  Four propositions regarding 
this model and its causal paths are discussed in the next section. 
1.3. Propositions 
 
Four propositions or hypothetical statements were derived from the research questions 
and are discussed in this section as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: The NH plan adequacy is contingent upon the NH’s organizational 
complexity.  
In other words, quality of patient care is contingent upon NH complexity, resource 
dependency, and systems learning. This is especially important for patients with dementia, 
Alzheimer’s, or other cognitive disabilities, because their physical conditions deteriorate with the 
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added stress of uncertainty or changes in routine (Bowblis & Hyer, 2013; Brown, et al., 2012).  
So NH administrators and frontline staff need to share information regarding resource needs and 
resource availability as well as disaster successes from previous experiences. 
Organizational complexity as defined for this study determined the disaster plan design 
and resiliency strategy. Organizational considerations included multiple factors: Patient Acuity 
(ADL Acuity and ADL Score), Work Load (CNAHRD, LPNHRD, and OCCUPANCY), and 
Administrative Strengths (STAFFRATING, RNRATING, and NURSERATIO).  These second 
order indicators of organizational complexity behave as a latent exogenous construct upon the 
latent endogenous construct, plan adequacy. Plan adequacy through resource sharing among 
affiliations with other emergency networks then directly affects resiliency. 
How well the plan utilizes network collaboration and how well the plan is understood by 
NH staff, leads to the second hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a direct positive causation from NH plan adequacy to NH 
resiliency.  
The disaster plan design is expected to save time and adequately provide disaster 
resources through written agreements, as examples of network collaborations. For example, the 
plan to evacuate requires training of staff. NH staff must proceed quickly and efficiently while 
minimizing patient decompensation. Practicing the plan before an emergency increases the 
likelihood that the plan guidelines will be followed. Thus, the NH can absorb, cope, and recover 
at an adequate level of resiliency (Alexander, et al., 2010; CDC and PHPR, 2011; Drabek & 
McEntire, 2002).  Understanding the connection between the basic principles of the emergency 
management plan as designed by the NH staff within the organizational structure of the facility 
leads to third hypothesis as follows: 
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Hypothesis 3: There is a direct correlation between nursing home organizational 
complexity and nursing home resiliency.   
Contingency theory suggests an organization’s reliance upon available resources and the 
capacity for utilizing those resources prior to, during and immediately after a disaster effect 
resiliency. Some scholars believe the location and placement of an organization affects its 
accessibility to additional disaster resources and that geographic placement is crucial to an 
organization’s resiliency (Cutter, et al., 2008).  In some cases, the location of a nursing home is 
beyond the control of the NH staff and therefore, they depend upon internal strengths of the 
organization to determine a level of resiliency. Nursing home organizational complexity includes 
internal procedures contingent upon the complexity of personnel availability and routine 
resources being supplemented with disaster resources. This hypothesis considers the direct 
influence of NH organizational complexity upon NH resiliency.    
The possibility of a cumulative and/or synergized effect of organizational complexity and 
plan adequacy upon NH resiliency provided a fourth hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis 4: There is a cumulative effect of NH complexity and NH plan adequacy on 
NH resiliency.  
Even though an organization may demonstrate a degree of resiliency without 
implementing an emergency plan, professionals agree that contingency theory implies the 
likelihood that an adequate plan will elevate resiliency for that organization (ACHE, 2013; 
Alonzo-Zaldivar, 2012; Brown, et al., 2009; Dosa, et al., 2010; Drabek & McEntire, 2002).  
Together, the organization and the plan, are proposed to positively enhance nursing home 
resiliency. 
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1.4. Delimitations and Limitations 
Research delimitations were used to control the size and homogeneity of the case studies. 
Case studies for this research came from the membership database of the Florida Health Care 
Association (FHCA) to control for licensed providers within a specific geographic area that were 
not retirement communities or special focused facilities. 
Two other delimitations for quality measures were used: 1) facility related data from the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) reports and 2) a structural equation model (SEM). 
Data from the CMS were used to maintain consistency of information across three measure 
models.  Secondly, the SEM illustrated results from a combination of path analysis, confirmatory 
factor analysis, factor analysis reduction and multiple regression. This was the most efficient 
methodology for identifying the most influential measures of resiliency.   
SEM may be criticized by some scholars as measuring only some not all of the direct 
influences on resiliency.  However, the model can equate a measure to an “unseen” indicator 
such as an organization’s internal culture.  Previous disaster studies reveal knowledge experience 
increases coping abilities overtime, especially when shared as part of an organization’s internal 
culture (Rivera, 2012).  Therefore, SEM adds to the discussions by demonstrating internal 
culture as three latent endogenous indicators: organizational complexity, plan adequacy and NH 
resiliency.  
SEM’s ability to reduce large volumes of data into a manageable format also provided a 
simple way of explaining a complex problem.  For example it was possible to glean from 
multivariate first factors (i.e. quantity of patients, number of patients needing assistance with 
daily living (ADL), the number of patients per nurse, staff ratings and staff work hours) into 
three measurable secondary factors for organizational complexity.   
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Two limitations of this research were (1) the length of time since a community wide 
disaster has challenged the adequacy of NH disaster plans and (2) the element of human 
unpredictability.  It was the human behavior component that proved the most limiting. For 
example: incomplete surveys, opting out after consenting to participate, changes in NH staff 
during time the survey link was open, and invalid email addresses. 
This research was non-experimental and not related to pre- and post-disaster 
observations. Therefore this research relied heavily upon descriptive statistics and a KSA 
questionnaire. 
1.5. Definition of Terms 
This section defines the terms used in this dissertation that may have more than one 
definition in other research areas. The terms are: resiliency, nursing home, assistance with daily 
living, nursing home resiliency, disaster and the four phases of emergency management.  
The scientific term resiliency originated from the biological and environmental sciences 
description of an organism’s ability to survive adverse conditions.  The social sciences adapted 
this term to describe humans that have survived unusually stress filled changes in their routine 
living environment. Organizational behaviorists also, contend that organizations and 
communities display degrees of resiliency, because they are composed of humans.   
Nursing homes (NH) for the purposes of this dissertation are specialized skilled nursing 
facilities (SNF) that do not have to follow mandated evacuations due to the frailty of patients. 
They are distinct from special focused facilities (SFF) and continuous care retirement 
communities (CCRC). These facilities provide custodial care and higher levels of assistance with 
daily living (ADL) activities.   
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Assistance with Daily Living (ADL) is a scaled measure of patient care as the degree of 
assistance required to: move in and out of bed, use toilet, bathe, and eat or any other daily 
routine.   The ADL ranges from a minimum of 0 units for self-performance to a maximum of 19 
units for complete dependency. The ADL score was used in this research as one factor for 
organizational complexity.  The ADL data were derived from CMS reimbursement forms.  See 
APPENDIX G: ADL CALCULATIONS WORKSHEET.  For an outline of ADL categories and 
performance definitions from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid see Table 1: ADL Score 
Definitions (CMS, 2013). 
 
Table 1: ADL Score Definitions 
ADL Category  Self-Performance 
Score 
Support Score ADL Score 
 
Bed Mobility 
Transfer 
Toilet Use 
 
-, 0, 1, 7, or 8 
2 
3 
3 or 4 
(any number) 
(any number) 
-, 0-2 
-, 0-2 
3 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 
Eating 
-, 0, 1, 2, 7, or 8 
-, 0, 1, 2, 7, or 8 
3 or 4 
3 
4 
-, 0, 1, 2, 7, or 8 
-, 0, 1, 2, 7, or 8 
3 or 4 
3 
4 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Source: Long-Term Care Facility Resident Assessment Instrument User’s Manual version 3, Chapter 6, Section 6.6   
 
In this document the term nursing home resiliency is interchanged with performance 
outcomes during disasters.  Resiliency is the NH’s capacity to absorb, adapt, and recover from 
any disaster that causes a sudden disruption of utilities and/or loss of resources that interrupts 
routine patient care. This capability of adapting is measured as better outcomes for continuously 
providing quality care during and after a disaster (Lamb, Zimring, Chuzi, & Dutcher, 2010).   
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Organizational resiliency is customarily defined by sustainability capacity and economic 
resources such as operating budgets, disaster reserves, and socioeconomic resources. Some 
emergency management scholars believe an organization’s resiliency capacity can be enhanced 
through a well-designed and well-implemented disaster plan. So we can go a step further and 
propose implementation through sustainability and flexibility provide better organization and 
community resiliency (Alexander, et al., 2010; Bea, et al., 2007; Blake, Howard, Eiring, & 
Tarde, 2012; CDC & PHPR, 2011; ICMA, 2007; Kapucu, 2010). The importance of community 
resiliency is recognizd at a nationl level. 
The Government Accounting Office in 2009 recommended that FEMA provide better 
definitions and measurements for resiliency performance in reporting successes and in requesting 
additional disaster response funds. Therefore, performance as effective assistance after major 
disasters can be discussed in quantifiable terminology (Scire', 2009).  Because disaster response 
budgets are linked to the cost of personnel and disaster response equipment, disaster 
professionals distinguish between disasters and emergencies by the degree of urgency needed for 
response and recovery.  
Of course, that means first defining disaster variations and then quantifying the 
anticipated recovery resources within categories of capability.  For example, a brushfire will 
require a different number of personnel and a different vehicle than an apartment fire. The size of 
the fire will determine the number of fire teams. In conclusion, resource definitions include 
categories and types: Type I, II, III, IV, or V per definitions used by the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS).  Therefore, disaster resources are quantifiable during all phases of 
emergency management (i.e. prior to, during and following a disaster).   
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In anticipation of a disaster, emergency managers collaborate through four overlapping 
phases within disaster resource networks. These four phases are directed by formal and/or 
informal stakeholders through interagency public/private collaborations.  
By definition, these emergency management phases are: preparedness, response, recovery 
and mitigation. They are sometimes referenced as the cycle of emergency management and are 
given equal amounts of significance as demonstrated in Figure 1. Emergency Management 
Phases (Committee on Private-Public Sector Collaboration to Enhance Community Disaster 
Resilience, 2011; FEMA, 2012; FHCA Education & Development Foundation, 2009; Waugh, 
2012).  
 
Figure 2: Emergency Management Phases 
 
Each emergency management phase has goals and objectives implemented through 
standard operating procedures. For example, during the preparedness phase, emergency 
managers assess a community’s vulnerabilities and write plan policies to address vulnerabilities 
with measurable objectives. One objective is mitigation or hardening of a community’s 
infrastructure. (i.e.  Re-fortify bridges and levees). 
The mitigation phase incorporates physical activities that minimize damage during the 
response phase of managing a disaster. Some professionals agree mitigation crosses over into 
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other disciplines, such as urban planning for community infrastructure and economic 
development (Council for Excellence in Government, 2006; Dolan & Messen, 2012; Drabek & 
McEntire, 2002; FEMA, 2012; IAEM, 2012; Kapucu, 2010; Waugh & Streib, 2006).  
1.6. Problem Summary 
The complexity of an organization determines the adequacy of its emergency 
management plan and that plan determines the organization’s level of disaster resiliency. In other 
words, organizational complexity (A) influences plan adequacy (B) and organizational resiliency 
(C).  Plan adequacy is witnessed through staff knowledge, skills and attitudes.   
  
13 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Healthcare and emergency managers are credited with protecting and saving lives during 
disasters. Resiliency remains contingent upon both sectors working closely together before, 
during, and long after a disaster. People are not expected to die from disaster related incidents. 
In 2006, it was determined that local, state, and national authorities’ “failure to act” 
exacerbated living conditions after a category 4 storm breached the city’s levees. Flood waters 
swept into the city streets August 28, 2005 and remained in some areas at a maximum height of 
four feet until September 29, 2005. During that time medical staff and administrators from two 
skilled nursing facilities made national headlines. One facility was privately owned and operated 
within a one story building. It lost 34 souls. The other facility rented the seventh floor of a New 
Orleans hospital and was publicly owned by an out-of-state corporation. It lost 105 souls. 
Forty-eight hours after Hurricane Katrina (Category 4) passed through St. Bernard 
Parrish, Louisiana, St. Rita’s Nursing Home staff began floating patients through facility 
windows on top of mattresses (Alonzo-Zaldivar, 2012; Fink, 2013).   
Life Care at Memorial Hospital sheltered palliative care patients and was assumed to be 
safe from flood waters on the seventh floor. However, after five days of isolation, no electricity, 
minimal back-up generators, no water, no communications, and minimal staff; Life Care 
survivors began to lose hope. Speculation remains that some nursing home patients were 
inadvertently over-medicated by disaster response physicians who were unfamiliar with and 
prevented from accessing patient medical histories (Fink, 2013).  
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Court findings in both cases, further concluded two important points: 1) the public and 
the nursing home owners were not warned in time of the possibility of flooding, and 2) the Lake 
Ponchatrain levees were not maintained to acceptable standards by local authorities.  Thus, the 
St. Rita nursing home staff were exonerated because they relied upon their prior experiences of 
successfully sheltering in place through previous storms. As for the staff at Life Care, 
professional reputations were tarnished even though no formal charges were made against the 
surgeon that volunteered to assist patients languishing in the humidity without power for five 
days (Alonzo-Zaldivar, 2012; Florida Health Care Education and Development Foundation, 
2008).  
Even though these tragedies occurred in Louisiana, the escalating challenges of managing 
community-wide disasters continue across the nation. There remain public health service gaps 
during disasters, especially among nursing home patients. Because of the frailty of patients 
nursing homes are exempt from mandatory evacuations (Bascetta, 2006; Brown, et al., 2012; 
HHS OIG, 2012).  Contingency planning professionals continue to be proactive and rely upon 
emergency management principles for mitigating disaster losses from cascading events, while 
simultaneously coping with the increased frequency of declared national disasters and the 
unpredictability of human behavior (FEMA, 2011; Kovner & Knickman, 2008; Kroch, 
Champion, DeVore, et.al., 2012).   
The challenge of coordinating among three levels of government during a disaster creates 
unexpected problems when implementing response and recovery strategies. Sometimes the 
disaster is not wide-spread enough to involve higher levels of governmental authority. Problems 
begin with coordinating the timing of disaster declarations as events cascade out of the control. 
The bureaucratic lines of authority begin at the municipal level, then pass through state 
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authorities and when necessary, up to the federal level. The Federal Emergency Management 
Agency or FEMA reports to the President and therefore cannot activate until a formal request for 
assistance from a state governor is received and accepted by the President. By law, disasters are 
considered under local authority first. A federation structure such as the United States prevents 
state or national interventions without local declarations of emergency.  Therefore, emergency 
plans for nursing homes (NH) begin at the local level with strategies for coordinating additional 
disaster assistance, if needed. 
One way of overcoming layers of authoritative bureaucracy during a disaster is by having 
an adequate local plan design that is familiar to facility staff members and the local emergency 
responder agencies. A poorly designed plan can diminish the effectiveness of an organization’s 
ability to absorb, cope and recover from a disaster. Thus, an inadequate plan can create 
additional resiliency problems for a very complex organization. The complexity within a nursing 
home is determined by patient acuity and the severity of patient illnesses. Therefore, the 
emergency management plan effectiveness compensates for organizational complexity to 
provide quality of healthcare during less than optimal conditions. 
 Effectiveness of the plan guidelines are related to the NH staff’s familiarization with 
disaster policies that differ from routine policies. Richardson points out those social groups that 
share experiences include stakeholders and utilize feed-back loops of thought can learn from 
each other (Richardson, 1991). This “learned” efficiency within the healthcare system develops 
overtime among NH staff as they practice the NH emergency management plan during disaster 
exercises.  
This research study began by examining the emergency planning process between local 
and state policy levels. The units of analysis were skilled nursing facilities (SNF), specifically 
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nursing homes (NH) within the State of Florida. The exogenous variables from the unit of 
analysis were represented by Organizational Complexity, A.  The study treatment or intervention 
was the adequacy of the NH disaster plan or Plan Adequacy, B. The outcome measure was the 
NH’s capacity for disaster resiliency, C.  The NH was chosen as the unit of analysis, because 
NHs are subjected to three levels of legislative guidance: city/county; state; and national.   
Firstly, at the local level, nursing home licensing contracts require certificates of need, 
facility permits, and Life Safety Code or LSC inspections as part of the disaster plan review.  
Secondly, at the state level, nursing homes are mandated to meet the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid (CMS) reimbursement guidelines and adhere to Florida Statutes 252 and 59A of Title 
XXIX Public Health Chapter 400 Nursing Homes and Related Health Care Facilities. Lastly and 
thirdly, at the national level, the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) promotes the 
Code of Federal Regulations Title 42: Public Health, Chapter IV Section 483 for Long Term 
Care Facilities ( CFR 483) (GPO, 2015). 
Florida’s historical experience with natural disasters and the state’s popularity as a 
retirement destination provides a cultural mix of skilled nursing facilities and acute care clinics 
that have been exposed to the perils of hurricanes, wildfires, and related economic shifts 
(Bascetta, 2006; Council for Excellence in Government, 2006; Cowles Research Group, 2012; 
Dolan & Messen, 2012).   
In 2012, there were 679 licensed nursing homes in Florida that provided 81,657 beds with 
an 87.93% occupancy rate. That is approximately 71,753 nursing home residents (Florida, 2012) 
potentially requiring evacuation or sheltering in place during declared disasters. 
Whenever a disaster forecast mandates an evacuation order, nursing homes are exempt 
from complying due to the fragility and comorbidity of their patients (HHS OIG, 2006). Thus, 
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nursing home staff make decisions contingent upon four contextual elements: (1) available 
resources; (2) whether the nursing home is a network affiliate (i.e. member of a corporate 
healthcare system); (3) previous disaster experiences; and (4) imminence of the disaster. 
Healthcare and emergency managers are credited with providing the best possible 
response and recovery during disasters affecting their communities, recovery efforts remain 
contingent upon both sectors working closely together before, during, and long after a disaster. 
People are not expected to die from disaster related incidents. 
Performance measures for healthcare professionals and emergency managers are 
constrained on three governmental levels (local, state and national) within a federalist system by 
financial and regulatory legislation. The challenge to effective implementation of emergency 
management plans is to coordinate and collaborate through recognized mitigation performance 
measures.  Events over the previous decade have identified performance gaps between policy 
analysts, emergency planners and healthcare providers (Agranoff,  2003; Alonzo-Zaldivar, 2012; 
Brown, et al., 2009; CDC and PHPR, 2011).  
Emergency management plans consider all disasters as “local” and therefore disaster 
preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation efforts are initially contingent upon local 
response plans and local resources.  On the other hand, an adequate emergency management plan 
requires manpower, medical supplies and expenses that may never be regained. Therefore, local 
elected officials and public healthcare policy experts question the cost-effectiveness of an 
emergency management plan relative to the expense of providing continuous quality of care to 
disaster survivors. 
Popular media reports often illustrate, through anecdotal examples, a belief among 
citizens that some other outside agency or jurisdiction will “save the day.” Regardless, recent 
18 
 
events that strongly demonstrate that final outcomes rely heavily upon local preparation, local 
mitigation and local planning initiatives rather than reliance upon a cavalry-rescue approach 
from outside the impacted community (FEMA, 2012; National Council on Disability, 2007; 
Zinn, Mor, Feng, & Intrator, 2009).  More disaster research is needed to gain empirical evidence 
identifying methods for closing the planning gaps and improving disaster policies at all levels. 
Healthcare professionals are credited with providing the best possible patient care during 
the response and recovery phases of disasters affecting their community.  They demonstrate 
resiliency during day to day operations that lay the foundation for ingrained organizational 
resiliency that may be replicated in other sectors. The cascading affects during disasters add 
another dimension of urgency whenever planning resiliency performance. 
In 2005, property losses due to nationally declared disasters were over $115.4 billion 
dollars and totaled 1,256 disaster related deaths. Six years later the financial losses decreased to 
$23.8 billion with 1,019 dead (Hazards & Vulnerability Research Institute, 2012). Some scholars 
credit the successful implementation of emergency management plans, early activation notices 
for evacuations, and other local mitigation strategies for improving resiliency and for minimizing 
loss of lives and property (Kapucu, Augustin, & Garayev, 2009).  Thus, one may conclude there 
is a connection between pre-planning and disaster resiliency. 
Even though some communities pre-plan better than others, there remains concern about 
isolated segments that are more vulnerable than others (i.e. rural and shoreline areas).  For 
example, special focus facilities, centers for independent living, and long term care facilities 
located in coastal areas such as the Pacific (includes the states of Hawaii, Oregon, Washington, 
and California) and the Gulf States (includes the states of Texas, Louisiana, Alabama, Florida, 
19 
 
and Georgia) are more prone to natural disasters such as hurricanes. Other disaster vulnerabilities 
include wildfires, severe tropical storms, and tornadoes.  
Crises within the last decade, put California, Louisiana, and Florida as the top three states 
in the amount of damages caused by natural disasters.  These three states stand out because of 
their combination of high property values and densely settled populations that include higher 
percentages of the nation’s most vulnerable (i.e. elderly and frail) who will at some point be 
living in skilled nursing facilities (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2013a; Hazards & 
Vulnerability Research Institute, 2012). That is why the skilled nursing facility’s disaster plan is 
of significance to public health officials.  
The Health and Human Services’ Office of the Inspector General or OIG found that one 
year after Hurricane Katrina, there remained nationally, healthcare facility emergency plans that 
included less than full compliance with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services or CMS. 
Less than 20% of these facilities knew how to contact their respective disaster assistance 
agencies in 2005 (HHS OIG, 2006). In addition, some professionals speculated that prior to 
Katrina, the disaster plan review process of existing plans was cursorily done by inadequately 
trained reviewers. 
The OIG found that disaster plan surveyors were not trained to review emergency plans 
consistently and to a set standard.  Other than compliance for CMS reimbursement, there remains 
little accountability in the adequacy or effectiveness of NH disaster plans. Therefore, the NH 
emergency management plan review process is considered by a few public safety officials as too 
subjective for implementation.  A second concern is that each nursing home’s emergency and 
evacuation plan may or may not be fully tested prior to a disaster (Blake, Howard, Eiring, & 
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Tarde, 2012; CMS, 2013b; HHS OIG, 2006; Eiring, Blake, & Howard, 2012). Therefore, NH 
facilities remain vulnerable and potentially non-resilient without an adequate disaster plan. 
Some strategists believe the effectiveness of emergency management plans have overtime 
been diminished into a few pages of short, non-detailed bulleted descriptions in response to items 
outlined on the checklist.  Some emergency managers express frustration and concern that these 
plans are inadequate and the review process is merely a formality for new or renewing NH 
operating licenses (Brown, et al., 2009).   
Furthermore, there is speculation that the NH plans rely too heavily upon fire evacuation 
procedures and ignore other vulnerabilities.  The 1995 AHCA checklist or plan 
recommendations for nursing homes requires a fire evacuation plan per the Life Safety Codes 
(LSC) and a signed letter from the nursing home’s local Fire Chief.  Because, the LSC also 
requires a physical inspection of the nursing home facility every year, the fire inspection is 
considered by some emergency managers as adequate for all types of disasters. Never the less, 
others believe this is a narrow focus with limited technical knowledge of other types of hazards 
such as high winds and/or flash-flooding (CDC and PHPR, 2011). After all, fires are not the only 
impetus for nursing home evacuations. This concern requires additional attention especially 
when considering the political environment surrounding elderly care.  
Bassett (2006) testified before the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging that “hospital 
and nursing home administrators face challenges related to evacuations caused by hurricanes” (p. 
3). They must obtain specialized transportation that includes medical records and arranging a 
receiving facility with appropriate staffing and specialized services for functionally impaired 
patients (some with multiple morbidities).  As pointed out earlier in Chapter One, nursing home 
facilitators are exempted from following mandatory evacuations given by local government 
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because their residents may decompensate due to patient acuity. Thus, patients could 
unnecessarily suffer from the adverse rigors of transport to another facility. This is an important 
consideration in determining plan adequacy. 
Other considerations that demonstrate plan adequacy and/or resiliency for healthcare 
systems involve plan implementation, revenue, and resource distribution. Firstly, the plan 
implementation is an opportunity for the staff and administrator to identify decision triggers or 
when to evacuate their patients and when to notify emergency managers of the need to assist the 
nursing home with implementing the mutual aid agreements. On the other hand the plan 
implementation may not be practical when needed because the procedure relies upon weak 
agreements between the healthcare administrator and healthcare service providers or competing 
vendors.  
Secondly, revenue sources may be redistributed when evacuation and transportation 
agreements are enforced with other facilities and community vendors. When a client is 
transported to another location it can be extremely expensive based upon the degree of care and 
case management. For example, the patient’s physical and mental condition may diminish or the 
newer facility may encourage the patient to choose to remain instead of being transported again 
to the original nursing home after the disaster. 
Thirdly, in resource distribution, plan adequacy and NH resiliency can be managed by 
healthcare system administrators within an open system of inter-organizational agreements 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).  Emergency response resource sharing through collaborating 
networks demonstrates the capacity to build organizational resiliency within nursing homes.   
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2.1. Historical Overview of Contingency Theory and Research Literature 
Therefore, state legislative bodies created requirements for the emergency plan review 
process for public health and organizational safety.  For example, Florida Statute 252 Public 
Safety and Statute 59 Skilled Nursing Facility Administration (FL Statutes, 2012) outline public 
expectations and designated lines of authority. These polices and their place within the context of 
this study’s contingency research framework are discussed in more detail, later in this document. 
Decisions to implement the emergency plan are contingent upon staff experience from 
previous disasters or from disaster exercises where feedback loops of information are shared to 
improve future performance. Some scholars call this systems learning or systems theory, where 
the organization’s performance is described as open with vertical and horizontal sharing of 
knowledge within system functions (Richardson, 1991; Stevenson, 2012). 
 Knowledge sharing includes resource identification and training in how to most 
effectively use resources. In emergency management, resources are defined as logistical items 
that include trained personnel. In health care emergency management, resources include medical 
supplies, back-up power, and food as logistical items. So resource management is a key 
component of emergency management plan adequacy. Thus, two primary research aims were to 
first analyze the roles of the nursing homes’ organizational complexity within and without a 
healthcare system and secondly analyze the emergency planning process for managing disaster 
resources. 
The system of stakeholders in the NH community that provide direct health care services 
include professionally licensed employees (i.e., Registered Nurses and Licensed Practical 
Nurses) and certified paraprofessionals (i.e., Certified Nursing Assistants).  Thus, feedback from 
stakeholders may be critical to the practicality of NH disaster plans and economic survival. Some 
scholars contend that the emergency management process operates under a social learning frame 
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and that there are multiple layers of influences (both vertical and horizontal) that induce 
plausible explanations for individual and public behaviors. For example, some social resistance 
or “perceived barriers” exist among people that do not understand the consequences of a disaster 
or who need assistance when plans do not provide adequate guidance during disasters  (Eiring, 
Blake, & Howard, 2012; Oetjen, et. al., 2012; Morse, et.al, 2006; Rivera & Settembrino, 2012; 
Zinn, Mor, Feng, & Intrator, 2009). Staff considerations and knowledge of the organization’s 
disaster plan affect performance outcomes.   
Previous research has also, confirmed that employees will first take care of personal 
needs and family members before reporting to work or possibly, not report for duty at all, during 
disaster conditions (Council for Excellence in Government, 2006; Community Preparedness 
Division, 2011, p. 16).  If the nursing home staff is expected to implement a plan that does not 
include their family concerns and/or is too physically demanding to follow, then the likelihood of 
the plan’s success may be compromised. Therefore the strength of the nursing home’s resiliency 
performance during an actual disaster is dependent upon staff considerations.  
Staff members are significant to nursing home resiliency because of their direct influence 
in the implementation of consistent quality of care for the patients.  The core competencies of the 
nursing home staff contribute to organizational complexity because the workforce can be 
categorized into four skill sets: direct care, administration, service personnel, and other workers. 
Core competencies are also significant to resiliency as staff KSAs become tested during the 
disaster environment. Thus the importance of recognizing the plan’s dependence upon each 
category of skills within the context of the organization. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) proposes a “Whole Community” 
stakeholder concept in the emergency planning process to prevent collaboration gaps such as 
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miscommunication or misunderstanding of responsibilities within the disaster community. This 
concept can be applied to the structural organization of the nursing home environment. Since, 
FEMA recommends including an all levels of leadership approach to planning and mitigating 
disaster performances, then nursing home emergency plans are also expected to include all levels 
of leadership because the forgotten staff member could be the weakest component in 
strengthening resiliency. 
Specifically, the inclusion of every stakeholder into each phase of the emergency 
management process, especially in the preparedness planning phase has proven to be the best 
practice. Some policy analysts suggest planning sessions within a healthcare network that also 
includes personal emergency planning for personnel and their families during a disaster. This 
active inclusion has been demonstrated to successfully build and strengthen community 
resiliency for other populations (Council for Excellence in Government, 2006; FEMA, 2009a; 
National Organization on Disability, 2009a). 
Whenever designing an emergency management plan, nursing home administrators are 
encouraged by the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) to include employee 
contingency planning into their facility’s emergency management plan. Citizen surveys after 
Hurricane Katrina (the second most costly U.S. natural disaster to date, after Super Storm Sandy) 
revealed that 45% of businesses did not have contingency plans for employees and important 
personnel (i.e. security officers and first responders) abandoned their assignments to take care of 
family needs (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011, p. 12). Therefore, most disaster 
experts propose that all employee stakeholders and their families be included in the emergency 
plan as an internal network of resources. 
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Network theorists understand the importance of sharing emergency resources internally, 
externally, and across agencies, especially within non-profits (Gazley & Brudney, 2007; ICMA, 
2007).  Collaborative efforts among healthcare networks within the height of a disaster are the 
basis for effective emergency management through collaboration guidelines designed from 
multiple levels. These guidelines come in the form of a disaster plan with the goal of determining 
strategies for tough decisions. These decisions might be to evacuate or to remain in place during 
and immediately after a disaster (i.e. roof damage, power outage, or water encroachment). 
The rationale for choosing to shelter in place versus evacuation is contingent upon three 
determinants: (1) patient acuity, (2) timeline and (3) resources.  First, will each patient need 
assistance from more than one staff member?  Second, how long will it take to gather enough 
staff and supplies to evacuate patients?  Third, is there an alternate facility large enough to 
accommodate the evacuated patients? All three concerns involve transportation needs. 
 Other considerations include transporting patients and supplies whenever routine travel 
and delivery routes are blocked by disaster debris. Also, is there enough back-up power available 
during the disruption of utility services? How long will patients suffer when the facility is 
isolated or without power? Are enough transport vehicles available to accommodate all of the 
patients, their respective caregivers, and relevant patient records plus medical supplies? Will 
there be enough beds available in the alternate receiving facility?  Emergent staff and patient 
behavior will likely need leadership familiar with the disaster plan. 
Many disaster sociologists and organizational psychologists utilize leadership concepts 
designed by Fred Fiedler to examine human and organizational behavior.  Prior to Fiedler, 
analysts researched only human traits and personalities (Ashby, 2007).  Fiedler postulated that 
leadership styles and learned behaviors can create performance effectiveness within an 
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environment. However, the degree of complexity and stressfulness creates the need for 
controlling a situation through leadership. Two measures are important in Fiedler’s model: 
context and task orientation. Some still use the scale designed by Fiedler to measure leadership 
effectiveness. Criticisms of Fiedler’s task measurement (Least Preferred Coworker) scale 
contend that it is inaccurate when measuring leaders’ interpersonal feelings and it provides 
inflexible solutions.   
On the other hand, proponents of Fiedler’s scale believe it works well for leadership 
effectiveness measurement within the context of disasters (Agranoff, 2003). They assume the 
disaster response is task oriented and that survivors are unfamiliar with emergent volunteer 
responders. Fiedler contends a natural leader will arise from the disaster environment and 
organize the chaos using innate skills.  
However, this may not always be the most effective or efficient way of handling a 
situation, especially without appropriate training to the tasks, as during the 1983 earthquake in 
Mexico City. 
In 1983, 113 volunteers died from injuries they received while responding to an 
earthquake. Emergent volunteers working frantically among strangers in a debris field, did not 
coordinate tasks well. Thus, endangering themselves and increasing the number of casualties. 
From that single event came the idea for a community-wide civilian training program. The 
Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) or neighbor helping neighbor concept was 
formalized in 1987 in Los Angeles, California by the fire department (FEMA, 2011). CERT is 
designed for developing community disaster leaders and for training volunteers their task 
assignments prior to working together during emergencies. Trained volunteers lead other 
volunteers. Some disaster contingency scholars think human capabilities are measured within the 
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context of managing resources inside a stress filled environment. CERT is an example of a shift 
in contingency theory by replacing Fiedler’s weak measurement scale of Least Preferred Worker 
(LPC) (untrained and unknowledgeable) with a trained professional volunteer. Public health 
managers and NH administrators can, also, be trained in emergency management contingencies. 
In 2008, another transformation in the health field entailed a recommitment to “transcend 
complexity” through the ten steps of systems thinking (WHO, 2009, p. 33). This required an 
indepth comprehension of each element within the relationships that make a system. One 
relationship is that of Emergency Management (EM) as a disaster planning partner of healthcare 
providers. The EM sector already plans interventions with system wide outcomes, because EM is 
a network partner in risk aversion.   
Healthcare systems benefit from shared information and emergency plans that promote 
continuity of operations following a disaster. Stakeholder buy-in and joint emergency planning 
increase the likelihood a disaster plan will be followed and therefore overcomes limitations of a 
traditional approach. Systems thinking allows EM plans to become useful tools in maintaining 
patient care during all types of complex disasters because they save time and task redundancy 
through simplification of priorities and flexible systems thinking (Richardson, 1991).  
One demonstration of a “flexible and responsive cause and effect” decision process is 
also based upon pre-identified criteria of internal and external considerations or systems 
thinking. This contingency theory based model is redrawn in Figure 2 from the National Criteria 
for Evacuation Decision-Making in Nursing Homes (Florida Health Care Association, 2009, p. 
2).   
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Source: National Criteria for Evacuation Decision-Making in Nursing Homes 
(Florida Health Care Association, Florida Health Care Education and Development Foundation, 2009, p.2) 
 
Figure 3: National Criteria for Decision to Evacuate or Shelter in Place 
 
A strong disaster response network requires collaboration to be successful.  Some 
scholars point out the importance of both vertical and horizontal relationships in managing 
complex disasters effectively. High organizational performance is equivalent with high 
organizational resiliency and the capacity to respond quickly to restore organizations back to a 
previous level of operations (Kapucu, Arslan, & Demiroz, 2010). The network collaboration 
components provide opportunities to share knowledge and disaster experience as well as material 
goods. This collaboration can extend to all levels of government. Florida nursing homes not only 
have access to resources provided by their local network of healthcare systems, there are national 
organizations wishing to collaborate through other network collaboration research.  
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2.1.1. Complexity Component of Contingency Theory 
Healthcare professionals evaluate the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) of their 
staff as core competencies within three tiers of responsibility. These competencies are proven by 
Fielder’s complexity theory requirements for situation and task orientation measurements. In this 
study, these competencies were compressed into three elements of organization complexity 
based upon relevant correlations: patient acuity, workload, and administrative strengths. These 
competency sets are discipline specific and apply to front line staff as well as supervisory 
positions in the healthcare field. Occasionally, this is referred to as a medical model for 
complexity. 
The Institute of Medicine’s report The Future of Public Health introduced the idea of an 
“ecological model of public health” and included a recommendation for teaching leadership 
management skills. That report led to a 2003 Institute of Medicine study Who Will Keep the 
Public Healthy? Educating public health professionals for the 21st Century.  The study focused 
on five areas: epidemiology, biostatistics, environmental health, heath services administration, 
and social behavioral sciences (Council on Linkages, 2012). 
  Also, the IOM recommends that healthcare professionals incorporate the public health 
ecological model into areas of communication, policy, and thus create a culture of competence 
through staff retention and professional development. That recommendation led to eight core 
competencies used today by health care professionals to evaluate their workforce and training 
programs.  These eight core competencies were identified by nineteen members of the Council 
on Linkages between Academia and Public Health Practice (Public Health Foundation, 2013).  
The eight core competencies for public healthcare professionals are: 1) 
analytic/assessment skills, 2) policy development/program planning skills, 3) communication 
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skills, 4) cultural competency skills, 5) community dimensions of practice skills, 6) public health 
sciences skills, 7) financial planning and management skills, and 8) leadership and systems 
thinking skills. These skills are measured in each of three levels of accountability or position 
“tiers” (Council on Linkages, 2010). 
 These core competencies are also important to nursing homes as they pertain to 
emergency management objectives.  For example, a cultural competency skill (item four in the 
above paragraph) prevents discrimination when implementing an emergency management plan 
among fifty-seven self-identified race combinations.  
Among researchers, it is accepted that race be defined as a group of physical 
characteristics, while culture is an accumulation of learned behaviors, personal development, and 
mores. Ethnicity, on the other hand is the self-identified origin of a person. Sometimes the 
literature interchanges the term race with ethnicity as a cultural identity and this creates 
confusion for research analysts. This is a problem, whenever collecting information from more 
than one data source. Therefore, race and ethnicity are considered by the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) apart from cultural identification (Humes, Jones, & Ramirez, 2011, p. 2). 
The federal government recognizes only two ethnicities: Hispanic and Non-Hispanic  (United 
States Census Bureau, 2010). Nevertheless, access to healthcare during disasters remains 
equitable acorss racial, ethinic, and cultural barriers. The challenge comes when emergency 
management agencies attempt to identify who needs help. 
During the 2004 hurricane season, survivors identified as Hispanic demonstrated 
reluctance in requesting and accepting disaster assistance. This particular social dynamic was 
demonstrated in an analysis of Puerto Ricans who survived a natural disaster.  The level of 
personal discomfort in requesting and receiving disaster assistance from others formulated 
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emergent disaster response behaviors within this ethnic group (Rivera, 2012; Rivera & 
Settembrino, 2012).  Head of households did not wish to be seen as weak or unable to provide 
for their families. They refrained from reaching out for disaster assistance after three hurricanes 
came inland to Central Florida. This was an example of how difficult it is to quantify resiliency 
performances within some healthcare environments, because of cultural perceptions and attitudes 
of emergency personnel.   
Therefore, ethnicity dynamics within organizational complexity as defined by the nursing 
home context affects plan adequacy and nursing home resiliency.  Aggregate ethnicity data are 
available at the community level and not at the nursing home level. However, an estimated break 
down of Florida’s cultural diversity provides a demonstration of emergency managements 
challenges in reaching out to 24% of the state population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013). See 
Figure 3 Florida Cultural Diversity. 
 
 
Figure 4: Florida Cultural Diversity 
 
Florida is comparatively dense with a population of 350.6 persons per square mile.  Of 
19.5 million Florida residents approximately 18.7 percent are over 65 years of age and 
approximately 2.1% of that population are over 85 years old.  The Disability & Health Data 
System approximates 33.9 % of this age group live in Florida with one or more disabilities 
Hispanic 24%
White 55.7%
Asian 3%
Black 17%
Native American .3%
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(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014).  See Appendix B: Disability Status 
Overview. Previous studies of NH complexity reveal that the majority of NH patients are elderly 
females (RTI Insitute, 2012). This may be due to longevity across genders.  The percentage of 
elderly females (both Black and White) in Florida exceeded the national percentage.  See Table 3 
for Demographics and Geography of Florida and USA. 
 
Table 2: Demographics and Geography of Florida and USA 
 Florida USA 
Population, 2013 estimate 19,552,860 316,128,839 
Persons 65 years and over, percent, 
2013 
18.70% 14.10% 
Female persons, percent, 2013 51.10% 50.80% 
White alone, percent, 2013 (a) 78.10% 77.70% 
Black or African American alone, 
percent, 2013 (a) 
16.70% 13.20% 
American Indian and Alaska Native 
alone, percent, 2013 (a) 
0.50% 1.20% 
Asian alone, percent, 2013 (a) 2.70% 5.30% 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific 
Islander alone, percent, 2013 (a) 
0.10% 0.20% 
Two or More Races, percent, 2013 1.90% 2.40% 
Hispanic or Latino, percent, 2013 (b) 23.60% 17.10% 
White alone, not Hispanic or Latino, 
percent, 2013 
56.40% 62.60% 
   
Land area in square miles, 2010 53,624.76 3,531,905.43 
Persons per square mile, 2010 350.60 87.40 
FIPS Code 12  
(a) Includes persons reporting only one race.   
(b) Hispanics may be of any race, so also are included in applicable race categories 
Source: http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12000.html 
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2.1.2. Resource Dependency Component of Contingency Theory  
Researchers believe resource dependency theory among network partners may generate 
potential strengths that can create additional sustainability opportunities for the nursing homes’ 
network agents. Overtime and with increased familiarity with the principles of disaster resource 
management, NHs can restructure their resiliency capacity, especially in the area of resource 
management. 
Nursing home (NH) leadership initiates a disaster plan, then authorizes disaster revenue, 
that pays for and distributes available resources. Some scholars call this series of activities plan 
implementation. Thus resource dependency as a contingency theory ultimately identifies those 
revenue resource variables that influence leadership decisions. Identifying appropriate and 
adequate resources is significant for designing effective response activities and to sustain long 
term recovery procedures that develop into NH resiliency (Alexander, et al., 2010; Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Kapucu, Augustin, & Garayev, 2009; Kroch, et. al., 2012; National Council on 
Disability, 2007).   
Other emergency plan integrity factors are evacuation and/or shelter in place items 
required by AHCA such as: the frequency of staff disaster training; planned notifications to 
patient family members during times of a disaster; employee hotline; financial reserves; 
medication reserves; and mutual aid agreements to procure additional resources such as 
specialized transportation and facility arrangements for an alternate shelter.  This concept of 
resiliency is an adaptive process for vulnerability assessment and for identifying available 
resources needed for recovery (Agranoff, 2003; Council on Linkages, 2012; Cutter, et al., 2008).  
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2.1.3. Systems Learning Component of Contingency Theory 
As discussed earlier, the theory of systems learning is demonstrated by nursing homes 
when causal factors are considered in emergency plans. Systems learning or systems thinking is 
the theory that resiliency can be taught as a ten or more step system. Some resiliency scholars 
observed among school children that resiliency techniques can be learned through shared 
experiences (Sandfort, Selden, & Sowa, 2008). These findings can be generalized to an adult 
population of employees and patients within a nursing home environment. Systems learning can 
be used to effectively design resiliency strategies (HHS OIG, 2006; FHCA, 2009; WHO, 2009).  
Emergency managers use similar planning principals during all four disaster management 
phases  (Drabek & McEntire, 2002; FEMA, 2012). One of the outcomes of systems learning for 
emergencies is the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Common terminology and 
system definitions can be taught to any and all emergency response practitioners. Using 
resiliency tools such as NIMS can curtail misunderstandings whenever emergency managers and 
nursing home administrators collaborate across disciplines. NIMS accommodates the four 
cyclical phases of emergency management.  
Systems learning goes beyond cause and effects, it also teaches partners how to work 
more efficiently across units. The two cultures of healthcare and emergency management can be 
brought together in one unified system with a plan of common objectives using common 
terminology. Common language that crosses cultural barriers is important because organizations 
that insist upon their own internal communications may feel excluded and thus isolated from 
other groups among the disaster response network (Waugh, 2003). EM planning becomes more 
intuitive by using systems learning combined with resource dependency in managing complex 
disasters for complex organizations. For example the use of the National Incident Management 
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System (NIMS) as common language and universal principles (i.e. chain of authority) to shift 
traditional paradigms across cultures such as public health, law enforcement, fire suppression, 
and local politics. 
Even though it has only been around since 2002, this system is composed of two proven 
concepts that are effectively used during disasters: incident command structure (ICS) and tactical 
support terminology (i.e. TYPE I, II, III, or IV).  
Components from organizational systems that are important to contingency planning 
come together to provide a common working language and common disaster task assignments. 
These management principles were gathered from across collaborating networks , such as the 
forestry and wildfire service, the military, public health, and fire departments, that traditionally 
respond to wide spread emergencies. One of the most important principles in NIMS is the ability 
to assign appropriate resources into action using tactical support terminology. 
For example, the term ambulance can mean different things to different groups so the 
capabilities of the ambulance are distinguished by Type and capability Level in NIMS.  In other 
words a Type I  ambulance has less capability than a Type II because it may have only a 
paramedic while the Type II carries a registered nurse.  Thus, systems learning allows diverse 
members within multiple agencies within a network, to understand each other’s rationale in 
contingency plans.  
This systematic collaboration is vital to what Richardson describes as maintaining “social 
homeostasis” during times of chaos (Richardson, 1991, p. 52).  The systems learning feedback 
loop allows for systematically streamlining and prioritizing disaster dynamics through plan 
adequacy.  
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Thus the plan becomes a more useful tool in maintaining the quality of patient care 
during all types of disasters, especially across emergency response cultures. The two cultures of 
healthcare and emergency management can be brought together into one unified plan of common 
objectives with common terminology. Common language crosses cultural barriers and 
organizations that insist upon their own internal communications may feel excluded and isolated 
from other groups. There needs to be adequate planning among the disaster response network 
that includes both NH and EM (Waugh, 2003). A common communication language between 
NH personnel and public safety responders may have prevented the misstep in turning away 
rescue helicopters as described by Sheri Fink in her book, “Five Days at Memorial” (Fink, 2013). 
Fink’s interviews with the Coast Guard pilots sent to rescue patients from hospital roofs revealed 
the confusion created by inappropriate hand movements from staff untrained in aviation signals. 
Healthcare systems can benefit from other forms of shared information as emergency 
plans promote continuity of operations (i.e. uninterrupted patient care) following a disaster. 
Systems learning proves the idea that NH staff share technical expertise during joint planning 
opportunities with other NH staff, NH administrators, and NH owners.  Other stakeholders that 
need to be included in the joint planning are the local emergency managers (EM). 
Stakeholder buy-in and joint emergency planning increase the likelihood a disaster plan 
needs feedback from disaster staff that are familiar with written disaster procedures. Therefore 
the emergency management plan becomes a living document of frequent updates as new 
knowledge is acquired and shared. More terminology and definitions common to both 
emergency managers and NH administrators can enable each to understand the other’s capacity 
for future rescue collaborations. Once that is identified, then one can begin to quantify degrees of 
readiness in the form of collaboration capacity.  
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In other words, the plan review process uses a feedback loop between healthcare and 
emergency managers as a systems thinking tool that enhances plan adequacy along with network 
collaboration. Multidisciplinary systems thinking creates better outcomes during opportunities 
for network collaborations. 
2.1.4. Network Collaboration Component of Contingency Theory  
Recent literature suggests that problems between healthcare facility administration and 
emergency management responders include multiple interagency challenges that hinder effective 
coordination, communication, and collaboration before, during and after a disaster (Gazley & 
Brudney, 2007). Network Collaboration is significant to nursing home resiliency as disaster 
recovery and the sustainability of the nursing home uses additional resources and operational 
knowledge during actual crises. Some scholars consider network stability is derived from 
sustained internal relationships among sub-networks of collaboration and mandatory network 
collaboration does not need to be funded by partners outside of the network (Agranoff & 
McGuire, 2004; Gazley, 2008).  Multiple reports from all three levels of government (local, 
state, and national) confirm the need for better emergency management planning that emphasizes 
shared financial responsibilities and accurate communication of disaster needs across disciplines.   
Disaster resiliency may be contingent upon federal, state, and local partnerships as seen 
through mandatory collaborations within a network of other healthcare providers and emergency 
management agencies. The measurement of that collaboration capacity begins with a 
measurement of the factors affecting resiliency capacity or the disaster recovery performances.  
The measurement of collaboration capacity within network theory can be demonstrated as factors 
for NH resiliency: caregiver to travel with patients during evacuations (TRAVCAREGIVER), 
the estimated travel time needed to evacuate patients (TRAVTIME), procedures for contacting 
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network partners (ESSPROC) and network membership in the Emergency Services Status 
network (ESS).  These factors have been identified by other research projects as potential 
indicators of resiliency derived from healthcare and emergency management network affiliations 
(Institute of Medicine, 2009; National Research Council & Geographical Science Committee, 
2011).   
Because interagency collaboration is so vital to public health and safety, Florida Statute 
252 was written to establish collaboration between county emergency management agencies and 
healthcare facilities in emergency management planning. Florida Statutes 58 and 59 provide 
specific criteria for Skilled Nursing Facility emergency plans (Florida Senate, 2011; Florida 
Statutes, 2012; ICMA, 2007).  Since legislation is so stringent for nursing homes, some 
professionals believe the NH leadership’s emergency planning policies can guide future 
management practices for all units of a healthcare system (Florida Health Care Education and 
Development Foundation, 2008).   
2.1.5. Routine Networks and Disaster Response Networks 
Research literature of healthcare facility emergency management plans and the 
administration networks that implement those plans does not demonstrate specific professional 
network development. Written agreements of mutual understanding formalize the network. More 
research is needed regarding the direct correlation between informal healthcare networks and 
formal requirements (i.e. legislation for facility certification) for an emergency plan in healthcare 
facilities and systems. On the other hand, nursing home administrators discuss the importance of 
their role as leaders and contingency plan designers as well as risk managers. These leadership 
skills become part of the emergency management plan process for healthcare facilities 
(American College of Healthcare Executives, 2013).  
39 
 
 
The formal or authorized healthcare leaders may have initial “command or control” in 
writing the emergency plans however the coordination of vendor contracts and mutual 
agreements with other facilities may have to rely upon informal collaborations built upon social 
capital and trust built over time and through prior experience.   
There is an assumption that competition for clients rule disaster policy and the decisions 
to evacuate or to shelter in place. 
Could this be the result of healthcare administrators remaining within a vertical silo when 
planning for disasters? Are there unrealistic expectations that having a plan is adequate to meet 
any disaster? There are missing components such as emergency response training and regular 
exercising of or practicing the emergency plan. Will implementation with network partners work 
prior to a disaster? There could be lack of horizontal networking across agencies or missing 
collaborations with vital organizations such as the local chapter of the American Red Cross and 
local emergency managers.  
More research is needed regarding the possibility that healthcare facility emergency 
planners working within a normal network still need to consider how and when to change the 
normal network into the disaster response network while using the same resources.  
Five differences between routine networks and the disaster response networks are in the 
type of leadership, funding sources, the scale of the network mission (or disaster complexity), 
how resources are managed and the degree of sharing information.  Routine networks share 
information informally and use available resources as collaborations among network partners.  
A routine network leader is chosen from within the network based upon proven skills or 
access to needed resources. The network mission that brings the routine network together is a 
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manageable commonality among interdependent network members. The routine network may 
transform into a disaster response when a formal declaration and formal leader is authorized to 
manage an extreme situation.  
All together these five measures comprise what motivates collaboration among network 
partners. For example FEMA launched its Project Impact 1997 series of disaster resistant 
community workshops to mitigate loss of lives and property while the Institute for Business and 
Home Safety generated new business for the Blue Sky Foundation’s fortified home program and 
other network partners providing local, state, and federal public education programs in building 
safety construction. In all fairness, not only were these network partners motivated by funding 
sources they were also encouraged by recognition from other agencies.  
In some cases, the same agency would be collaborating formally and informally among 
other organizations that they ordinarily would not have been associated with outside the common 
mission of disaster response and mitigation (Waugh, 2003; Waugh & Strieb, 2006). 
Not all routine networks qualify as a potential disaster response network, however, 
disaster response networks may operate as a normal network prior to a disaster. See Table 2 for a 
concept matrix of the characteristics of these networks. 
  
Table 3: Routine Networks and Disaster Response Networks 
 
Measure Description Routine network Disaster response 
Leadership Type Informal Formal 
Funding  Source Availability dependent Government Reimbursements 
Complexity Scope  Manageable mission Extreme threat to life and property 
Management Resources Collaboration Procedures and formal processes 
Communications Info Sharing Informal Formal Declaration 
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Besides the difference in types of leadership between routine and disaster response 
networks there is a difference in the way effective leadership is developed. Some routine 
network leaders may be formal or informally determined by the amount of influence they have 
over the network’s resources and the internal coordination activities among network partners 
selecting their leadership. 
However, in disaster response networks, leadership may occur in the form of authorized 
command with a formalized hierarchal structure.  A disaster response network stresses 
accountability in the selection process of leadership. For example, when the 9/11 Commission 
and House Select Committee investigated Hurricane Katrina’s poor performance. This 
committee placed the root cause for the poor emergency response at the feet of the 2005 disaster 
response network leadership at all levels of government. 
 Also, there seemed an unwillingness to initiate any action even when imperfect weather 
predictions and a 2003 Army Corps of Engineers vulnerability assessment pointed out the 
fragility of the Ponchatrain levees. The committee found elected officials failed to adapt existing 
plans while Hurricane Katrina developed offshore in the Gulf of Mexico. So lessons learned 
from the 9/11 emergency response were forgotten and not applied in managing response 
strategies.  
Even though a comprehensive emergency management framework provides room for 
collaboration in hard mitigation there remained a lack of leadership in understanding how to 
braid together disaster recovery and response missions into a flexible and adaptive plan. Waugh 
and Strieb (2006) speculate there was lack of good information sharing or lack of leadership 
coordination that led to a “lack of imagination” and “failure of initiative.”  
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Leadership in the Department of Homeland Security emergency management network 
may be too dependent upon its command and control structure. Perhaps Charles Wise as cited by 
Waugh and Strieb (2006) is correct and the Domestic Homeland Security processes could be 
more flexible in sharing information across agencies thus stimulating more collaboration and 
creating an atmosphere of adaptive management. Adaptive management provides opportunity for 
organizational learning and network improvisation. 
The nursing home emergency management process often appears well thought out on 
paper, yet the plan could actually be too weak to be effective whenever needed. Therefore, the 
reliance upon CEMPs as the only measurement may be inadequate to give a worthwhile study of 
a nursing home’s resiliency.  
Another concern associated with depending upon CEMPs outside an established network 
is the expectation that one or the other tool is not necessary for disaster recovery. After action 
reports from famous disasters such as Hurricane Katrina prove the idea of a “disconnect” or false 
assumption that nursing home emergency management plans alone are sufficient to provide 
adequate services to clients during and after disasters. 
Successful nursing homes may need to be involved in a participatory network that is 
flexible within its structure and adaptable to changes in membership. Thus, a network analysis 
provides an additional measurement tool that may reflect the potential for collaboration capacity 
building and another perspective of community resiliency. 
Nursing homes share an internal network within a healthcare system or corporation. 
However, some nursing homes are stand-alone and need to find collaboration partners thorough 
an external network. So an online system of healthcare partners was created to share resources 
during disasters; the Emergency Status System (ESS). 
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This member network is the collaboration or affiliation indicator for this study. The ESS 
is used real-time before an anticipated disaster and during the response phase. Nursing home 
administrators choose to become members of the ESS and activate their online account to locate 
available facilities or extend assistance to other members. For example, one nursing home may 
have ten empty beds available to receive patients from another facility that is damaged and needs 
to transfer some patients. 
2.2. Research Literature Specific to Resiliency 
The terms resilient, resiliency, and resilience may have originated during the Roman 
Empire from the Latin word resilio.  In the biological sciences a plant is considered to be 
resilient when it continues to grow after being cut back, trampled on, or subjected to other 
adverse conditions such severe weather (drought or hard freeze).  
Overtime social scientists began to resiliency to describe the ability of individuals and 
organizations to overcome adversity, economic hardship, or environmental disruptions. 
Similarly, resiliency is used in the public administration of emergency management to describe 
the absorption of damage, recovery from adversity, and the ability to continue as before or to 
improve after a change in circumstances (de Bruijne, Boin, & van Eeten, 2010; Wachtendorf & 
Kendra, 2004; Waugh, 2011).  
Resilience is understood by some professionals as the ability of individuals and 
communities to recover quickly from the physical and economic damages of a manmade or 
natural disaster.  Resilience also describes organizations, communities, cultures and any other 
arrangement of individuals with the potential to survive adverse situations. In order to measure 
something such as resiliency, it must first be defined within a range of possibilities (Cutter, et al., 
2008).  For example, a nursing home facility’s staff resiliency may be defined by the amount of 
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adaptability demonstrated through modified knowledge, skills, and attitudes (KSAs).  These 
modified KSAs can be seen in the decision to shelter in place and/or to evacuate. 
Some experts believe resiliency is strengthened through community education projects 
and building code implementation (Comfort, 2012).  However, there does not seem to be an 
agreed upon framework or methodology for measuring private-public or community resiliency 
(CPPSC, 2011), particularly within ethnicities and cultural communities. 
Some researchers consider performance outcomes as qualitative measures for resiliency 
in nursing homes (Hyer, Brown, Berman, & Polivka-West, 2006; Thomas, et al.,  2012; Thomas, 
Hyer, Castle, Branch, Andel, & Weech-Maldonado, 2012).  There are other examples of people 
being self-reliant upon their own experience rather than someone else’s plan.  
In some cultures, requests for assistance are viewed as admission of weakness or failure 
and actions follow belief systems, so will fatigued nursing staff ask for help after long hours 
working a disaster when their ethnic inclination is to “tough it out” (Kapucu, 2009; Rivera F. , 
2012; Rivera & Settembrino, 2012).  Additionally, there appears to be no empirical explanation 
for an administration’s determination when to move patients into another facility, except that it is 
perhaps due to subjective judgment and the decision maker’s attitude towards risk aversion 
(Council for Excellence in Government, 2006; Mileti, 2009).  
To help with the decision process, in 1994, the Agency for Health Care Administration 
designed a “checklist” for nursing home emergency management plans. That checklist is still 
used today by some but not all nursing homes. The list recommends separate written agreements 
for each disaster resource provider. However, these agreements may not be enforceable during a 
disaster. Also, small communities share the same vendors and services may not be available 
during community-wide disasters. 
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This creates the potential for conflict among NH plans that rely upon the same providers. 
Disaster service demands from multiple NHs can overwhelm resource providers while also 
creating a surge in NH services. Additional complexity ensue whenever both sectors are 
simultaneously delivering relief and supplies (i.e. alternate facility, additional staff, ambulance 
service, durable medical equipment, and prescription medicines) to multiple NHs affected by a 
disaster.  
Consider that if NH disaster plans include memorandums of agreement among the same 
pool of resource providers then supply and demand become incongruent and the agreements 
unenforceable. For example, more than one NH contract can overload available local resources 
such as durable medical equipment (DME); special needs case managers; supplemental disaster 
staff; qualified ambulance drivers; dietary suppliers; and other public safety response services 
(i.e. Police, Fire, and EMS).  
However, within the context of this study, the profit status and system or non-system 
affiliation directly affects the endogenous latent construct “nursing home resilience.”  If the NH 
is affiliated with a for-profit system (corporation), then there may be additional resources and 
economic resources available from outside the disaster area (i.e. corporate system vendor 
contracts in another county). 
The significance of belonging to a corporation may not guarantee that a NH 
administration will implement the disaster plan as designed by “out of area” leadership. Facility 
staff knowledge and understanding of procedures for emergency resource management is crucial 
to success. Employees respond to a disaster per their interpretation of the procedures outlined in 
their NH plan. This sociological perspective affects resiliency (Alexander, et al., 2010; Fink, 
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2013; FHCA, 2009; Rivera & Settembrino, 2012). So the plan design process is correlated to the 
facilty owenership. 
This study examined the correlations between the NH organizational variables that 
indirectly affect the adequacy of the plan design (Kapucu, Hawkins, & Rivera, 2013; Weech-
Maldonado, et al., 2012).  
As the healthcare system became more complex two planning design tools were created: 
The National Criteria for Decision Making in Nursing Homes (Florida Health Care Education 
and Development Foundation, 2008) and the Emergency Management Guide for Nursing Homes 
(Florida Health Care Association, 2009).  Also, as an assessment and accountability process, the 
Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) have guidelines for patient care and 
legislative compliance for reimbursement (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2013).  
Future emergency management professionals, community leaders and nursing home 
administrators have to consider these legislative and financial drivers along with their other 
changing roles in society that influence how they collaborate on nursing home emergency plans. 
They also work together within a context of decreased predictability and increased service 
expectations from varying ethnic groups at the risk of diminished healthcare due to a rapid 
occurring disaster and its cascading effects (FEMA, 2012; Mileti, 2009; Wachtendorf & Kendra, 
2004).  
Recent restructuring of healthcare delivery systems has encouraged an interest in the 
Performances Management Movement because of the debate around what defines quality of 
care.  Some scholars assess Quality of Care by four effectiveness measurements: management 
capacity, management performances, program capacity and program performances.  
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Four characteristics of the performances movement are “greater reliance on standards and 
guidelines; routine and systematic interval measures of patient function and well-being…pooled 
clinical and performance data, and appropriate results from the data base analyzed and 
disseminated to meet the concerns of each decision maker” (American College of Emergency 
Physicians, 2012, p. 2).  
In 2009, the Center for Disease Control financed a study conducted through the Emory 
Rollins Preparedness and Emergency Response Research Center. The survey of 27 nursing home 
administrators in California, Florida, and Georgia found that local emergency management 
agencies had less influence on the resiliency planning for nursing homes than the local fire and 
law enforcement. Of those nursing homes surveyed, 64% exercised their disaster plans twice or 
more times a year without participation from their local emergency management agency (Eiring, 
Blake, & Howard, 2012).  These findings reconfirmed what the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) found in their 2006 study of nursing home failures during the 2005 
Hurricane Katrina evacuations.  
Five years after the OIG’s initial findings it stated that the plans remained inadequate 
with some of the previously identified disaster preparedness and response concerns. Nursing 
home plans and disaster response procedures “lack relevant information,” and have “unreliable 
transportation contracts, negative effects on residents, and lack of collaboration with local 
emergency management” (HHS OIG, 2012, p. 22 ). Where were the gaps in the emergency 
management planning process? 
The emergency management process has four elements in the preparedness cycle 
described as: planning, response, recovery, and mitigation. This cycle is ongoing throughout the 
life of an organization and therefore can have overlapping activities.  Never the less each element 
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requires an amount of collaboration between the nursing home and its disaster resiliency 
partners. This collaboration is through written agreements of understanding and just in time 
contracts. In turn that stakeholder collaboration strengthens the organization (Alexander, et al., 
2010; Kapucu, Hawkins, & Rivera, 2013; ICMA, 2007).    
A contingency model for NH resiliency performance can be cumulatively derived from 
both the NH organizational complexity and the adequacy of the NH’s disaster plan. The 
contingency theory framework proves the dynamics of this second order model can be measured 
as defined by the organizational characteristics used by healthcare practitioners  to distinguish 
between service providers (Atkinson, Martin, & Rankin, 2009; Government Accountability 
Office, 2007; Hazards & Vulnerability Research Institute, 2012; Grandbois & Sanders, 2009; 
Jackson, Firtko, & Edenborough, 2007).  
2.3. Disaster Network Collaboration 
There are multiple levels of social influence that minimize or eliminate emergency 
management collaboration that are too advanced for this study and will be reserved as latent or 
unobserved indicators in future research regarding healthcare emergency plans (Langan & 
Christopher, 2012).  
Collaboration is not only significant to NH disaster response it is also linked to the 
recovery and sustainability of the nursing home. Some scholars consider network stability is 
derived from sustained internal relationships among sub-networks of collaboration (Agranoff & 
McGuire, 2004; Gazley, 2008).  Thus, resource dependency theory and systems thinking among 
network partners may generate potential learning that can create sustainability opportunities for 
the nursing homes’ network agents to restructure their collaboration capacity; hence, the NH 
system’s institutional collective actions can transform into a resiliency process for resource 
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distribution (Kroch, Champion, DeVore, Kugel, Lloyd, & Rothney-Kozlak, 2012; Neely, et al., 
2000).  For example networks of nursing home administrators and local emergency managers 
collaborate together to provide equitable and quality patient care during and immediately after 
manmade and/or natural disasters.  
An online tool for this collaboration is called the Emergency Status System (ESS).  This 
system allows nursing home administrators to share their bed availability or need for assistance 
with other facilities. Essential health care provider information can also be tracked immediately 
as the emergency impact is reported through this password protected electronic system. ESS 
provides individual user accounts for health care providers, affiliates, and provider partners. 
Accounts must be approved and identified with an AHCA User Code. In addition, network 
affiliates require provider approval for access to the system.  
Prior to a disaster, ESS partners are required by Florida Statute 408.821(4) to provide 
updated points of contact information and current phone numbers. Other operational information 
is also required such as the facility’s utility service account and type of existing generators. 
Network activities are linked to disaster events. For example, an approaching hurricane or a near-
by wildfire will determine the type of account entries made into the ESS.  
The Emergency Status System (ESS) assists with prioritizing response activities and can 
be a resource in implementing the disaster response strategy of the nursing home (NH). Disaster 
activity reports in the ESS can be viewed by the Emergency Operations Center, the Attorney 
General Office Staff and the Long Term Care Ombudsman Staff.  If the ESS is written into the 
EM plan design then appropriate NH staff that is assigned authority to log into the ESS can 
collaborate with other ESS partners.  Inventory and sharing of disaster resources can be 
streamlined with more efficient transmittals of updated information.  For example, a facility can 
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report through ESS the availability of additional beds to nursing homes needing an alternate 
location for evacuation. Pre-storm information may include evacuation status of the provider and 
the plan for transporting to a safer destination. Evacuation time can be minimized by sharing 
pertinent information ahead of time. Special needs such as oxygen, dialysis dependency, danger 
of patient elopement, and caregiver contact information can also be supplied prior to the disaster. 
Of course the patient census and bed availability can be updated as the disaster event progresses 
overtime and patients evacuate or family members join them as they shelter in place.  The ESS is 
an example of a formal network with structure and accountability built into the collaboration 
process. However, there are less formal and informal disaster networks. 
 
Other studies of informal internal networks among nonprofits and their government 
partners in Georgia demonstrated that when the non-contractual relationships are weakly 
collaborative and temporary, there is no sharing of knowledge or network learning.  This lack of 
knowledge sharing or network learning can also occur across multiple teams within a contracted 
network system because tension created by the diversity of leaders creates a need for unity of 
purpose. For example, the Ortho Infrared Project and Iowa Geographic’s collaboration network 
that mapped a community’s growth corridor using GIS technology teams demonstrated that 
collaboration capacity includes joint information sharing activities and events (Gazley, 2008).  
However, core organizations evolve overtime to an increased status and thus stabilize the overall 
collaboration network.   
Thus, effectiveness can be learned overtime when the internal network is stable enough to 
sustain itself through continuous sharing of information (Gazley). Therefore, NH system 
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collaboration can be an indicator of resiliency as derived from a nursing home being part of a 
healthcare system or not part of a healthcare system.   
2.4. Critique of the Validity of Contingency Theory Research 
Contingency theory alone is not enough to capture the causality of healthcare network 
agents that can restructure a nursing home’s collaboration capacity within the context of a multi-
layered healthcare system.  Hence, the validity of contingency planning requires additional 
theories to capture the NH system’s institutional collective actions that transform contingency 
planning into a manageable resiliency process for emergency resource distribution (Kroch, 
Champion, DeVore, et.al., 2012; Neely, et al., 2000).   
Contingency theory research alone may not always include resource dependency theory 
and/or systems learning and/or network collaboration. These three other grounded theories are 
partitioned as stand-alone cause/effect analysis by resiliency experts. Resiliency research 
actually relies upon multiple jurisdictions and cross-sections of a population. Therefore the 
validity of resiliency research within a framework of contingency theory that encapsulates 
resource dependency, network collaboration and systems learning is necessary for a robust study.  
2.5. Summary of What Is Known About Contingency Models 
In the public health sector there is minimal empirical evidence for minimizing observed 
disparities when prioritizing emergency response activities to save time and expense. Previous 
disasters revealed that external factors weighed internal decisions. For example staff family 
members need shelter so employees are unencumbered and can then attend to fragile patients; or 
transporting less frail patients first to alternate locations accommodates for less available 
resources.  Other case studies demonstrate that systems knowledge improves overtime as shared 
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through networks. New knowledge and experience gained during a disaster can be applied to 
increase coping abilities for the next disaster (Rivera, 2012). The significance for “thinking 
ahead” thorough an emergency plan and designing disaster response activities that are prioritized 
before-hand is understood to save time, expenses and lives.  
A grounded framework for adaptive public health management research and emergency 
management contingency scholars is composed of four theoretical possibilities:  complexity 
theory, systems learning, network collaboration, and resource dependency. Even though many 
theories are available the contingency framework allows analysis for some of the same variables 
indicated in other frameworks. For example, contingency theory includes the leadership 
consideration that the SNF Corporation creates internal communication barriers for the on-site 
NH staff working during a disaster.  
Along with internal corporate challenges, implementation of NH emergency management 
plans may also be hindered by confounding variables within a latent context of organizational 
structure, socio-economic effects, broader environmental influences and public policies (i.e. 
AHCA checklist).  These indicators could not adequately be evaluated during the short timeline 
of this study, therefore secondary data were collected and correlated through the CMS. This data 
can be used as proxies for organizational variances among cases. The quality rating and total 
nursing hours per patient have been used in previous studies as proxies to demonstrate structure 
characteristics within a contingency framework (Kovner & Knickman, 2008). 
The ability to think ahead may not be quantifiable or demonstrated in a path analysis 
alone, therefore a contingency model contributes to the literature because it can show latent 
endogenous constructs for resiliency as an index for measuring plan adequacy.   
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This study also adds to the literature discussions about the NH disaster planning process 
and the complexity of NH culture.  Thus, emergency managers will have a better understanding 
of the importance of the NH staff’s knowledge and inclusion in designing disaster plans. Also the 
significance of the NH cultural environment as a major consideration whenever designing 
collaborative disaster networks. 
There are two major literature and public discussion contributions generated from this 
contingency modeling of resiliency.  Firstly, additional material for future presentations and 
increased dialogue during annual conferences and local mitigation strategic planning meetings 
among professionals responsible for community governance and urban plan development (i.e. 
Central Florida Disaster Coalition Strategic Planning Meeting and FEPA Biannual Workshop).   
Secondly, multi-disciplinary literature contributions from this research in the form of 
white papers and journal articles. Future discussion articles will be submitted across disciplines 
to varied publications such as: Public Health, Emergency Management, Local Governance, and 
Risk Management.  Contingency theory articles will be submitted to the Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory; the Journal of Organizational Behavior and Human 
Performance; the Academy of Management Journal; the American Journal of Psychology; the 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. White papers will be submitted to relevant 
associations and agencies such as: the Florida Division of Emergency Management; the Florida 
Emergency Preparedness Association; the Florida Association of Health Care Administrators; 
and the Florida Department of Health Special Needs Agency. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The unit of analysis was a regulated nursing home (NH). The study was non-
experimental without a pre-test and post-test, because a disruption of routine activities was 
prohibited within the nursing home. This scholar considers the process of planning for an 
emergency as a form of treatment for organization’s with limited resources. Therefore a context-
process-outcome model research design used a structural equation model (SEM) to demonstrate 
contingency variations of resiliency.   
There are three recognized forms of resiliency: individual, organizational, and 
community. Since, the unit of analysis is an organization, the SEM demonstrated contingency 
variations of organizational resiliency (NH resiliency).  Characteristics of organizational 
resiliency included an alternate facility, communications, written agreements to procure disaster 
resources and affiliation within a disaster network.  
3.1. Research Methodology 
This research was a non-experimental descriptive analysis of an organization’s 
performance capacity. The beginning logic model design illustrated the causal path relationships 
between the context of organizational complexity (A) and disaster plan adequacy (B) in the 
outcome of nursing home disaster resiliency (C).  
Linear regression analysis could not fully demonstrate correlations among the nursing 
home’s first order factors in organizational complexity (A), plan adequacy (B) and NH resiliency 
(C).  So, additional methods were used in SEM to quantify the fluidity of casual paths of 
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resiliency (C). SEM was the preferred research design because it incorporates confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA), correlational regression coefficients (R2) and complex paths 
simultaneously into one model ( (Hox & Bechger, 2011, p. 356; Wan, 2002, p. 89).    
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) identified the first order elements for each latent 
construct.  Maximum Likelihood Indexes (MLI) were used as the optimal estimation technique 
for all three of the proposed independent measurement models.  The final covariance model or 
SEM illustrated the causal paths within a contingency framework of organizational complexity 
(A) and plan adequacy (B) toward organizational resiliency (C).   
Four causal paths for NH organizational resiliency (C) were illustrated as follow:   
A → B → C 
A → C 
B → C 
AB → C 
Contingency indicators identified in the literature were analyzed with software designed 
for “analysis of moment structures,” also called AMOS. Emergent properties needed to be 
identified, especially when examining bivariate correlational analysis of mean and covariance 
structures to illustrate both the direct and the indirect effects of organizational complexity (A) 
through disaster plan adequacy (B) upon nursing home resiliency (C).  Thus a structural equation 
model provided a simple, traditional analysis perspective for measuring this complex problem of 
NH resiliency (Byrne, 2010, p. 17).  For example, measuring emergent collaborations of NH 
staff, alternate facilities and NH disaster plan procedures (i.e. NH staff familiarity with the 
Emergency Status System for confirming the availability of an alternate facility for evacuees). 
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Organizational complexity (A) was determined by the context of the Florida nursing 
home environment (patient acuity, workload, and administrative strengths) as eight exogenous 
variables: patient acuity (ACUINDEX), the  number of patients needing assistance with daily 
living (ADLSCORE), the number of hours patients spend with certified nursing aides 
(CNAHRD), the number of hours patients spend with licensed nurses (LPNHRD), the percentage 
of occupied beds (OCCUPANCY), overall staff rating (STAFFRATING), registered nurse rating 
(RNRATING) and the number of nurses required per patient (NURSERATIO).  
Plan adequacy (B) was determined by the NH administrators’ knowledge of and/or 
confidence in plan components: alternate facility (ALTFACIITY), primary communications 
(PRIMCOM), transportation agreement (TRANS), additional disaster staff (ADDSTAFF), back-
up power supply (POWER), and medical reserves (MEDS).   
NH resiliency (C) was demonstrated by disaster performance indicators: travel caregiver 
for evacuees (TRAVCAREGIVER), knowledge of estimated travel time needed to evacuate 
patients (TRAVTIME), knowledge of procedures to activate disaster network (ESSPROC) and 
affiliation with the emergency status system (ESS). These four indicators were the most 
statistically significant factors for resiliency in the dataset. 
3.2. Sample 
Traditionally, scholars recommend using the “10 Responses per Parameter Rule.” 
However, this formula could not work for this over-identified measurement model for two 
reasons. Firstly, there are 52 parameters in the hypothesized measurement composition and with 
the predicted response rate of 520 from a population frame of only 680 ( or approximately 76% 
proportion) deemed impractical and created the possibility of a Type I error in rejecting the 
hypothesis when it is true (Bickel, 2007). A precise, sample estimation was needed to prevent 
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this error. Therefore, Soper’s sample formula was chosen because it accommodated the three 
hypothesized constructs that required individual estimations.   
David Soper designed a simulated statistical method that considered each proposed 
construct in the final covariance structural model. These calculations were done with proper 
simulation techniques and power analysis for each model.  The proper sample size for the 
cumulative SEM model was determined by using the following inputs: 
Anticipated effect size = .3 
Desired statistical power level = .9 
Number of latent (unobserved) variables = 19 
Number of indicator (observed) variables = 14 
Probability or p-value (rule out Type I error) = .05 
The recommended sample size used the above listed assumptions as threshold 
parameters. Dr. Soper’s software calculated a recommended optimal sample size of 200 with a 
minimum sample size of 75 participants to detect the medium effect (Soper, 2013).  
After determining the sample size, a descriptive analysis of the NH population in the state 
of Florida was done to ensure that the sample was a true representation. Thirty-one of the sixty-
seven counties in Florida were represented in the sample. The majority of survey participants 
worked in Orange (15.7%) and Pinellas (12.7%) counties.  Of the 102 survey respondents 90% 
were facility administrators and the remaining 10% were directors of nursing, facility managers, 
or regional administrators in charge of more than one facility. 
The context of the nursing home included a mixture of patients described as frail, elderly, 
chronically ill, and with disabilities (See APPENDIX B: DISABILITY STATUS OVERVIEW).  
Elements used for sample integrity comparisons were: number of dialysis patients (DIALYSIS), 
the number of patients with ostomies (OSTOMY), the mean of patients requiring assistance with 
daily living (ADLINDEX), the mean of patient acuity (ACUINDEX), the number of times 
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changes were made ownership within the previous twelve months (CHG_OWN) and the number 
of certified beds (CERTBEDS). 
Facilities averaged between two to four patients on dialysis (population = 2.09 +/- 2.3 
and sample = 2.26 +/- 2.3) and between five to twelve ostomy patients (population = 5.06 +/- 
6.69 and sample = 5.15 +/- 7.14).   
The change in ownership count was based upon administrative changes reported to CMS 
within the previous twelve months. In this study, the frequency of changes in ownership among 
the sample (1 +/- 0) did not proportionately represent the frequency of ownership changes within 
the FL NH population (2 +/- 2.).  Changes in administration are considered by most scholars as 
an indication of administrative strength and stability within an organization (Agranoff, 2003; 
Kahan, Allen, George, & Thompson, 2009; Oetjen, et al., 2012). Other research revealed that 
new and frequent changes in ownership created additional internal stress from unfamiliarity with 
routine operations (Delaney & McWhorter, 2010).   
The number of certified beds was used as facility size. The largest facility in the FL NH 
population had 462 certified beds, while the largest facility in the NH sample had 300 certified 
beds.  
The average NH size among the population was 120.83 +/- 49.794 certified beds and the 
average size within the sample was 116.44 +/- 44.423 beds. 
 These six indicators demonstrated that the study sample was a fair representation of the 
FL NH population. Therefore, the research design could be generalized to a larger community. 
Also, the research findings could be replicated in future studies. 
For added convenience, the descriptive statistics for the unit of analysis are listed in 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for NH Population and NH Sample.  
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for NH Population and NH Sample 
  
FL NH Population 
(N=680) 
Randomly Selected 200 
FL NH Survey Sample (n=102) 
 Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D 
Dialysis  0 13 2.09 2.26 0 38 6.5 2.33 0 15 2.26 2.33 
Ostomy 0 52 5.06 6.69 0 41 5.15 7.14 0 41 5.15 7.14 
ADL 
Index 6 16 10.42 1.21 10 12 10.32 1.63 0 16 10.47 1.63 
Acuity 
Index 6 19 10.70 1.30 10 12 10.81 1.79 0 19 10.77 1.79 
Owner 
Change 0 10 2.03 2.13 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
# of Beds 15 462 120.83 49.79 20 300 120 44.52 20 300 116.44 44.42 
 
The study sample was a fair representation of the FL NH population as illustrated in the 
bar graph of Figure 5 Survey Sample Represents FL NH Population. 
 
 
Figure 5: Survey Sample Represents FL NH Population 
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3.3. Research Procedures 
 Prior to the research, site visits were conducted in three geographic areas: Florida 
Panhandle, Central Florida and South Florida. These informational interviews and site visits 
provided guidance in constructing a workable survey instrument. They also provided additional 
anecdotal material for future research.  
All Florida licensed nursing homes (NH) were initially identified by cross-checking CMS 
information with the Florida Health Care Association membership database. Three control 
variables for protecting the homogeneity of the sample were: license status, percentage of elderly 
and the service area (urban or rural).   
After the secondary data for 681 NH facilities in Florida were collected, a consent letter 
was emailed to each facility. From this outreach, 277 administrators expressed interest in helping 
with the research, while others opted out or their email messages bounced back. Participant 
enthusiasm for this project was further demonstrated by the facility administrators who followed 
up with phone calls and invitations to visit their facilities.  
The optimal sample size needed for this study was 200 with a minimum of 75 
participants (Byrne, 2010, p. 53; Soper, 2013). Therefore, only 200 randomly selected NH 
administrators from the 277 consenting group received an electronic link to the 
knowledge/skills/attitudes (KSA) survey instrument.  
3.4. KSA Survey Instrument 
An online logic survey was designed to capture NH staff knowledge of disaster plans. 
The design and distribution software was Qualtrics through the University of Central Florida’s 
license. See APPENDIX A: KSA SURVEY INSTRUMENT. 
The survey instrument’s twenty-five questions were pilot tested for comprehension and 
approximate completion times.  Both the KSA survey instrument and accompanying consent 
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letter were reviewed and approved by the UCF IRB (See APPENDIX C: UCF IRB APPROVAL 
LETTER).  The twenty-five questions were randomly arranged and used a 5-point Likert scale of 
“none,” “less than enough,” “enough,” “more than enough,” and “do not know.”  
Electronic links embedded with unique identification numbers eased the burden of 
correlating CMS data (i.e. county, ownership, and workload). Three phone numbers were 
provided for those requiring assistance with completing the survey. Only ten participants actually 
called with general questions about the research or to explain that corporate headquarters would 
need to approve the questions before they could be answered. Three of these callers were sharing 
their evacuation experience during 2004, 2005, and one case was in another state.  Other 
communications from participants came through emails as contact updates thus survey links 
were reissued to these newer addresses.   
Consent forms were initially distributed electronically on October 28, 2014 to 277 email 
accounts associated with a skilled nursing facility. Of those emails, 33 were bounced back. This 
may be due to security filters because each email was verified by phone prior to distribution. 
Twelve facilities opted out of participating and were removed from this initial distribution list as 
well as the 33 bounce backs. Thus, 200 of the consenting facilities were randomly selected and 
the survey electronic link with an “opt out” option were redistributed on November 4, 2014.  
Reminders were emailed every two weeks until January 19, 2015. This timeframe was 
during the last month of hurricane season and during holiday weeks when facilities tend to be 
short-staffed and awareness of emergency plans may be minimal. Primary data from completed 
surveys were combined with secondary data collected by CMS.  
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3.5. Treatment of Data 
Five treatment steps were needed to glean and cross check pertinent data from four 
sources into one manageable dataset of relevant information.  For example, quantitative nursing 
hours and the number of certified beds came from CASPER and quality rankings came from 
CMS.  The Florida Health Care Association reconfirmed facility size and service areas. Data was 
cross checked using the minimum data set, MDS 4.0 of February 2012.  The five treatment steps 
are as follows: 
First, before researching other databases, a tracking method was needed to correlate data 
from multiple reports.  So, the CMS provider number was embedded into the facility’s KSA 
survey. This CMS provider number was used as a reference point among other reports until all 
facility related data was confirmed then the CMS provider number was discarded and replaced 
with an anonymous random case number.  
Second treatment was adding the qualitative data collected from the KSA surveys with 
related quantitative data collected from CASPER and MDS 4.0 (i.e. number of Non-English 
patients and for-profit or non-profit affiliation). 
Third treatment included descriptive analyses using SPSS 22.0 for frequencies and 
degrees of variability among the cases.  
Fourth treatment was a confirmatory factor analysis that identified the strongest bivariate 
correlations among the dataset.  
Fifth and last treatment factor analysis reduction to decrease the data into manageable 
size. 
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3.6. Descriptive Analysis  
The control variable, license status verified that each facility in the sample was familiar 
with AHCA emergency management plan requirements. Other control variables were the 
rural/urban service area and the percentage of elderly in the county population.  
Only eight percent (8%) served rural communities while ninety-two (92%) served urban 
communities. See Figure 6: Percentage of Rural Florida Nursing Homes. 
 
Figure 6: Percentage of Rural Florida Nursing Homes 
 
The percentage of elderly ranged from 10 to 35% of the county population with a mean 
of 19% +/- 6 %.      
Descriptive analysis of ownership affiliations of the sampled facilities revealed 83% were 
affiliated with a healthcare system while the remainder were not affiliated with any type of 
system.   
The average age of the nursing facility was 26 years (based upon the initial participation 
date). The oldest facility in the sample was 47 years with the newest facility being less than a 
year (See Table 33 Aggregated Descriptive Statistics).  
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3.7. Correlation and Regression Analyses 
According to the literature, multicollinearity occurs at a level of correlation that is greater 
than .9 (Bickel, 2007). Therefore, the maximum correlation threshold for this study was .9 with 
.30 as the minimal threshold. This range was predetermined earlier, when calculating the desired 
optimal sample size (Bickel, 2007; Pallant, 2007; Soper, 2013).   
Correlation analyses were done on all proposed indicators to rule out duplication of data 
(multicollinearity) and to identify causal relationships within three latent endogenous constructs: 
organizational complexity (A), plan adequacy (B), and NH resiliency (C). 
The correlation analysis for this study also included Cronbach’s coefficient alpha to 
demonstrate internal validity of the data, as recommended in the literature (Bickel, 2007; Pallant, 
2007).  This coefficient indicated an average correlation among the scale of items within a value 
range of 0 to 1.  
Thus the closer to 1 then the more robust the data. In other words, the strength of the 
indicator effect depended upon its proximity to absolute 1 (positive or negative).  Therefore, the 
factor loading effect in the measurement model was 1. Some of the proposed indicator pairings 
were too insignificantly related as causal effects and therefore were eliminated or relocated 
within the final contingency model based upon stronger correlations found during the CFA. 
3.8. Confirmatory Factor Analysis  
  The CFA for organizational complexity confirmed eight variables as first-order factors 
in determining organizational complexity (A). These first-order factors or exogenous variables 
were: ACUINDEX (X1), ADSCORE (X2), CNAHRD (X3), LPNHRD (X4), OCCUPANCY 
(X5), STAFFRATING (X6), RNRATING (X7), and NURSERATIO (X8).  
A factor reduction analysis provided flexibility as a regression analysis and sorted 
collinearity of these first-order factors into three second-order components. In other words, the 
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second-order components were derived from the most significantly correlated indicators for 
organizational complexity (A).   
These second-order components for the latent endogenous construct, NH organizational 
complexity were:  patient acuity (1), workload (2), and administrative strengths (See 
Figure 7: Proposed Measurement Model for Organizational Complexity.   
 
 
Figure 7: Proposed Measurement Model for Organizational Complexity 
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The following section discusses the measurement model for plan adequacy (B). 
The proposed indicators for plan adequacy (B) were chosen for two reasons. Firstly, these 
indicators were included in the AHCA criteria for licensure.  Secondly, these indicators were 
recognized in an earlier disaster research study conducted by the CDC and the University of 
South Florida through a grant from the Hartford Foundation (Eiring, Blake, & Howard, 2012).  
 The CFA for plan adequacy (B) found three of the nine proposed indicators did not meet 
the predetermined threshold for significance (< .30).  Therefore, only six remain as first order 
factors for the latent endogenous construct, plan adequacy (B). The confirmed factors were as 
follows:  ALTFACILITY (Y1), PRIMCOM (Y2), TRANS (Y3), ADDSTAFF (Y4), POWER, 
(Y5) and MEDS (Y6).  See Figure 8: Proposed Measurement Model for Plan Adequacy.   The 
next paragraph discusses the CFA for NH Resiliency (C). 
 
 
Figure 8: Proposed Measurement Model for Plan Adequacy 
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Factor analysis for NH Resiliency was most difficult as this research has never been done 
for organizations as complex as a nursing home. However, the factor analysis did confirm that 
primary data collected from the KSA survey does provide quantifiable indicators for NH 
resiliency. The CFA confirmed four out of ten proposed indicators for NH Resiliency (C). The 
confirmed factors were: TRAVCAREGIVER (Y7), TRAVTIME (Y8), ESSPROC (Y9), and 
ESS (Y10).  See Figure 9: Proposed Measurement Model for NH Resiliency.   
 
 
Figure 9: Proposed Measurement Model for NH Resiliency 
 
Now in the next section, results from all three CFAs are gathered into an easy to read 
compilation of the confirmed indicators used in each of the revised models. Factor descriptions 
have been listed alongside their respective data sources in Table 5: Confirmed NH Factors. 
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Table 5: Confirmed NH Factors 
Second Order First Order Variable Database Code Factor Description Data Source 
  
C
O
N
- 
  
  
T
R
O
L
S
 
COUNTY % elderly/county CENSUS 
  RURAL Rural or Urban CASPER 
Organizational 
Complexity 
Latent 
Endogenous 
Construct 
1 
Patients 
Acuity 
1 
 
X1 ADLSCORE Patient severity CASPER 
X2 ACUINDEX Patient acuity CASPER 
  X3 CNAHRD CNA  time with patient CASPER 
Workload 
2      
X4 LPNHRD LPN time with patient CASPER 
X5 OCCUPANCY Percent beds occupied CASPER 
Administrative 
Strengths  
 3 
X6 STAFFRATING Staff Rating CASPER 
X7 RNRATING Nurse Rating CASPER 
X8 NURSERATIO RN per patients CASPER 
Plan Adequacy  2 
Y1 ALTFACILITY Evacuation point 
KSA 
Survey 
Y2 PRIMCOM Cellphones & text 
KSA 
Survey 
Y3 TRANS 
Written agreement for 
disaster transport 
KSA 
Survey 
Y4 ADDSTAFF Additional staff for disaster  
KSA 
Survey 
Y5 POWER Back-up for outages 
KSA 
Survey 
Y6 MEDS Reserves for 3 days/patient 
KSA 
Survey 
NH Resiliency  3 
Y7 TRAVCAREGIVER Evacuation staff w/patient 
KSA 
Survey 
Y8 TRAVTIME 
Know time needed to travel 
out of harm's way 
KSA 
Survey 
Y9 ESSPROC Network Procedures  
KSA 
Survey 
Y10 ESS  Network affiliation 
KSA 
Survey 
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Figure 10: Covariance Structure Model for NH Resiliency  
3.9. Analysis for Reliability 
Descriptive data of the nursing homes in Florida have been collected from the Florida 
Association of Healthcare Agencies member database and cross referenced with CMS.  A self-
administered questionnaire of 25 elements was distributed to randomly selected nursing home 
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administrators that consented to participate in this research (see APPENDIX A: KSA SURVEY 
INSTRUMENT). These questions were adapted from a 2009 nursing home research project 
conducted by the University of South Florida for the John Hartford Foundation (FL Healthcare 
Foundation, 2008, pp. 14-20).    Each nursing home survey was addressed to the administrator 
because they are the contact person for local emergency response agencies.  
 Factor loadings were checked for significant affect of indicators on latent constructs. The 
larger the loading then the more effect of that indicator on correlated constructs.  The t-value or 
Critical Ratio (C.R.) range was larger than 1.96 or less than -1.96. This ensured that there was a 
good model fit and that the stastically significant effect was .05 (Byrne, 2010). 
Consideration of the importance of an indicator to the study was determined when 
estimating the sample size. The indicator threshold was established as .30, so any indicators 
above .30  and below .90 remained in the final contingency model. 
Other measures for model reliability were likelihood ratios:  CMIN (x2/df), goodness of 
fit index (GFI), adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI), parsimony goodness of fit index (PGFI), 
root mean squared (RMS), root mean squared equity adjustment (RMSEA) and Tucker-Lewis 
index (TLI). Pearson distribution coefficient was also considered for normal curve distribution as 
another indication of goodness of fit (Spatz, 2008; Wan, 2002).  
Some analysts consider the Hoelter critical N as confirmation of the sample size as 
significant at .05. Hoelter rejected models with more than 200 participants because chi-square 
goes from nonsignificant to significant in samples greater than 200. Instead, Hoelter believed 
sample sizes  between 75 and 200 are acceptable confirmation of the chi-square goodness of fit 
test  (Pallant, 2007). However, some scholars continue to ignore Hoelter and prefer Cronbach’s 
alpha.  
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This ensured that the data were reliable and can be repeated in other studies. The 
acceptable minimum threshold for Cronbach’s alpha was set at .7 as recommended in the 
literature (Bickel, 2007; Pallant, 2007).  However, the closer to 1 then the more robust were the 
data.  As the last reliability step, the modification index (MI) list of values were used as 
recommended adjustments to the model for a parsimonious fit. The MIL identified measurement 
error correlations that were too high and considered redundant among the latent constructs 
(Bickel, 2007).  
3.10. Delimitation of Social Desirability Bias 
There was concern regarding social desirability bias affecting the resiliency outcomes. 
Since the 1960’s some scholars believe there are two paths of social desirability bias. One is self-
deception and the other path is other-deception.  Self-deception occurs whenever the participant 
chooses an answer based upon their belief that socially unacceptable characteristics should be 
ignored. Therefore, they provide a preferred or acceptable answer. Other-deception bias is 
evident whenever participants provide inaccurate data to impress an observer. Either type of bias 
is intended to protect that participant’s self-image. It was important to protect the validity of 
KSA survey results in this research. 
Therefore, not all resiliency indicators in this study were derived as latent constructs from 
staff KSA surveys.  The self-reported data were anonymously linked with other facility data, 
therefore the need for social approval, various response styles, evaluation apprehension, pre-
survey effects, and social desirability bias were minimized as aggregated results (Azlina & 
Jamaluddin, 2010; de Jong, Pieters, & Fox, 2010; Nederhof, 1985).  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FINDINGS 
This study considered the context of the nursing home environment as a complex 
organization with highly structured leadership. The internal complexity of the NH was measured 
by patient acuity, staff workload, and administrative strengths.  
Findings confirmed that the sample (n=102) represented the research population 
(N=680). Findings from the 102 surveyed facilities were generalizable and testable for future 
studies of complex organizations.  However, the findings may not be generalized to lesser 
regulated organizations, because the surveyed nursing homes were isomorphic, adhere to 
regimented licensure criteria and mimic other nursing homes or health units.  
Some scholars of organizational behavior categorize regulated organizations (i.e. nursing 
homes) as isomorphic and prone to suffer from “regulatory capture.”  Highly complex 
organizations present with highly correlated characteristics and adopt routines learned from 
similar organizations (Drabek & McEntire, 2002; Salamon, 2002).  Regulatory capture explains 
why in this study, some of the bivariate correlations within the construct A (organizational 
complexity), met or exceeded the maximum threshold (.9) for significance among the first-order 
factors. 
Therefore, some correlations greater than .9 were not interpreted as a multicollinearity 
issue in this dataset.  Close approximations and stronger than expected correlations were due to 
regulatory capture of the unit of analysis as an isomorphic, licensed health facility.   
This multivariate non-experimental research incorporated only the most significantly 
related indicators extracted from three measurement models; nested within a structural equation 
model (SEM).   
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4.1. CFA and Measurement Modeling 
An extraction technique was used for determining the three multivariate models: (A) 
organizational complexity, (B) plan adequacy, and (C) nursing home resiliency. The extraction 
began with a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and then an over-identification of the best 
fitting factors for each of six latent constructs (Wan, 2002).  The methodology used was a two 
part process.  
The first step was to run a confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) using SPSS 22. Then the 
graphic software, AMOS was used to assign a factor regression weight of 1 to a factor. This 
method scores the regression weights of the other factors within the latent construct. Then the 
modification indexes (M.I.) were used to identify previously unseen correlations. 
Standardized regression weights (SRW), unstandardized regression weights (URW), 
critical ratio (C.R. or t-value) and sample probability (p) values provided further proof that 
correlations at the .05 level or above were significant indicators for each construct.  In addition, 
these measures are indicators of a parsimonious model goodness of fit.   
However, there are other likelihood indexes designed specifically for SEM.  They include 
chi-square (x2) per degrees of freedom (df),  the parsimony goodness of fit index (PGFI), 
goodness of fit (GFI), adjusted goodness of fit (AGFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) and root mean 
squared error adjustment (RMSEA).  In addition there is the Hoelter sample index for .05 
reliability that the sample size represents the population. 
The findings specific to organizational complexity (A) begin in the next paragraph and 
are followed by discussions regarding the findings related to the other two latent endogenous 
constructs: plan adequacy (B) and NH resiliency (C). 
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4.2. Organizational Complexity Measurement Model 
First consideration is the context of the nursing home.  Significant similarities between 
the Florida population of nursing homes and the sample are described first, followed by 
organizational complexity factors in order of their contribution to the final measurement model. 
Data were from the 2012 CASPER dataset. 
The FL NH population ADL Index mean for patient severity was 10.42 +/- 1.21. The 
study sample mean for ADL Index was 10.47 +/- 1.63 units.  This finding was a significant 
indicator of patient acuity within the construct organizational complexity (A).   
The ADL Score ranged from 0 (independent patient) to 5 (totally dependent patient).  The 
average score among the sample was 4.12 +/- .57. The skewness of distribution within the 
nursing home sample was toward the left (-3.76 with standardized error of .24). The FL NH 
population ADL Score average in 2012 was 4.18 +/- .016 while the skewness of distribution was 
-.5 with standardized error of .1.   
The Acuity Index measured patient cognitive abilities and ranged from 0 to 19.  The 
study sample (10.77 +/- 1.8) was a good representation of the population (10.70 +/- 1.3).  
Findings revealed that some patients required advanced life support (ALS) as 
administered only through licensed practitioners. In other words, in the study, the severity of the 
patient conditions increased the staff workload, as additional specialized staffing were required 
that ultimately elevated operating costs while it diminished revenue.  
Facilities had an average of 2 +/- 2 patients on dialysis. The highest number in one 
facility was 15 dialysis patients.  Ostomy patients per facility were higher in numbers with an 
average of 5 +/- 7 patients. One NH in the sample housed 42 patients with ostomies!   
Besides patient acuity and chronic health conditions, some social science scholars believe 
cultural barriers can also influence patient and staff dynamics within the context of healthcare. 
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Group diversity affects community members’ expectations and can either lessen or enhance the 
organization’s problem-solving experiences (Rivera F. , 2012; Rivera & Settembrino, 2012).  For 
example, cultural language and methods for overcoming obstacles can determine the internal 
culture of an organization through client expectations and staff qualifications. During times of 
disaster, the nursing home patients expect to use the language that they are most familiar and 
comfortable using during times of emotional distress. Thus, resiliency begins by overcoming 
communication barriers. Therefore, in this study, the variable NON_ENG was used as a proxy 
indicator for cultural diversity within FL NHs.  
The number of patients that use another primary language are reported each quarter to 
CMS as Non-English.  The count used for this study came from the last quarter of the 2012 
Minimum Data Statistics (MDS) database.  Facilities in the survey sample with Non-English 
speaking patients averaged 4 +/- 7 patients that did not have English as their primary language. 
This was significant to organizational complexity because translators, interpreters, or multi-
lingual assistance may be needed to provide quality of care during a disaster.   
Another descriptive statistic was the organization’s dependence upon Medicaid for 
revenue.  The indicator PCTMCAID, demonstrated the percentage of Medicaid reimbursements 
for each facility. Of the 102 facilities in the sample, 4.9% +/- .22 did not have Medicaid patients 
while the other 95.1 % +/- .22 received Medicaid compensation. As a socioeconomic indicator, 
this was seen as non-representative of the population because it was disproportionate to the state 
average of only 55.7% (+/- .8) Medicaid patients.  This may be because the sample facilities 
were cross-referenced with the CMS database.  
Organizational complexity descriptive statistics included the NH population as the 
number of NH residents compared to the number of licensed beds.  The percentages of beds 
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occupied in each facility were identified by the variable, OCCUPANCY.  In the NH sample, 
facilities averaged 87% +/- .15% of available beds filled. This was an indicator for revenue and 
affected the overall workload as levels of staffing hours and as levels of required resources.   
Physical therapy per patient per day (PTHRD) was extremely small when compared with 
other healthcare services. Perhaps due to the endurance levels of frail patients and the frequency 
of therapy sessions offered. In other words, the therapist may not be meeting with individual 
patients each day, but in groups or as weekly sessions. The CASPER reports for the survey 
sample indicated the average PTHRD was .13 +/- .09 hours per day (or 5 to 12 minutes a day).  
This variable was ruled out in the correlation regression analysis as less significant and was 
eventually removed from the structural equation model. However, PTHRD was included in the 
variable for total staff/patient contact hours (TOTHRD). 
The dataset also provided the Total Staff hours per patient per day (TOTHRD). The 
average among the survey sample was 4.33 +/- .98 hours (or 260 +/-59 minutes).   Both 
CNAHRD and TOTHRD were assumed to have a strong correlation because CNA’s provide the 
majority of TOTHRD hours.  Now that we have described the nursing hours, let us describe the 
staff ratings found in the quality assurance reports included in CASPER. 
The NH facility staff (STAFFRATING) are evaluated on a scale of 1 (low) to 5 (high). 
All patient care services and administrative staff are included.  STAFFRATING of the research 
sample averaged 3.45 with a deviation +/- 1.02. The highest percentile rating was 4 and 58.8% of 
the sample were rated 4 while 5.9% were rated a 5. So approximately 64% of the sample NH 
staff were rated above average. 
Registered nurse ratings (RNRATING) averaged 2.96 +/- 1.12 with 56% of the sample 
ratings at 3 or above. Only 32% of the RN staff were rated below 3. Staff ratings are only one 
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measure of the organizational complexity within a nursing home, there is also the nurse to patient 
ratio. 
The nurse/patient ratio average was 4.29 +/- .98 or roughly 3 to 5 nurses per patient.  This 
statistic indicated the length of time each certified nurse, licensed nurse and registered nurse 
spends with each patient each day.  
Confirmatory factor analysis for the organizational complexity measurement model 
identified eight first-order factors that were reduced into three second-order factors. 
Eight correlated first-order factors were: acuity index (X1), ADL score (X2), total patient 
contact hours per day (X3), percentage of beds occupied (X4), number of nursing staff per 
patient (X5), overall facility rating (X6), staff rating (X7) and registered nursing staff rating 
(X8).   
This section shows the evidence of the validity of organizational complexity as seen in 
the secondary data collected from Certification and Survey Provider Enhanced Reports 
(CASPER).   A descriptive analysis of the data demonstrated the organizational complexity of 
NH facilities within the sample.  The analysis results for mean and standard deviations across the 
102 participating facilities can be seen in Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for Organizational 
Complexity. 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Organizational Complexity (n=102) 
 Mean SD 
ADLINDEX  10.47 1.63 
ACUINDEX 10.77 1.79 
ADLSCORE 4.12 .57 
DIALYSIS* .70 .5 
OSTOMY* .86 .4 
PCTMCAID* .95 .2 
NON_ENGL* .71 .5 
OCCUPANCY* .87 .2 
CNAHRD** 2.7 hrs. .64 hr. 
LPNHRD** .95 hr.  .28 hr. 
RNHRD** .67 hr. .26 hr.  
PTHRD** .13 hr. .09  hr. 
TOTHRD** 4.3 hrs.  .98 hr. 
*Percentage of facility population       **hrs./day/patient 
 
The Assistance with Daily Living (ADL) Index is a scaled measure of patient severity 
used by CMS as a service indicator. The index minimum is 0 with 16 being the maximum. The 
FL NH population averages 10.42 +/- 1.212 and the study sample represents this population with 
an average ADL of 10.47 +/- 1.630.   
The Acuity Index was a measure of patient cognitive ability and ranges from 0 to 19.  
Again the study sample is a good representation of the population with 10.70 +/- 1.303 for the 
population and a mean of 10.77 +/- 1.794 in the sample.  
Certified Nurse Hours per Patient per Day (CNAHRD) were the average time certified 
personnel spent with patients. The average CNAHRD times in the surveyed sample were 2.72 +/- 
.64 hours (or 163.20 +/- 38.4 minutes). The maximum time a CNA spent per day per patient in 
the survey sample was 4.95 +/- 2.72 hours, or between 2.23 and 7.67 hours per day.  This was 
more than the combined averages of RN and LPN patient hours.  Thus confirming that nursing 
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homes try to contain costs through appropriate staff assignments (Oetjen, McSweeney-Feld, 
Welch, Warthen, & Kopera-Frye, 2012). 
CNAHRD was the highest patient/professional contact indicator and subsequently was 
used as a first order factor for the second order factor workload.  The next highest contact hours 
were with licensed nurses with the ability to administer patient care outside the scope of certified 
nurses. 
The total patient contact hours with licensed nurses (LPNHRD) were between .5 and 1.5 
hours with a mean of .95 hours and a standard deviation of .28 hours per day. This data 
combined with the CNAHRD and OCCUPANCY (85 -89%) data were significant to 
organizational complexity as indicators of the second order factor for workload.  
Data collected for physical therapy demonstrated the lowest patient/professional contact 
indicator between .04 and .22 hours with a mean of .13 hours or 7.8 minutes per patient per day.  
This small number may be due to several unknowns such as weekly therapy sessions distributed 
as daily contact quotas in the reports when the sessions actually occur biweekly. Other 
justifications for the small numbers may be due to Medicaid reimbursement schedules and/or 
number of patients in each physical therapy sessions. The data were deemed unclearly defined 
and showed an insignificant effect, therefore the PTHRD data were not used in the revised 
measurement models.  
Occupancy rates were calculated using the total number of residents reported by the 
respective facility in the 2012 CASPER with the number of CMS licensed beds for that same 
provider.  Total number of residents (RESTOT) and total nurse hours (TOTHRD) were used to 
calculate the Nurse Ratio.  
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The correlation analysis of the exogenous variables identified eight indicators for 
organizational complexity:  X1(1); X2 (.618, p < .01); X3 (.234, p < .05); X4 (.501, p < .01); X5 
(.956, p < .01); X6 (.449, p < .01); X7 (.645, p < .01); and X8 (.789, p < .01).  See Table 7 
Correlation Matrix for Organizational Complexity Construct. 
Table 7:  Correlation Matrix for Organizational Complexity Construct (n=102) 
 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 
ACUINDEX (X1)   1        
ADLSCORE (X2)    .618** 1       
TOTHRD (X3)    .170 .234* 1      
OCCUPANCY (X4)   .216* .329** .501** 1     
NURSERATIO (X5)    .183 .263** .956** .518** 1    
OVERALLRATE (X6)   .075 .096 .449** .128 .412** 1   
STAFFRATING (X7)   .085 .096 .645** .154 .588** .568** 1  
RNRATING (X8)   -.001 .086 .470** .082 .463** .553** .789** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Other important first order elements were reduced by using SPSS 22 Factor Reduction 
Analysis.  A Varimax rotation was performed after the principal component extraction. This 
separated out the three constructs: patient acuity (1), workload (2), and an administrative 
strengths (3).  These second-order factors then behaved as exogenous indicators of the latent 
endogenous construct: organizational complexity ().   
The first-order factors for organizational complexity are highlighted in yellow in Table 8: 
Factor Loadings of Organizational Complexity: Rotated Component Matrix.  
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Table 8: Second Order Factor Loadings of Organizational Complexity 
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
 
 
Component 
WORK PATIENTS ADMIN 
ACUINDEX .065 .841 .103 
ADLINDEX .048 .858 .097 
ADLSCORE .137 .772 -.063 
DIALYSIS .071 -.231 .036 
OSTOMY .032 -.005 .251 
NON_ENGL -.067 -.219 .088 
NURSERATIO .467 .255 .873 
OCCUPANCY .818 .468 .056 
PCTMCAID .184 .582 .258 
PROFITSTATUS -.216 .029 .180 
LPNHRD .759 .325 .009 
PTHRD .280 .087 -.024 
RNHRD .773 -.084 -.068 
CNAHRD .811 .235 -.081 
TOTHRD .605 .233 -.067 
RESTOT .058 .276 .516 
STAFFRATING .823 -.100 .823 
QUALITYRATE .507 .209 .043 
OVERALLRATE .663 -.088 -.038 
RNRATING .729 -.221 .829 
OWNERSHIP .226 -.224 -.040 
BEDS -.147 .048 .541 
RURAL .025 .051 -.136 
CERTIFIEDBEDS -.156 .032 .538 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a Rotation converged in 4 iterations. 
 
Each of the measurement models in this study used the Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index 
(PGFI) because it was specifically designed for SEM by James, Mulaik, and Brett (1982). The 
PGFI includes complexity with parsimony of fit and is usually a lower value than GFI (Byrne, 
2010, p. 78).   
See Table 10: Parameter Estimates and Regression Weights for Organizational 
Complexity for other critical model values. 
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Table 9: Parameter Estimates and Regression Weights for Organizational Complexity (Revised) 
 SRW URW S.E.      C.R.          P LABEL 
Patient_Acuity  1.00 .663  .158 4.201 ***  
Workload  1.00 .363 .059  6.178 ***  
Administrative_Strengths  1.00 1.00        
ADLSCORE (X1) .481 .630     X1 
ACUINDEX(X2) .249 .980 1.60 1.73 .08 X2 
CNAHRD (X3) .435 1.00 1.91 4.60 *** X3 
LPNHRD (X4) .397 .610  .50 4.63 *** X4 
OCCUPANCY (X5) .738 .500    X5 
STAFFRATING (X6) .619 .950 .10 5.88 *** X8 
RNRATING (X7) .393 .800 .11 3.52 *** X6 
NURSERATIO (X8) .506 .660     X7 
 
Modification Indexes for the revised measurement model provided better understanding 
of correlations among unseen variables and corresponding parameters.  This revised 
organizational complexity measurement model was considered over identified and parsimonious 
with a reasonably good fit for the data.  
The PGFI was .568 and the GFI was .929.  Also this study’s participant size of 102 met 
Hoelter’s recommended sample size for 95% reliance.  The reliability scale coefficient or 
Cronbach’s  for internal consistency was .7 for eight items.  
See Appendix H Table A for model fit summary of Organizational Complexity.  
Organizational Complexity with three correlated second-order factors are labeled as Patient 
Acuity, Workload, and Administrative Strengths in Figure 11: Measurement Indicators for 
Organizational Complexity.  
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Figure 11: Measurement of Indicators for Organizational Complexity (Revised) 
This revised measurement model for the latent endogenous construct organizational 
complexity is included in the covariance structural model (CSM) and nested within the final 
structural equation model (SEM). The SEM demonstrates the effect of organizational complexity 
directly and indirectly through plan adequacy. 
This concludes the section on findings regarding NH organizational complexity (A). 
Other findings concerned plan adequacy (B) and NH resiliency (C), as discussed in the next 
sections. 
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4.3. Plan Adequacy Measurement Model 
This study considered plan adequacy (B) as a representation of the NH staff’s knowledge, 
skills and attitudes (KSAs) regarding key elements in the process of designing and implementing 
a NH emergency management plan.  
These plan elements included disaster resource management items: alternate facility for 
evacuations (ALTFACILITY), primary communications for staff during emergencies 
(PRIMCOM), transportation arrangements for evacuations (TRANS), additional disaster staff 
(ADDSTAFF), back-up power that was enough to last three or more days (POWER), and 
reserved medical supplies for three or more days (MEDS). There were three major findings 
regarding plan adequacy based upon the planning process:   
First, the emergency plan checklist and review process were outdated. Of the survey 
sample, 93% of the NH staff members did not use the AHCA checklist.  Among those facilities 
surveyed, 29% used a corporate template and 29% used the Florida Healthcare Association 
template. The majority of facilities (55%) included NH staff in designing a template.   
Second, 45% of the NH staff surveyed were unfamiliar with the written emergency plan 
and specific disaster procedures for their facility.  
Third, NIMS was incorporated into only 23% of the NH plans. However, 100% of the 
facilities practiced the NH plan as an annual exercise for staff as required by AHCA.  
The intent of the survey was to quantify staff confidence levels within their knowledge of 
their facility’s disaster plan. Therefore, the following discussion evaluates staff knowledge, skills 
and attitudes regarding disaster resources and written agreements within the plan design.  
The descriptive statistical report comes from data regarding the plan design, apart from 
plan implementation policies.  Even though, planning a response strategy prior to a disaster may 
save time and lives, it is important to recognize the importance of staff KSAs regarding that 
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strategy. In other words, the adequacy of a particular disaster management strategy remains 
unpredictable, due to changes in human behavior.  
In this study, plan adequacy was measured using fourteen parameters that included six 
observed variables: availability of an alternate facility (ALTFACILITY), primary 
communications (PRIMCOM), transportation agreement (TRANS), additional disaster staff 
(ADDSTAFF), back-up power (POWER), and medical reserves (MEDS).  The mean 
distributions of these strategy characteristics among the sample are listed in Table 11: 
Descriptive Statistics for Plan Adequacy. 
 
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for Plan Adequacy (n=102) 
 Mean Std. Deviation 
ALTFACILITY(Y1) .90 .299 
PRIMCOM(Y2) .92 .270 
TRANS (Y3) .80 .399 
ADDSTAFF(Y4) .79 .406 
POWER(Y5) .92 .270 
MEDS(Y6) .98 .139 
  
Alternate Facility (ALTFACILITY): Contingency theory literature proposes the decision 
to shelter-in-place or to evacuate to another facility is dependent upon internal management 
KSAs. For example, NH Staff confidence that the NH emergency management plan provided an 
alternate location to house patients during a disaster was quite high with 90.2% of the 
respondents knowing there was a pre-identified Alternate Facility.  Therefore, there is a strong 
likelihood that the NH will be more resilient. However, the remaining 9.8% did not know about 
an alternate location for patient evacuation. Nevertheless, their resiliency may be contingent 
upon other factors than having an alternate facility. 
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Facility Primary Communications (PRIMCOM): Historical after-action reports (AAR) 
declare communications to be a major concern and often interoperability of communications 
equipment is the largest short-fall in response and recovery strategy (Mileti, 2009; Waugh, 
2011). Of the NH facilities surveyed, most of the staff (92.2%) were aware of the primary 
communications strategy to be used during a disaster. Not all plans used the same technology. A 
few organizations provided satellite phones while the majority rely upon text messages through 
cell phone. Since only aggregated numbers were collected to protect staff identities, the findings 
only specify what percentage of the sample have a primary communications technology in place 
(92.2%) and what percentage of the sample (7.8%) does not have a primary communications 
component in the NH disaster plan. 
Transportation Agreement (TRANS) is a written contract hiring a transportation company 
on an “as needed” basis or a contingency partner during disasters. These agreements vary in the 
amount of detail with specifications for the type of equipment needed for frail patients. This 
survey tried to quantify the KSA of NH staff that would implement these agreements. 
Confidence seemed high with 80.4% answering the question “How adequately does your CEMP 
provide transportation of patients during an evacuation to another facility when sheltering in 
place is not an option?” It is interesting to note that 19.6% answered “do not know” or were not 
confident the plan was adequate. Qualitative interviews with facility managers explained 
transportation agreements are their largest concern because they are “contingency agreements” 
that may nor may not be enforceable during local disasters (E. Carter, personal communication, 
November 2014; Reynolds, 2014) 
87 
 
Additional Disaster Staff (ADDSTAFF) for relief of exhausted employees was enough 
for 79.4% of the respondents, while over 20% did not feel the plan would provide enough 
additional people during a disaster. 
Back-up power (POWER) for 72 hours is recommended by the majority of emergency 
response agencies because that is the average time needed to activate and transport additional 
resources from one location to another (FEMA, 2012). Ninety-two percent (92%) of the survey 
respondents felt confident that there would be enough back-up generator power and fuel for the 
generators to last 72 hours. Of that number 77% felt their facility had more than enough. 
Medications (MEDS) for 72 hours: the question regarding medical reserves asked “Does 
your Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan provide Medical Supplies for seventy-two 
hours?” Of the online respondents, only 2.18% answered “less than enough” with 97.81% 
respondents displaying higher confidence levels by replying “More than enough (78.36%)” and 
“Enough (19.57%).” See STATISTICS for additional survey distributions. 
The next portion of this section will discuss findings that further justify a revised model 
for the latent endogenous construct Plan Adequacy.  The correlation and regression findings are 
listed in Table 12 Parameter Estimates and Regression Weights for Plan Adequacy.  
Table 11: Parameter Estimates and Regression Weights for Plan Adequacy (Revised) 
 SRW URW S.E. C.R. P Label 
ALTFACILITY (Y1) .881 .995 .088 11.315 *** Y1 
PRIMCOM (Y2) 1.000 1.016 .071 14.213 *** Y2 
TRANS (Y3) .496 .749 .141 5.327 *** Y3 
ADDSTAFF (Y4) .573 .876 .139 6.294 *** Y4 
POWER (Y5) .322 .327 .098 3.321 *** Y5 
MEDS (Y6) .222 .116 .051 2.257 .024 Y6 
 
Even though the factor weight of Y6 (MEDS) was only .22, this factor was retained in the 
model for two reasons. Firstly, the modification index (MI) identified a significant correlation 
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between Y5 (POWER) and Y6 (MEDS).  Secondly, disaster reserves of medications and back-up 
power are required by the ACHA Checklist criteria for licensure.  
Lastly, these two factors are also indicators of resource dependency within the study’s 
theoretical framework of contingency theory.  The revised parameters are illustrated in Figure 
12: Measurement Model for Plan Adequacy. 
 
 
Figure 12: Measurement Model for Plan Adequacy (Revised) 
 
The likelihood ratio test for the measurement model for plan adequacy included chi-
square (x2) of 29 and 13 degrees for freedom (df). The PGFI was .566 and is considered the most 
realistic index for structural equation models because it considers the number of parameters in 
saturated model as hypothetical complexity (Byrne, 2010).  Cronbach’s or the internal 
consistency of the data was .7 for six items.  
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A complete list of all the likelihood ratio tests can be found in Appendix H. Table B. Plan 
Adequacy. For convenience a short summary of the model fitness indices is listed in Table 13:  
Model Fitness Indices for Plan Adequacy.  Pre-determined thresholds were adequately met for 
this revised measurement model. 
 
Table 12: Model Fitness Indices for Plan Adequacy 
Model RMSEA GFI AGFI PGFI PCLOSE 
Default model .050 .914 .861 .566 .037 
Independence model .409 1.000   .000 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 8 29.002 13 .007 2.231 
Saturated model 21 .000 0   
Independence model 6 268.437 15 .000 17.896 
 
The next section will look at evidence for a revised measurement model of the latent 
endogenous construct, NH resiliency. 
4.4. NH Resiliency Measurement Model 
Factor analysis confirmed that primary data collected from the KSA survey does provide 
quantifiable indicators of NH resiliency. These strongly correlated resiliency factors were: 
caregiver to accompany patient during evacuation (TRAVCAREGIVER), travel time needed to 
evacuate (TRAVTIME), procedures to activate disaster network (ESSPROC), and affiliation 
with disaster network (ESS).   
The resiliency indicator, TRAVCAREGIVER had a mean of .84 +/- .365. Thus, 
displaying a high level of staff confidence that during patient transfers to another facility there 
will be enough qualified personnel to continue providing quality of life care during the transport. 
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There is still the likelihood that social likeability bias skewed these findings, even though the 
question used a five-point Likert scale and was presented randomly in the survey. 
However, other indicators are more empirical.  For example, the distance between one 
location and another can be measured in miles and estimated travel time. The resiliency indicator 
TRAVTIME represents the staff knowledge of estimated mileage and traffic times between 
facilities. In the study sample of 102 NH administrators, the mean for TRAVTIME knowledge 
among staff was .75 +/- .438.  This indicator is a mandatory part of the disaster plan. Therefore 
staff knowledge of TRAVTIME was expected to be a strong indicator in this study on resiliency.   
Two other resiliency indicators were also factors for network collaboration. The NH 
staff’s resiliency was indicated by their knowledge of the Emergency Status System (ESS) and 
the procedures for contacting other network members during a disaster (ESSPROC).  
Of the 102 surveyed facilities the mean of ESS awareness was .87 +/- .34 and the 
ESSPROC mean was .71 +/- .46.  These network collaboration items are not mandatory items; 
however, they were included as part of the research theoretical framework for disaster resiliency. 
See Table 14: Descriptive Statistics for NH Resiliency.  
 
Table 13: Descriptive Statistics for NH Resiliency (n=102) 
 Mean Std. Deviation 
TRAVCAREGIVER (Y7) 0.84 0.365 
TRAVTIME (Y8) 0.75 0.438 
ESSPROC (Y9) 0.71 0.458 
ESS (Y10) 0.87 0.335 
 
 In the MI of the measurement model for NH Resiliency there were two unseen 
correlations. The first correlation identified was between TRAVCAREGIVER (Y7) and 
TRAVTIME (Y8). The second correlation was between ESSPROC (Y9) and ESS (Y10).  
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The factor ESSPROC might have been eliminated from the measurement model because 
of the low standardized weight (SRW) of .204. However, the strong correlation with ESS 
maintained the significance of ESSPROC as an indicator for NH Resiliency.  See Table 15 for 
Parameter Estimates and Regression Weights for NH Resiliency. 
 
 Table 14: Parameter Estimates and Regression Weights for NH Resiliency (n=102)  
 SRW URW S.E. C.R. P Label 
TRAVCAREGIVER(Y7) .463 1.099 .138 7.963 *** Y7 
TRAVTIME (Y8) .267 1.000    Y8 
ESS (Y9) .500 1.053 .190 5.534 *** Y9 
ESSPROC (Y10) .204 .919 .282 3.261 .001 Y10 
 
See the final measurement model for NH Resiliency illustrated in Figure 13: 
Measurement Model for NH Resiliency (revised). This is an over-identified non-recursive 
measurement model.
 
Figure 13: Measurement Model for NH Resiliency (Revised) 
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The likelihood ratio test for the measurement model for plan adequacy included chi-
square (x2) of 32 and 10 degrees for freedom (df). The PGFI was .869 and is considered the most 
realistic index for structural equation models because it considers the number of parameters the 
in saturated model as hypothetical complexity (Byrne, 2010).  Cronbach’s or the internal 
consistency of the data was .7 for four items.  
Table 16: Model Fitness Indices for NH Resiliency was proven to be significant per the 
predetermined thresholds.  
 
Table 15: Model Fitness Indices for NH Resiliency 
Model RMSEA GFI AGFI PGFI PCLOSE 
Default model .047 .869 .869 .869 .004 
Independence model .044 1.000   .000 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 0 31.884 10 .000 3.188 
Saturated model 10 .000 0   
Independence model 4 114.913 6 .000 19.152 
  
The correlation matrix for the endogenous construct Plan Adequacy had six correlation 
pairings. These pairings demonstrated staff knowledge regarding the facility’s disaster plan. The 
correlation coefficient values ranged from .322 to .885. Two indicators, alternate facility (Y1, 1) 
and primary communications (Y2, .885) were outside the predetermined thresholds. These 
indicators were retained in the measurement model because they are mandated for plan adequacy 
and are so highly correlated because 100% of the sampled participants had emergency plans.  
Other indicators for plan adequacy measured the knowledge levels of NH staff. 
The complete list of significant indicators for Plan Adequacy are defined as follows:  
arrangements for an alternate facility during evacuations (ALTFACILITY, Y1, 1), primary 
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communications for staff (PRIMCOM, Y2, .885, p < .01), a transportation agreement (TRANS, 
Y3, .499, p < .01), payroll policy for additional staff during disasters (ADDSTAFF, Y4, .573, p < 
.01), and a back-up power source with enough fuel to operate for three days (POWER, Y5, .322, 
p < .01) and enough medical supplies for each patient to last three days (MEDS, Y6, .485, p < 
.01).  
The correlation matrix for the facility staff knowledge of the emergency management 
plan is provided in Table 17: Correlation Matrix for Plan Adequacy Construct. 
Table 16: Correlation Matrix for Plan Adequacy Construct (n=102) 
 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 
ALTFACILITY 
(Y1) 
    1      
PRIMCOM (Y2)   .885**    1     
TRANS (Y3)   .418** .499**   1    
ADDSTAFF (Y4)   .484** .573** .298** 1   
POWER (Y5)   .272** .322** .040 .212* 1  
MEDS (Y6)   .191 .222* -.070 .103 .485** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
The correlation analysis among the proposed six (6) indicators for Plan Adequacy had 
correlation coefficient values from .322 to .885. The predetermined range for the correlation 
coefficient for this study was from .30 to .85.  Even though Y1 and Y2 exceeded the range, they 
remained in the construct as required by the mandated plan design and healthcare legislation. 
The NH resiliency correlation pairings included:  network membership in the Emergency 
Status System (ESS); knowledge of ESS procedures for network collaboration (ESSPROC); 
knowledge of amount of travel-time needed to evacuate patients (TRAVTIME) and having 
enough staff to accompany patients during evacuations (TRAVCAREGIVER). These were 
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important indicators proven by network theory (Brown, et al., 2009; Blake, Howard, Eiring, & 
Tarde, 2012; FEMA, 2012; Kapucu, Arslan, & Demiroz, 2010; W.L. Waugh & Streib, 2006). 
The correlation matrix for NH resiliency can be seen in Table 18: Correlation Matrix for 
NH resiliency. 
Table 17: Correlation Matrix for NH Resiliency 
      Y7          Y8         Y9       Y10 
TRAVCAREGIVER 
(Y7) 
Pearson             1 
 
  
Sig. (2-tailed) 
  
  
TRAVTIME (Y8) Pearson .676**            1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
 
  
ESSPROC (Y9) Pearson  .313** .215*            1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .030 
 
 
ESS (Y10) Pearson .482** .384** .463** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
4.5. Structural Equation Model  
All the measurement models for the three latent endogenous constructs (organizational 
complexity, plan adequacy and resiliency) were joined into one covariance structure model 
(CSM) also known as a structural equation model (SEM). Since this research was conducted 
within a theoretical framework of four contingency theories and SEM is the universally accepted 
methodology to describe the dynamics within contingency models, further discussion will 
reference SEM principles.  
The three-step process of analysis used earlier was repeated for the SEM.  First, any weak 
factor weights were removed. Second, the summary of model fit was verified. Lastly, the MI 
recommendations were considered for a final parsimonious model.   The chi-square was 483 
with 129 degrees of freedom. The RMSEA was .051 and the SEM specific index PGFI was .537.  
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The complete summary of model fit indices and other likelihood measures can be found in 
Appendix G.  
The final SEM design for a contingency model of NH resiliency was composed of 171 
moments of structure parameters. These included 47 variables consisting of 18 observed and 29 
unobserved. The latent exogenous variable, organizational complexity (and two latent 
endogenous variables: plan adequacy (, and NH resiliency (.  Path coefficients among the 
latent constructs were statistically significant above the predetermined effect threshold of .3   
There were four hypothesized causal paths. Of these paths, three demonstrated direct 
relationships as: first pathƔwas “organizational complexity toward plan adequacy”; second 
path was “plan adequacy toward resiliency;” and third path (was “organizational 
complexity toward nursing home resiliency.”   
The fourth causal path (Ɣ1) was the indirect influence of organizational complexity 
on nursing home resiliency via plan adequacyAnother way of expressing these four causal 
paths are as follows in Table 18: SEM Causal Path Labels. 
 
Table 18: SEM Causal Path Labels
Causal Path Label 
     Ɣ 
     
 Ɣ 
( Ɣ(   
Indirect effect 
 
 
 
See Figure 14: Structural Equation Model for NH Resiliency for complete illustration of 
causal paths and construct relationships. 
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Figure 14: Structural Equation Model for NH Resiliency 
 
 
1 
2 
 
Ɣ
Ɣ2

 
F1 

F2 

F3 


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See Table 19: Parameter Estimates and Regression Weights for SEM for NH Resiliency, 
which indicates significant correlations greater than .01 for the retained 23 endogenous variables. 
These findings provide a contingency perspective of organizational complexity, emergency 
management plan adequacy and nursing home resiliency (see Figure 15: Evidence of Effects on 
NH Resiliency (Revised).   
 
Table 19: Parameter Estimates and Regression Weights for SEM for NH Contingency 
 SRW URW S.E. C.R. P 
Plan_Adequacy .143  .479 .346 1.383 .167 
NH_Resiliency ( .819  .792 .119 6.650 *** 
Patient_Acuity(F1) .282 1.879 .775 2.429 .015 
Workload (F2) 1.051 1.000     
Admin_Strengths (F3) .802  11.916 2.434 4,895 *** 
ADLSCORE (X1) .918 1.000       
ACUINDEX (X2) .673 2.305 .978 2.357 .018 
CNAHRD (X3) .893 7.630 1.309 5.827 *** 
LPNHRD (X4) .714 2.691 .516 5.214 *** 
OCCUPANCY (X5) .504 1.000     
STAFFRATING (X6) .679 .594 .091 6.525 *** 
RNRATING (X7) .393 .372 .110 3.385 *** 
NURSERATIO (X8) 1.189 1.000    
ALTFACILITY (Y1) .885 1.000    
PRIMCOM (Y2) 1.000 1.022 .065 15.618 *** 
TRANS (Y3) .499 .753 .136 5.536 *** 
ADDSTAFF (Y4) .573 .880 .134 6.593 *** 
POWER (Y5) .322 .329 .098 3.362 *** 
MEDS Y6) .222 .117 .051 2.269 .023 
TRAVCAREGIVER (Y7) .703 1.000    
TRAVTIME (Y8) .594 1.016 .149 6.801 *** 
ESSPROC (Y9) .441 .789 .210 3.756 *** 
ESS (Y10) .667 .871 .159 5.485 *** 
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Figure 15: Evidence of Effects on NH Resiliency (Revised) 
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CHAPTER FIVE HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
 
 Emergency management scholars still debate whether plan adequacy (B) can compensate 
for organizational complexity (A) within the context of a disaster.  Legislation mandates require 
that emergency management plans provide equitable access to disaster resources, regardless of 
organizational complexity (i.e. functional needs service support or FNSS).  But definitions of 
organizational complexity and plan adequacy remain unspecified in resiliency research.  
Most disaster behavior scholars agree that organizational complexity and emergent 
disaster elements can be defined by the research unit of analysis and the scope of the disaster 
(Ashby, 2007; Mileti, 2009).  Therefore, this research defined organizational complexity as the 
level of patient acuity, the severity of the workload, and the organization’s administrative 
strengths. Plan adequacy was defined by the nursing home staff’s disaster knowledge of their 
facility’s written disaster agreements, disaster procedures, and disaster network affiliation.  
Four hypotheses were based upon these definitions and their relationship toward 
organizational resiliency from a contingency perspective. Next will be discussions of evidence 
proving each hypothesis followed by a summarization in the final section of this chapter. 
Hypothesis 1:  There is a positive causal effect of Nursing Home organizational 
complexity (A) upon Nursing Home plan adequacy (B).  
The first hypothesis regarded the relationship between plan adequacy (B) and 
organizational complexity (A). The exogenous latent variable, organizational complexity (A) 
was defined by the second-order factors of Patient Acuity, Work Load, and Administrative 
Strengths. These organizational characteristics, along with previous disaster experience, material 
resources and staff knowledge affect plan adequacy (B).  In other words, the quality of care 
patients receive during a disaster is contingent upon complexity theory, resource dependence 
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theory and systems learning. Pfeiffer and Salancik contend that the development of relationships 
outside the context of an organization is necessary for guaranteed access to resources. They 
found a 10% variance in performance among leaders in their analysis of resource dependence 
upon outside vendors (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). In this study, variances among plans were 
measured by external resource dependence items such as alternate facility for evacuations, back-
up power, additional staff, and medical supplies. 
The first hypothesis statement that plan adequacy is contingent upon organizational 
complexity was proven true and expressed as: A (organizational complexity) affects B (plan 
adequacy).   
The study dataset proved a one-way causal relationship, Ɣbetween organizational 
complexity () and plan adequacy () with a standardized regression weight of .143.  Even 
though, this dataset did not meet the predetermined threshold of .30 for strength, it did meet the 
statistical standard for significance (p > .05) as a positive causal path.  
The correlation coefficient (r = .143) implied a positive causal relationship that plan 
adequacy (B) was statistically significant and therefore contingent upon the complexity within an 
organization (A).  Thus, empirical evidence proves the complexity theory that organizations 
adapt to the environment and that the emergency management plan provides flexibility during a 
dynamic change in the environment caused by an unexpected disaster. The causal path 
demonstrated that the disaster plan relies upon external resources to compensate the 
organization’s vulnerabilities. Therefore, the latent endogenous construct organizational 
complexity can be treated as an exogenous variable for the latent endogenous construct, plan 
adequacy. 
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Therefore the hypothetical statement 1 was accepted as a true statement. See Figure 16: 
Hypothesis 1 Test.  
 
 
 
Figure 16: Hypothesis 1 Test 
 
Ɣ
 
 
 
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Hypothesis 2: There is a direct positive causality between Nursing Home plan adequacy 
and Nursing Home resiliency.  
The disaster plan design (B) was expected to save time and adequately provide NH staff 
knowledge of disaster resources through written agreements and to provide NH staff additional 
skills and confidence as provided through affiliation with the Emergency Status Support (ESS) 
network. Specialized knowledge before an emergency increases the likelihood that staff will 
perform to the plan guidelines and thus respond, cope, and recover at an adequate level of 
resiliency (CDC and PHPR, 2011).   
The second hypothesis regarded the relationship between plan adequacy (B) and 
resiliency (C). The endogenous latent variable resiliency is a function of the exogenous latent 
variable, plan adequacy. This research demonstrated the importance of and a better 
understanding of the connection between the basic principles of the emergency management 
(a.k.a. disaster) plan and the facility’s capacity for resiliency.   
Data provided empirical evidence that there is a strong one way causal relationship,  
between plan adequacy ( and NH resiliency (with a standardized regression weight of 
.82. In other words p < .05 at a 95% confidence level can be duplicated in future 
renderings of this dataset. 
Thus, Hypothesis 2 is proven by the data: there is a strong and positive causal direction 
from NH plan adequacy (B) toward NH resiliency (C). Therefore, nursing home resiliency is 
considered a function of the emergency management plan and Hypothesis 2 is accepted as a true 
statement.  See Figure 17: Hypothesis 2 Test. 
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Figure 17: Hypothesis 2 Test 
 
 
 
 
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Hypothesis 3: There is a direct positive causality between nursing home organizational 
complexity and nursing home resiliency.   
The third hypothesis proposes organizational complexity has a direct positive causality to 
NH resiliency.  Complexity theory suggests an organization without a plan is adequate within the 
context of a structured hierarchy that relies solely upon internal resources. 
It is proposed that resiliency for regaining optimized order from chaos is contingent upon 
leadership alone. This is demonstrated by the organization’s hierarchical control over internal 
resources during a disaster (Cutter, et al., 2008).  Unfortunately, the dataset in this study did not 
meet the predetermined threshold (r = .30) to be considered moderately relevant. Nevertheless, 
the dataset did prove there was a weak and statistically significant direct effect (Ɣ.13, p <.05) 
of organizational complexity ( on NH resiliency (.  In other words, even though a direct 
relationship was witnessed, it was too weak. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 was rejected.  
 
 
Figure 18: Hypothesis 3 Test 
However, the cumulative or joint effect of both organizational complexity and plan 
adequacy was further examined in the test of Hypothesis 4.  
Ɣ 
 
 

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Hypothesis 4: There is a cumulative positive effect of nursing home complexity and 
nursing home plan adequacy upon nursing home resiliency.  
Earlier it was confirmed that the latent organizational complexity construct (1) does 
have a direct effect (Ɣ=.13, p<.05) upon resiliency ( without implementing an emergency 
plan. Even though the direct effect is not statistically significant, the complexity theory implies 
there is a likelihood for an adequate plan () to significantly enhance resiliency (outcomes. 
In other words, organizational complexity (A) with plan adequacy (B) may have an indirect 
influence or joint effect (AB) on resiliency (C).  Therefore, it was proposed that together the two 
independent direct causal paths of Ɣ (organizational complexity on resiliency) and plan 
adequacy on resiliency) would increase the capacity for NH resiliency (2). 
However, as demonstrated in Figure 19: Hypothesis 4 Test, the degree of that 
organizational complexity effect is so minor (.05) that it was considered too weak to be a 
significant contributor to the variability in NH resiliency.  On the other hand, plan adequacy’s 
independent effect (.82) remained significantly strong. To reconfirm this, the cumulative effect 
data were illustrated through R-square values.  Both regression paths remained .673, p <.05 as 
illustrated in Table 20 the Cumulative Effects on NH Resiliency.  Therefore, Hypothesis 4 
statement was not proven by the data and therefore rejected as a true statement. 
 
Table 20: Cumulative Effects on NH Resiliency 
 R2 
Independent Effect of Organizational Complexity  0.017 
Independent Effect of Plan Adequacy 0.673 
Joint Effect of Org Complexity & Plan Adequacy 0.673 
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Figure 19: Hypothesis 4 Test 
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In summary, resiliency outcomes are contingent upon plan adequacy as it provides 
appropriate resources and simplifies chaos. The context (A, NH organizational complexity) 
positively affected the process (B, NH plan adequacy) with a statistically significant direct causal 
coefficient of .14.   
The process (B, NH plan adequacy) positively and strongly affected outcomes (C, NH 
resiliency) with a significantly direct causal coefficient of .81.  
The context (A, organizational complexity) indirectly influences (C, NH resiliency) by 
way of implementing the process (B, plan adequacy). This indirect causal path was demonstrated 
by the R-square coefficient of .017.  However, this was a weak correlation as it remained well 
below the minimum threshold of significance (.05).  Another consideration was the cumulative 
or joint effect of context and process upon outcomes. 
The joint effect was evaluated by using the R-square correlation coefficient .673. It was 
determined that the joint effect of A (.017) and B (.673) upon C was the same strength as the 
independent direct effect of B (.673) upon C and again A was an insignificant influence.  Thus 
the emphasis of a well-designed emergency management plan remains significant, regardless of 
the context of an organization. 
This further proves the contingency theory that systems mimic other systems to 
compensate for structural weaknesses. A unit within a system (NH) learns by repeating historical 
successes of other units within their system (healthcare system) (Ashby, 2007; Richardson, 
1991).  
Considering that plans become isomorphic and are designed to compensate for previous 
shortfalls as recognized within the context of an organization, these findings are not surprising. If 
the context (A, organizational complexity) is weak then it stands to reason the process (B, Plan 
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adequacy) is mandatory to strengthen performance outcomes (C, NH resiliency). Thus, outcome 
(C) is contingent upon the process (B), as structured by the context of the organization (A). 
However, within the context of nursing home facilities during 2012, the influence upon 
process (B) was weak at .14 while the effective minimum threshold was held at .30.  This 
weakness may be due to outside parties determining the plan design as mandated through three 
levels of legislation and using plans not guided by the healthcare model but an emergency 
management cycle.  
The dataset showed the causal path from plan adequacy to resiliency (.82, p <.05) 
increased NH resiliency by sixteen (16) percent. This included the less than significant 
organizational effect (.14).  
Another consideration was the organizational complexity direct causal path to NH 
resiliency (Ɣ2 as .05, p <.05 with  confidence.  Again this was a relatively weak direct effect. 
However, the indirect effect of organizational complexity through plan adequacy on NH 
resiliency [(Ɣwas greater than its direct effect (.05).   
The cumulative effect of plan adequacy independent path (.673) and organizational 
complexity independent path (.017) was not evident when examining the change in R2.   
Findings from this study through hypothesis testing are summarized in Table 21: 
Hypothesis Testing Summary.    
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Table 21: Hypothesis Testing Summary 
  Hypothesis statement Status 
H1 There is a positive causal path from NH’s organizational complexity NH 
plan adequacy. 
Accepted as a 
true statement. 
H2 There is a positive causal path from NH plan adequacy to NH 
resiliency. 
Accepted as a 
true statement. 
H3 There is a direct positive causal path from nursing home 
organizational complexity to NH resiliency. 
Rejected as a 
true statement. 
H4 There is a cumulative positive effect of NH complexity and NH plan 
adequacy on NH resiliency. 
Rejected as a 
true statement. 
 
Some professionals believe organizations have “built in” resiliency through staff 
experience, ownership stability and resource acquisitions (Alexander, et al., 2010). Other 
scholars believe some organizations may be less resilient because of structural complexity and 
the enormity of internal hierarchies (Ashby, 2007).  Contingency theory implies that written 
disaster plans, cannot directly affect resiliency without hierarchical organizational complexity to 
implement the plan. More research needs to be done to evaluate the effectiveness of an 
organization’s implementation of the disaster plan. 
None the less, this research provided empirical evidence that the disaster plan (B) has a 
stronger direct influence (1 = .82, p < .01) on NH resiliency (C) regardless of organizational 
complexity (A). In other words, the most important finding from this limited study was the 
confirmation that resiliency is improved by the disaster plan process, regardless of organizational 
complexity.  The next chapter will discuss possible conclusions and the implications of this 
research.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter outlines conclusions for and implications from collecting NH information to 
design a contingency model for NH resiliency.  Research questions are answered based upon the 
findings from Chapters Four and Five. The last section of this chapter offers recommendations 
for future research based upon a multidisciplinary approach to collaboration across jurisdictions, 
specifically in disaster planning and evacuation decisions. 
6.1. Contingency Framework Conclusions 
Nursing home resiliency is contingent upon many aspects within the context of a disaster. 
According to contingency theory, a complex organizational structure (A) does not directly ensure 
the attainment of expected outcomes (C, resiliency) because the structure is too complicated to 
actually measure. Considering, the vulnerabilities inherent within the organizational complexity 
(A) of the nursing home environment, complexity theory was proven to be true. Thus, preparing 
an adequate emergency management plan (B) could compensate for organizational complexity’s 
vulnerabilities with a stronger direct effect on NH resiliency (C). 
The descriptive analysis of the FL NH population is proven by the complexity theory as 
an organizational structure that is too multivariate within a system of internal and external 
operational contingencies. The organizational characteristics are too numerous to ever be 
quantifiable and therefore should be defined within and by previous healthcare research (Ashby, 
2007; Vesterby, 2008).  For this study organizational complexity was defined and measured by 
patient acuity, workload, and administrative strengths. These three parameters are accepted by 
systems theorists as quantifiable measurements for a complexity measure (Kahan, Allen, George, 
& Thompson, 2009).   
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Plan adequacy was concluded to be the strongest predictor (.81, p <.05) of resiliency even 
though the data did not consider intervention tests for measuring the implementation success or 
failure of the plan.  
Since Hurricane Andrew (1991), skilled nursing facilities are legislatively mandated to 
write comprehensive emergency management plans that use a mimetic system of strategies 
(Florida Senate, 2011).  Isomorphic plan designs meet common legal requirements, but vary in 
adequacy. This study focused upon plan adequacy as a tool for implementing performance 
strategies grounded in three contingency theories: resource dependency, systems learning and 
network collaboration.  
Resource dependency was demonstrated by organizational behaviors that conformed to 
external and more powerful organizations that control access to disaster resources (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 2003). Nursing homes are resource dependent upon local vendors, corporate systems, 
and AHCA licenses. Of the sample surveyed, 92.2% had primary communications for contacting 
outside agencies for assistance. Additional medications and medical supplies are available to 
98% of the surveyed facilities and 97% had enough food set aside for three days as required by 
the AHCA license. 
Systems learning was demonstrated by shared disaster experiences and stakeholder 
feedback (Richardson, 1991).  Nursing homes mimicked best practices from other nursing homes 
and from previous disaster experiences. In 2005, during Hurricane Katrina, some emergency 
response personnel did not report to work because of family needs (Bea, et al., 2007).  This 
research illustrated the importance of NH employees and their families within the healthcare 
system as 60.8% of the NH facilities, surveyed in 2014, had employee hotlines and 86.3% 
provided shelter for employee families.  
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Network collaboration was displayed by high levels of confidence in disaster partnerships 
through written agreements and affiliations within a healthcare system and/or the emergency 
status system (ESS) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS).  For example, 
80.4% of the facilities had written agreements for disaster transportation and 81.4% of the NHs 
were affiliated with a for-profit corporate chain or healthcare system. Staff awareness of the ESS 
was higher (87.3%) than its familiarity with ESS procedures (70.6%) or the National Incident 
Management System (22.5%). It is concluded from these findings that disaster plans need to be 
practiced within a network of disaster partners, because there is the need for more practice in 
shifting from routine networks toward disaster networks (77.5% of the sample did not use 
NIMS). 
Multiple variables could be used to measure patient acuity. For this study it was 
concluded that two exogenous variables in the form of indexes would simplify the contingency 
model.  The two exogenous variables most significant to patient acuity were patient cognitive 
ability (ACUINDEX, .64) and patient physical ability (ADLSCORE, .96). The Acuity Index 
(mean score of 10.77 +/-1.79 S.D.) and ADL score (mean score of 4.12 +/- .57) provided a 
snapshot of the first aspect of the complexity within the daily environment of the NH.   
Another complexity measure was the time professional staff spend with patients because 
patients experience varying amounts of time with different levels of care. Analysis of the dataset 
concluded that the number of patients served (OCCUPANCY) and the levels of care (CNAHRD 
and LPNHRD) were strongly correlated as workload. Another variable affecting workload was 
the size of the facility. A summation of the NH workload is as follows: 
The average size of the FL NH facility in 2012 was 118 CMS certified beds with a mean 
occupancy of .87 +/- .15.  Patient time with a CNA ranged between two to four hours a day with 
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a mean of 2.7 +/- .64 hours. Patient time with an LPN ranged less than one hour to an hour and a 
half with a mean of .97 +/- .28 hours.  
From the above descriptive statistics, it was further concluded that the workload of a NH 
is high with 87% occupancy requiring a daily minimum of three hours of direct professional 
contact with each NH patient.  
It was further concluded that NH patients spend more time with certified nursing 
assistants (CNA’s) than other professional staff, thus deducing bonds of trust between patients 
and certified caregivers create overtime, a culture of trust and dependency (Rivera & 
Settembrino, 2012) as another contextual layer of organizational complexity.    
This frequent dependency upon another human being escalates during times of disaster as 
a patient decompensates in direct proportion to elevated levels of stress, such as may be 
experienced during emergency evacuations into hallways during a facility fire (Brown, et al., 
2012).  This study added to the ongoing NH research in culture change regarding nursing home 
environments and quality of care (Bowblis & Hyer, 2013; Chisholm, Weech-Maldonado, 
Laberge, Lin, & Hyer, 2013).   
Another significant conclusion regarding complexity, resource dependency, network 
collaboration and systems learning within a framework of contingency theory was the realization 
that administrative strengths can be measured and can make a difference when utilized during the 
resiliency planning process.  
This third and last complexity component, administrative strengths was derived from the 
first-order factors depicting the quality of professional staff (OVERALLRATING and 
RNRATING).  The overall staff rating in 2012, among the study sample was 3.4 +/- .8 within a 
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scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest level.  Registered nursing staff in 2012, among the study 
sample was 2.96 +/- 1.12 within a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest level.  
This research was based upon other studies regarding high turn-over in NH staffing and 
professional burn-out within the healthcare field (Azlina & Jamaluddin, 2010; Bowblis & Hyer, 
2013; Delaney & McWhorter, 2010; Eiring, Blake, & Howard, 2012; Lamb, Zimring, Chuzi, & 
Dutcher, 2010; Oetjen, McSweeney-Feld, Welch, Warthen, & Kopera-Frye, 2012) 
Thus, it is concluded that the context of organizational complexity (A) did not pose a 
significant influence on the process, plan adequacy (B) because the administrative strengths as 
measured by staff rating,  RN rating and nurse ratios are not actually included in the disaster 
planning process. In some cases, facility staff are missing from the plan design and therefore, 
that further weakens the organization’s contribution to NH resiliency. FL NH quality ratings 
ranged from average to above-average and further explains the conclusion for organization 
complexity (A) having a weak affect with resiliency (C).  
On the other hand, when considering organizational complexity (A) as only internal and 
external resources instead of structure alone, then the theory of resource dependency is proven 
by the findings of this study. Nursing homes are dependent upon other organizations that control 
access to the specialized healthcare resources needed by their patients. 
Resources as defined by eight exogenous variables can be measured as the first order 
factor: administrative strengths. The ratio of nurse to patients (NURSERATIO) was calculated 
using CMS data reports of professional staff total daily hours (TOTHRD) per total residents or 
patients (RESTOT).  The mean ratio of nurse to patients was 4.29 +/- .98 or 3 to 5 nurses per 
patient on average.  These components for measuring organizational complexity are major 
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considerations in designing an emergency operations plan or disaster response plan for a FL NH 
as they become resources during times of disaster.  
Administrative strengths was not the only factor for organizational complexity. Workload 
also, was a first order factor proving systems theory as organizational mechanisms are structured 
for maintaining an acceptable level of social homeostasis within the NH during disasters 
(Richardson, 1991, p. 52).  This is especially significant during moments of crisis, such as a high 
wind event or other unforeseen damage to the facility. Thus proving the first hypothesis as a true 
statement. 
H1. The NH plan adequacy is contingent upon the NH’s organizational complexity. 
Organizational characteristics and vulnerabilities are the basis for the Agency for Health 
Care Administration’s Emergency Management Planning Criteria for Nursing Home Facilities. 
See APPENDIX D: AHCA CHECKLIST. 
  Emergency management plans for nursing facilities are designed to save lives and 
protect property during all types of uncertainties (FEMA, 2012).  The dataset confirmed that 
organizational complexity (A) had a weak direct effect (.14, p<.01) on plan adequacy (B). Thus 
the dataset provided empirical evidence to show plan adequacy might be affected by or 
contingent upon organizational complexity. 
The first research question: Does organizational complexity affect plan adequacy? Was 
answered yes, even though the relationship was weak. The research conclusion is that the direct 
causal link between organizational complexity and plan adequacy proves dependency theory. To 
survive, the nursing home relies upon outside sources for disaster assistance.  From a 
contingency perspective, the organization should be strong internally and have adequate 
resources to implement an adequate disaster management plan. More research needs to be done 
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to identify alternative ways of strengthening the causal relationship of A (organizational 
complexity) to B (plan adequacy) and to C (outcomes for resiliency).  
The next section provides evidence that plan adequacy (B) strongly influences resiliency 
outcomes (C). Thus, the answer to the second research question (Does disaster plan adequacy 
effect nursing home resiliency?) is affirmative. 
H2. There is a positive causal path from NH plan adequacy to NH resiliency. 
The plan adequacy with a regression coefficient of .81 is considered to be a strong and 
significant effect on nursing home resiliency (or 16 times more effective than the organizational 
structure effect, .05).  In this study, plan design elements were used that are the most commonly 
accepted performance measures in social science research and are included in most disaster plan 
templates (Ashby, 2007; Blake, et. al., 2012).  These included items important to the NH staff 
working through a disaster situation. The most significant plan elements were: availability of an 
alternate facility, primary communications, a transportation agreement, additional staff, back-up 
power and enough medications for 72 hour patient care. 
Empirical evidence demonstrated the significance of these elements in emergency 
management plans that were specifically designed to meet NH staff requirements.  For example, 
staff communications was the strongest indicator for plan adequacy with a correlation coefficient 
of .885 at a confidence level of .95, p < .01. The majority of the NH administrators surveyed (.92 
+/- .27) required staff to use text messages through cell phones during disasters.  Other plan 
elements displayed significance relevance to association with the common construct as follows: 
Transportation agreement (.499), Additional staff (.573), back-up power (.322) and medications 
(.485).  
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A strong positive regression coefficient of plan adequacy (.81, p<.01) on NH resiliency 
confirmed Hypothesis 2: There is a strong causal path from the NH disaster plan to NH 
resiliency.  
When considering that the disaster plan is designed to compensate for organizational 
shortfalls during the time of crisis, one can further conclude that NH resiliency is sixteen (16) 
times more dependent upon plan adequacy (.81) than organizational complexity (.05). On the 
other hand, plan adequacy (or effectiveness) remains vulnerable to unpredictable changes in 
human behavior during disasters and even though organizational complexity is less significant 
than plan adequacy to resiliency, there remains a direct correlation. 
H3. There is a positive direct causal path from nursing home organizational complexity to 
NH resiliency.   
The data set did not confirm a significant relationship between organizational complexity 
and resiliency at .05 with confidence level of .95 and p<.01. Therefore, the third hypothesis was 
rejected.  This study imparts the necessity for evaluating the facility’s implementation policies 
apart from the plan design.  Only staff knowledge, skills and attitudes regarding their facility’s 
particular disaster plan design were evaluated and not the organization’s implementation of 
resiliency strategies apart from a plan.  Never the less, it was demonstrated that without a plan 
the organization has a direct influence on resiliency outcomes.  
Research data were not available for measuring the flexibility and accountability aspects 
of staff implementation practices during disasters.  However, after action reports from 
emergency managers do provide community response information and this after action report 
concept should also be adopted by NH administrators.  
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Therefore, more empirical data are needed that are specific to nursing home response 
implementation. This knowledge limitation will be further discussed in the next section about 
implications for disaster decisions. 
H4. There is a cumulative effect of NH complexity and NH plan adequacy on NH 
resiliency.  
No, was the answer to research question 4: Do organizational complexity and plan 
adequacy collectively influence resiliency? The hierarchal r-square regression analysis for joint 
influence or a cumulative effect demonstrated no change from the effect of plan adequacy alone 
(.673).  Thus, plan adequacy accounts for the most influence on NH resiliency. 
This was a surprise finding. However the significance of the independent effect of 
organizational complexity (.05, p<.01) was not acceptable as an indication of a direct influence 
on resiliency.  One might conclude that the frailty of patients and the complexity within the 
context of a nursing home environment lends itself to a weaker contribution toward resiliency. 
Thus an emphasis remains for the necessity of an adequate disaster plan. 
There were other, unforeseen surprises among study indicators previously thought to 
measure NH resiliency.  Previous studies theorized that economic resources and cultural beliefs 
influence human behaviors, especially during emergencies. Therefore, cultural affiliation and 
socioeconomic status were thought to influence levels of organizational resiliency.  
However in this study, the diversity of patients did not significantly correlate to other 
variables in this study. Some scholars believe the small representation of diverse populations 
within the nursing home environment is due to socioeconomic constraints and/or cultural 
preference (DHFS, 2005; Chisholm, et.al., 2013; Eiring, Blake, & Howard, 2012; FL ODH, 
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2010; Rivera, 2012; Rivera & Settembrino, 2012). Patients tend to choose facilities within the 
geographic location of their community. 
This study proved these earlier findings. Emergency management plans are written to 
meet all possible disaster contingencies for an entire community, without discrimination among 
populations. Therefore, cultural and functional access needs are mandatory plan design 
considerations, especially in diverse states, such as Florida. However, some analysts consider the 
nursing home population in Florida is less diverse because patients choose facilities within their 
cultural community or remain with family members (Elder Affairs, 2009). Therefore, cultural 
diversity and the number of non-English speaking patients were not significant to the findings.  
It was concluded that all ethnicities have access to disaster assistance through specific 
legislation and this encompasses cultural affiliations as well. This research concluded that other 
affiliations are more significant to improving resiliency outcomes, such as emergency support 
networks. 
An additional and unexpected conclusion from the dataset was the demonstration that 
transportation agreements and disaster network affiliations through plan design were more 
significant indicators of organizational resiliency, than socioeconomic and cultural affiliation. 
This surprising discovery may be due to effective legislation that promotes equitable access to 
disaster assistance, particularly during evacuations (Drabek & McEntire, 2002). In other words, 
resiliency is measured by the number of lives saved and the resources used to transport and 
shelter those lives.  
Therefore, other resiliency indicators, besides cultural and socioeconomic factors are 
included as policy considerations within the context of network affiliations and transportation 
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agreements. For example, translators are pre-identified to work as travel caregivers during 
evacuations. 
So, the study data revealed other factors that answered the research question: Q3. What 
other factors affect nursing home resiliency?  The availability of enough travel caregivers to 
accompany patients to an alternate facility during evacuations was highly significant. The 
correlation regression coefficient for alternate facility agreements (ALTFACILITY) was .83 with 
a .95 confidence level.  
Interviews with three facility administrators identified local community affiliations with 
other skilled nursing facilities and emergency management partners as important contingency 
factors for resiliency.   
This research proves the contingency theory that plan adequacy has a greater causal 
effect upon resiliency than organizational complexity. Therefore, it follows that resiliency can 
best be strengthened through an adequate disaster plan.  
However, more research is needed to fully understand three additional research 
implications found during this study. Additional disaster planning considerations identified were: 
1) evacuee transportation, 2) disaster plan templates (a.k.a. checklists), and 3) plan 
implementation.  
6.2. Implications for Disaster Decisions 
The finding that plan adequacy is significant to resiliency also implies that decisions are 
based upon efficiency in plan implementation and therefore, are also significant to resiliency 
outcomes. The keywords are adequacy and efficiency.  
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There remains a need for additional contingency theory research that is specific to 
resiliency predictions based upon plan implementation that includes measurements of flexibility 
and accountability as indicators of plan adequacy.   
6.2.1. Evacuee Transportation 
More needs to be understood about transportation decisions as a factor of resiliency.  The 
decision when and where to evacuate patients remains contingent upon many other factors 
beyond the control of the NH organization and its respective disaster plan. Three conclusions 
regarding the decision to evacuate are:  
1) Enforceability of written transportation agreement  
2) Availability of specialized medical transport equipment and  
3) Sufficient decision timeline.   
Even though the AHCA Checklist (See Appendix D) recommends a transportation 
agreement, 19.6% of the facilities surveyed felt transportation agreements were not enough to 
extend Health Related Quality of Life (HRQDL) for evacuees (CDC and PHPR, 2011).  The 
remaining 80.4% professing confidence in transportation agreements, may have been reacting to 
the social desirability bias of providing the best care for their patients.   
Repeated concern with patient transportation plans appeared over and over again in the 
after action reports, personal interviews, and site visits.  There is no substantial evidence in the 
literature confirming that pre-disaster written agreements are practical and enforceable during 
disasters. Implementation of the plan was not the focus of this study, the adequacy of the plan as 
understood by the staff through their knowledge, skills and attitudes was the measurement. 
For example, decisions to take action are encumbered by the logistical procedures for 
acquisition of “specialized” transportation equipment.  Locating enough trained personnel to 
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evacuate patients to a safe place is another hindrance. Because the transportation agreement is 
recognized as unenforceable, one administrator said, “they [pre-disaster agreements] have no 
teeth” (Reynolds S. , 2014).   
So, one concludes that the transportation agreement must define clear lines of 
authorization with enough flexibility to allow adaptations contingent upon available resources 
during a disaster. Thus, more research is recommended to evaluate transportation elements 
related to NHs as HRQOL outcomes.  
6.2.2. Disaster Plan Templates 
There are inconsistencies in writing disaster plans and in reviewing the plan design for 
most organizations.  First, disaster plans are designed internally within organization-centric silos 
of information.  Second, emergency management professionals are not trained across multiple 
disciplines, specifically public healthcare competencies or other specialized services required 
during a disaster.  However, they are responsible for the one basic commonality in plan design 
that directs the review process.  That is the vulnerability assessment.  
Vulnerability assessments are required by local fire inspectors, insurance agents, and the 
local emergency management agency. After the vulnerability assessment is completed, then 
planned actions are expected to be written. Therefore, the final design variations are based upon 
who and how the vulnerability analysis was conducted.   
Various methodologies for conducting vulnerability assessments are also known as risk 
assessments, risk analysis, vulnerability analysis, and cost-benefit analysis. These terms are also 
mixed in among acronyms such as strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) 
analysis.  A group of professionals in the Florida Health Care Association are attempting to 
123 
 
gather everyone onto the same page with one uniformed disaster template that begins with a 
standardized method for assessing a healthcare facility’s disaster vulnerabilities. 
The Florida Health Care Association wrote a guidebook (FHCA, 2009) based upon the 
AHCA Checklist and the National Criteria for Decision to Evacuate.  This book is distributed to 
the membership and is available for purchase as a cd and in print. The guidebook provides a step 
by step template for conducting a vulnerability assessment using historical disaster information.  
But only 8 of the 102 facilities completing the survey said they used the Association guidebook 
as a plan template. Local emergency management agencies can provide assistance with a 
vulnerability analysis, but more research needs to be done to evaluate this aspect of network 
collaboration. 
Emergency managers recommend to NH administrators to conduct locally focused 
assessments because the first response is local.  Emergency management agencies recommend 
the following principles in conducting a local vulnerability assessment: 
 Review local weather history (i.e. frequency and severity of thunderstorms),   
 Evaluate the physical location of their buildings (i.e. near clogged storm drains)  
 Notate infrastructure changes that may alter their evacuation route (i.e. new bridge 
construction or new train tracks). 
 Include staff in identifying local barriers.  
Those most familiar with the facility and its community may have knowledge that is 
unavailable to outside agencies.  Therefore, it was disappointing to find that among 102 FL NHs, 
45.1% of the participants did not include NH staff in designing the disaster plan. The majority 
(81.4%) of facilities in the sample were provided standardized plans from corporate 
administrations or healthcare systems.  This may appear beneficial at first consideration, 
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however treating each unit (a.k.a. skilled nursing facility) as having the same vulnerabilities may 
not be adequate or cost effective during an actual disaster.   
Preferred  steps toward plan adequacy are written solutions intended to mitigate 
anticipated damages (i.e. back-up generator, installation of storm windows, purchase a 
transportation vehicle  that accommodates patients, and pre-identify alternate shelter). These 
written solutions are also constrained by legislation from other sectors.  
For example, schools have disaster plans based upon public, private, or charter guidelines 
that include Life Safety Codes (LSC), International Building Construction Codes (IBCC), Red 
Cross Shelter Code 4496, ADA Compliance and any other local ordinance related items (FEMA, 
2012).  Health facilities follow the same urban planning codes as school systems, plus specific 
patient guided checklists such as AHCA and HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG).  
Emergency management disaster plans are based upon national incident management system 
(NIMS) terminology and resource types (Type I, II, III, & etc.). Therefore, plan designs are as 
unique as the composing agencies. 
 NH facility disaster planners can choose from a variety of emergency management plan 
templates (i.e. local county, state health department, corporate headquarters, professional 
association, and national checklist).  To minimize some of the chaos, legislation was created to 
include public safety plan reviewers as “collaborators” in the four phases (preparedness, 
mitigation, response and recovery) of the healthcare emergency management cycle (ACHE, 
2013; F.S. 252, 2012).   
There are other plan inconsistencies besides internal proprietary designs and untrained 
plan reviewers.  Even though, NHs are encouraged to analyze historical data to calculate the 
probabilities and frequencies of disasters, there remain suspicions that the plan implementation 
125 
 
procedures remain inadequate and possibly outdated (Bea, et al., 2007).  The more details a plan 
contains then the better probability of coping and responding to a disaster.  It is also important 
that staff are familiar with protocols and timelines as written into the facility’s emergency plan.  
Network theory grounded in contingency theory was proven by this study, however, it 
remains unclear how NH administrators structure their vulnerability analysis and thus design 
adequate strategies for disaster response and recovery, without training with network partners. 
Therefore, additional research is needed regarding the weak significance of organizational 
complexity (A) in designing plan adequacy (B).  
This is especially needed as the organization’s implementation of the plan becomes more 
significant to plan adequacy as a function of resiliency; starting with the choice of design 
templates, through the plan review process and into the disaster implementation phase or 
resiliency outcomes. 
6.2.3. Disaster Plan Implementation 
Not all facilities surveyed used the AHCA checklist to design a plan. As pointed out 
earlier, inconsistent plan designs can become the first hindrance to successful implementation.  
Only 30% used the AHCA checklist, yet the Florida emergency management community uses 
the AHCA criteria to review the plans! 
Interdisciplinary implementation was initially intended, by the spirit of the law, to be a 
collaboration that included emergency management (EM) into the local urban planning decisions 
and local evacuation exercises related to health care core competencies during disasters (ICMA, 
2007; Mileti, 2009).   
Over time, this collaborated implementation of the health disaster plan has been 
interpreted by some professionals as only a fee based review process toward obtaining health 
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facility license approval. In other words, NH disaster plans are bureaucratic paperwork, handled 
through corporate headquarters (29.4%) or designed by NH staff (54.9%).  In addition, there are 
two other rationalizations for diluted confidence in the NH disaster plan design template. First, 
corporate headquarters may be physically located out of the area and unfamiliar with the 
probabilities and/or the frequency of local disaster Threats to the NH facility.  Second, the high 
turn-over of staff creates the possibility that people unfamiliar with the plan will be responsible 
for its implementation (HHS OIG, 2012). On the other hand, when a facility’s staff has a long 
employment history and they are included in the plan design, then there is an increased 
likelihood that the NH will be more resilient (Comfort, 2012). See Table 23 for NH Plan Design 
Templates. 
 
Table 22: NH Plan Design Templates (n=102) 
 Percentage of users 
AHCA Checklist 7 
NH Staff Design 54.9 
Corporate Design 29.4 
Health Association 29.4 
Include NIMS 22.5 
Annual Exercise  100 
 
This study touched lightly upon the problem that emergency management professionals 
are distanced from the plan review process due to lack of training in identifying gaps in disaster 
patient care.  There needs to be more research and perhaps training redesigned to enhance 
individual resiliency among staff that will strengthen the overall resiliency of the organization. 
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6.3. Alternative Explanations of Findings 
The significance of an adequate disaster plan for effective resiliency may be further 
explained within the context of the external community and the internal culture. Some counties 
may have the same vendor agreeing to transport all the skilled nursing facility patients, thus 
creating an overwhelming expectation for assistance from the disaster community.  NH staff may 
ignore the plan and continue to behave as they did before the disaster, without anticipating 
cascading events (Ashby, 2007; Laditka, Laditka, Cornman, Davis, & Richter, 2009).  Staff need 
to be aware of the additional amount of time required for health facilities to pack up and deliver 
evacuated patients to a safer location.  Decisions to activate a disaster plan are also dependent 
upon the reliability of emergency warning systems (i.e. employee Hotline and primary 
communications).   
The plan’s effect on NH resiliency shows a substantially positive influence, because 
some emergent decisions may be derived from transformed policies, as interpreted by boots on 
the ground responders.  The likelihood exists that nursing home administrators’ and staff 
members will base disaster decisions contingent upon their own understanding of a disaster plan 
that has unclear objectives.  
Staff disaster actions may be contingent upon misdirected incentives, inadequate disaster 
reserves, no clear lines of authority and the assumptions that previous disaster successes will 
work again (Ashby, 2007; Bascetta, 2006). Thus, creating the likelihood, that with or without a 
plan, some facilities might choose to shelter-in-place in lieu of evacuating their “highest-risk 
patients,” even though circumstances predict less favorable outcomes (Mileti, 2009; Morse, 
Struyk, Pinegrina, Romanik, & Shapiro, 2006).   
Practicing the plan annually, minimizes the risk of inadequate plan implementation and 
poor resiliency decisions. As part of the AHCA checklist, disaster exercises are required 
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annually to familiarize the NH staff with their facility’s disaster strategy.  Even though an annual 
exercise was conducted by all 102 participants in the survey (as required by the HHS OIG), the 
design of the exercise may not be uniform across the state and therefore inadequate to reduce 
strategy shortcomings in the disaster plan.  Just as there are a variety of design templates, there 
are a variety of plan exercises: drill, tabletop, group discussion, virtual simulation or any 
combination of the four types.  
As pointed out earlier, not all facilities use the same checklists, templates, or type of 
exercise (i.e. tabletop, full scale, or timed drill).  Therefore, perhaps explaining why one facility 
decides to float patients through flooded windows while another facility arranges helicopter 
evacuations (Fink, 2013). 
Any staff member expected to make decisions during a disaster, as responsibilities may 
increase or shift away from daily routines, will be more resilient when they exercise an adequate 
plan. Staff participating in an exercise are more aware of planned disaster timelines required in 
packing up and evacuating patients, along with medical charts and additional supplies.  For 
example, practicing patient transport procedures and timing the transport route in anticipation of 
the need can help staff calmly think through alternative courses of action.  Thus, proving the 
need for a written decisions (disaster plan) based upon pertinent evacuation details acquired 
during the exercise.   
6.4. Recommendations for Plan Adequacy Improvements 
Some organization analysts believe there should be a differentiation among three types of 
disaster plan strategies: intent, emergent, and realized (Ashby, 2007). Theoretical contribution 
from this research was in the area of narrowing the gaps between the intent of the emergency 
management plan to establish a solid foundation for emergent collaboration between public 
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health planners and emergency management plan reviewers. Therefore, more stringent and 
expansive research needs to be done to confirm the dynamic moments between the parameter 
effects of plan adequacy and organizational resiliency.  One place to start is by narrowing the 
gaps between public health planning and emergency management response technologies. 
This study identified alternate facility, disaster supplies, and transportation agreements as 
the most important elements for measuring plan adequacy. Elements of plan adequacy from this 
study revealed the need for alternate transportation routes and smarter infrastructure design that 
evaluates the time need to transport frail patients out of harm’s way. Either better construction of 
nursing facilities and/or urban policies in choosing appropriate locations for facilities.  
There are numerous recommendations from this research for improving emergency 
management’s relationship with the healthcare sector. These can be summed up as two 
recommendations specific to improving plan adequacy:  
1) Include transportation authorities in the NH evacuation planning phase and  
2) Train emergency managers in the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) already 
used by healthcare professionals. 
There are other agency inputs needed in the planning process to remedy the lack of 
transportation coordination concerns revealed in this research.  Even small facilities not affiliated 
with a large health system, need to be aware of local evacuation procedures and egress as pre-
determined by law enforcement partners and emergency managers. Healthcare administrators 
need to be in attendance during local evacuation plan reviews. Most importantly, a transportation 
contact with local authorities should be included in the multidisciplinary team when designing a 
facility’s emergency management plan. 
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The second recommendation for adapting the emergency management plan review 
process to include the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). This will align public safety 
and healthcare objectives into quality of service partnerships. Presently, both emergency 
management disaster and healthcare analysts rely upon the Root Cause Analysis (RCA). This 
retrospective analysis of behavioral and anecdotal data is related to a sentinel disaster.  During 
disasters, each sector begins with a shared mission to save lives, however, they each have a 
different sets of objectives.  
Therefore it is recommended that emergency management learn the Failure Mode and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) process already used in healthcare. This proactive approach uses a 
multidisciplinary team that recognizes the predictability of errors during a crisis and designs a 
process of accountability to intercept missteps. It is akin to the vulnerability analysis already 
assumed by emergency managers and could provide a framework for an effective plan review 
process to supplement the AHCA checklist.  
Due to the time and legal constraints not all elements of contingency planning and 
organizational complexity were observed.  Staff ratings and patient acuity for this study 
demonstrated the dependence of organizational activity upon human experience, yet, more 
extensive, interdisciplinary research is needed to conclude what other human factors effect 
organizational complexity.  More research is needed to understand tipping points for 
organizational decisions (i.e. evacuations). 
During the analysis of data, many measurement models and alternative path analyses 
revealed some plausible options to illustrate the effect of plan adequacy in strengthening 
organizational resiliency. These optional measurement models are offered in the following 
sections for consideration in future research projects. 
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6.5. Recommendations for Future Research 
Three recommendations for future research are: 1) an interdisciplinary research, 2) 
interdisciplinary operational definition for resiliency, and 3) future research and modeling on the 
determinants of resiliency.  
Comparisons across human and organizational behavior studies are hindered by multiple 
interpretations of resiliency and not enough evidence has been collected to determine the best 
methods for implementing disaster plans.  Research recommendations in the next three sections 
and these are based upon identified disaster planning and recovery collaboration gaps from other 
resiliency and emergency management studies (Agranoff, 2003; Comfort, 2012; CDC and 
PHPR, 2011; Cutter, et al., 2008). 
Design studies for resiliency should use a range of assessment tools that monitor both the 
physiological and structural characteristics that define resiliency. For example, studies designed 
to predict outcomes from inputs of behavior changes during moments of stress, such as disaster 
recovery efforts from an earthquake provide various degrees of resiliency for responders 
depending upon physical conditions.  
Perhaps a virtual experiment designed to predict outcomes from strategic plan inputs 
designed by interdisciplinary partners (health, emergency management and urban planners). 
Injects of behavior changes or policy changes can then be graded upon degrees of effectiveness 
in attaining a degree of resiliency (a.k.a. effectiveness). The physiological and structural basis for 
resilient behaviors can be explored while research participants virtually exercise strategies for 
various types of disasters within a finite timeframe.  
The research community needs operational definitions for resiliency across disciplines. A 
definition of resiliency is needed that is based upon common characteristics already identified 
among the multiple disciplines.  Resiliency has been described as inherent within individuals, 
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organizations, and society as a dynamic process of functional and structural changes with 
degrees of variation. Psychiatric health terms may describe resiliency, however, resiliency is not 
clinically defined.   
Comparisons across studies are hindered by multiple interpretations of resiliency as it is 
borrowed from one science and imposed onto another. There needs to be increased research and 
design mechanisms for assessing individual and organizational resiliency behavior.  At present 
most disaster resiliency research uses terminology based upon economic performance. 
Health and environment affect resiliency throughout the lifespan of the individual or the 
organization. Modifiable and non-modifiable influences on resiliency may include ethnicity, 
culture, and education, previously stress filled experiences, and other behaviors (Blazer, Yaffe, 
& Liverman, 2015). Resiliency can be learned so comparisons of resiliency performance can be 
made between moments in time (before disaster and after disaster).  
Health and public safety research foundations, as well as, academic research centers 
should partner with each other in defining resiliency in degrees or some measureable term. Then 
specific guidelines for resiliency studies can be drafted and approved by an oversight committee 
of interdisciplinary stakeholders. 
6.6. Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations 
The main conclusion from this study is that nursing home resiliency (C) is strongly 
contingent upon plan adequacy (B), especially during situations requiring evacuations.  The 
contingency perspective of the relationship of organizational structure (A, organizational 
complexity) through processes (B, plan adequacy) slightly influences outcomes (C, resiliency). 
The contingency theory was proven as demonstrated in the formula:   A    →     B   →     C.   
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The direct causal path suggested by contingency theory was proven positive, not 
significant, and is demonstrated in the formula:  A   →   C.    
The indirect causal path of joint effects from structure A and process B, was a positively 
significant change as: AB   →    C.    However, the effect was similar to the independent effect 
of B upon C.  This similarity was accredited to the fact that structure (A) already proved 
indirectly and weakly significant through the plan process (B).  Consequently, the A to B to C 
aspects of contingency theory was proven by the dataset.   
Even though this dataset demonstrated a weak direct causal effect between organizational 
complexity and resiliency, this research identified opportunities for improving the NH structure 
and proved the need for emergency management processes to maintain and strengthen future NH 
resiliency.  
This empirical study offered strong proof  that NH resiliency is contingent upon and is 
directly influenced by an adequate emergency plan, and that the plan design is contingent upon 
the complexity of the organization.  
In other words,  organizational complexity indirectly  influences NH resiliency via the 
creation and status of the adequacy of the emergency plan design.  The implication of this 
important finding is that a nursing home should internally foster the adequacy or integrity of its 
emergency management plan.  
In addition, empirical confirmation of the significance of having disaster plans 
reemphasized the need to continue discussions for improving plan implementation by 
strengthening the infrastructure supporting NH homes.  
A summary of recommendations from this study to practitioners includes the following:  
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1) Identify an interdisciplinary definition for resiliency.  
2) Use a standardized plan template.  
3) Write clear lines of authority with allowances for adaptations (flexibility). 
4) Train health care plan reviewers in healthcare strategic planning. 
5) Include healthcare administrators in local emergency management evacuation plans. 
6) Conduct more interdisciplinary research in disaster organizational behavior.  
See Table 23: List of Conclusions and Recommendations for a more detailed list. 
 
 
 
 
Table 23: List of Conclusions and Recommendations 
Main conclusions Recommendations 
Definition and measurements for 
resiliency differ across disciplines. 
 Define resiliency in measureable terms  
 Use consistent definition of resiliency across 
disciplines. 
 Conduct interdisciplinary research (health, 
public affairs, emergency management, and 
public safety). 
 Use consistent indicators in interdisciplinary 
research. 
Plan adequacy strongly improves 
resiliency. 
 Include all stakeholders in plan design. 
 Train stakeholders and outside agencies that will 
be implementing the plan. 
 Practice the plan within the organization. 
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Qualtrics Survey Questions 
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APPENDIX B: DISABILITY STATUS OVERVIEW 
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Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014 
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APPENDIX D: AHCA CHECKLIST 
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Emergency Management Planning Criteria for Nursing Home Facilities 
 
 The following minimum criteria are to be used when developing Comprehensive 
Emergency Management Plans (CEMP) for all Nursing Homes. The criteria serve as the 
required plan format for the CEMP, and will also serve as the compliance review document 
for county emergency management agencies upon submission for review and approval 
pursuant to Chapter 252, Florida Statutes (F.S.). These minimum criteria satisfy the basic 
emergency management requirements of 400, Part II, Florida Statutes, but are not designed 
to provide specific emergency medical planning guidance. Although such planning is 
required under 400, Part II, Florida Statutes, and this rule and may be included in this plan, 
those items will not be subject to review or approval by county emergency management 
agencies. 
 These criteria are also not intended to limit nor exclude additional materials 
facilities may decide to include to satisfy other relevant rules, requirements, or any special 
issues facility administrators deem appropriate for inclusion. As before, such voluntary 
inclusions will not be subject to the specific review by county emergency management 
personnel, but only those items identified in these criteria. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 A. Provide basic information concerning the facility to include: 
1. Name of the facility, address, telephone number, emergency contact 
telephone number and fax number; 
  2. Owner of facility, address, telephone number; 
  3. Year facility was built; 
  4. Name of administrator, address, and work/home telephone number; 
  5. Name, address, work/home telephone number of person implementing the 
  provisions of this plan, if different from the administrator; 
6. Name and work/home telephone number of person(s) who developed this 
plan; 
  7. Provide an organizational chart with key emergency positions identified. 
 B. Provide an introduction to the Plan, which describes its purpose, time of 
implementation, and the desired outcome that will be achieved through the planning 
process. Also provide any other information concerning the facility that has bearing on the 
implementation of this plan. 
 
II. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES 
 A. Identify the legal basis for the plan development and implementation of local 
ordinances and apply 400-23, F.S., and 59A-4.126, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.). 
 B. Identify reference materials used in the development of the Plan. 
 C. Identify the hierarchy of authority in place during emergencies. Provide an 
organizational chart, if different from the previous chart required. 
 
III. HAZARD ANALYSIS 
  
 A. Describe the potential hazards that the facility is vulnerable to such as hurricanes, 
tornadoes, flooding, fires, hazardous materials incidents from fixed facilitates or 
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transportation accidents, proximity to a nuclear power plant, power outages during severe 
cold or hot weather, etc. Indicate past history and lessons learned. 
  
 B. Provide site specific information concerning the facility to include: 
1. Number of facility beds, maximum number of clients on site, average 
number of clients on site; 
  2. Type of residents served by the facility to include, but not limited to: 
   a. Patients with Alzheimer’s disease. 
   b. Patients requiring special equipment or other special care, such as  
   oxygen or dialysis 
   c. Number of patients who are self-sufficient 
  3. Identification of hurricane evacuation zone facility is in; 
  4. Identification of which flood zone facility is in as identified on a Flood  
   Insurance Rate Map; 
5. Proximity of facility to a railroad or major transportation artery (per 
hazardous materials incidents); 
  6. Identify if facility is located within 10-mile or 50-mile emergency planning  
  zone of a nuclear power plant. 
 
IV. POLICIES 
 This section of the plan defines the policies, procedures, responsibilities and actions 
that the facility will take before, during and after any emergency situation. At a minimum, 
the facility plan needs to address: direction and control; notification; and sheltering. 
  
 A. Direction and Control 
 Define the management function for emergency operations. Direction and control 
provides a basis for decision-making and identify who has the authority to make decisions 
for the facility. 
1. Identify by name and title, who is in charge during an emergency, and one 
alternate, should that person be unable to serve in that capacity. 
2. Identify the chain of command to ensure continuous leadership and authority in 
key position. 
 3. State the procedures to ensure timely activation and staffing of the facility in 
 emergency functions. Are there provisions for emergency workers’ families? 
4. State the operational and support roles for all facility staff. (This will be 
accomplished through the development of Standard Operating Procedures, which 
must be attached to this plan). 
 5. State the procedures to ensure the following needs are supplied: 
  a. Food, water and sleeping arrangements. 
  b. Emergency power, natural gas or diesel. If natural gas, identify alternate 
means should loss of power occur which would affect the natural gas system. What is the 
capacity of emergency fuel system? 
  c. Transportation (may be covered in the evacuation section). 
  d. 72-hour supply of all essential supplies. 
6. Provisions for 24-hour staffing on a continuous basis until the emergency has 
abated. 
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 B. Notification 
 Procedures must be in place for the facility to receive timely information on 
impending threats and the alerting of facility decision makers, staff and residents of 
potential emergency conditions. 
 1. Define how the facility will receive warnings, to include off hours and  
 weekends/holidays. 
 2. Identify the facility 24-hour contact number, if different than number listed in 
 introduction. 
 3. Define how key staff will be alerted. 
 4. Define the procedures and policy for reporting to work for key workers. 
5. Define how residents/patients will be alerted and the precautionary measures 
that will be taken. 
 6. Identify alternative means of notification should the primary system fail. 
 7. Identify procedures for notifying those facilities to which facility residents will be 
 evacuated. 
8. Identify procedures for notifying families of residents that facility is being 
evacuated. 
 
 C. Evacuation 
Describe the policies, role responsibilities and procedures for the evacuation of 
residents from the facility. 
1. Identify the individual responsible for implementing facility evacuation 
procedures. 
2. Identify transportation arrangements made through mutual aid agreements or 
understandings that will be used to evacuate residents (Copies of the agreements 
must be attached as annexes). 
3. Describe transportation arrangements for logistical support to include moving 
records, medications, food, water, and other necessities. 
 4. Identify the pre-determined locations where residents will be evacuated. 
5. Provide a copy of the mutual aid agreement that has been entered into with a 
facility to receive residents/patients. 
6. Identify evacuation routes that will be used and secondary routes should the 
primary route be impassable. 
7. Specify the amount of time it will take to successfully evacuate all 
patients/residents to the receiving facility. Keep in mind that in hurricane 
evacuations, all movement should  be completed before the arrival of tropical storm 
winds (40 mph winds). 
 8. Specify the procedures that ensure facility staff will accompany evacuating 
 residents/patients. 
9. Identify procedures that will be used to keep track of residents once they have 
been evacuated to include a log system. 
10. Determine what and how much each resident should take. Provide for a 
minimum of 72-hour stay, with provisions to extend this period of time if the 
disaster is of catastrophic magnitude. 
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11. Establish procedures for responding to family inquiries about residents who 
have been evacuated. 
12. Establish procedures for ensuring all residents are accounted for and are out of 
the facility. 
13. Determine at what point to begin the pre-positioning of necessary medical 
supplies and provisions. 
 14. Specify at what point the mutual aid agreements for transportation and the 
 notification of alternative facilities will begin. 
 
D. Re-entry 
 Once a facility has been evacuated, procedures need to be in place for allowing 
residents or patients to re-enter the facility. 
 1. Identify who is the responsible person(s) for authorizing re-entry to occur. 
 2. Identify procedures for inspecting the facility to ensure it is structurally sound. 
 3. Identify how residents will be transported from the host facility back to their 
home  facility and identify how you will receive accurate and timely data on re-entry 
operations. 
 
E. Sheltering 
 If the facility is to be used as a shelter for an evacuating facility, the plan must 
describe the sheltering/hosting procedures that will be used once the evacuating facility 
residents arrive. 
 1. Describe the receiving procedures for arriving residents/patients from evacuating 
 facility. 
 2. Identify where additional residents will be housed. Provide a floor plan, which 
 identifies the space allocated for additional residents or patients. 
 3. Identify provision of additional food, water, medical needs of those 
residents/patients  being hosted at receiving facility for a minimum of 72 hours. 
 4. Describe the procedures for ensuring 24-hour operations. 
 5. Describe procedures for providing sheltering for family members of critical 
workers. 
 6. Identify when the facility will seek a waiver from the Agency for Health Care 
 Administration to allow for the sheltering of evacuees if this creates a situation, 
which  exceeds the operating capacity of the host facility. 
 7. Describe procedures for tracking additional residents or patients sheltered within 
the facility. 
 
V. INFORMATION, TRAINING AND EXERCISE 
 This section shall identify the procedures for increasing employee and 
patient/residents awareness of possible emergency situations and provide training on 
their emergency roles before, during and after a disaster. 
 A. Identify how key workers will be instructed in their emergency roles during non-
 emergency times. 
 B. Identify a training schedule for all employees and identify the provider of the 
training. 
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 C. Identify the provisions for training new employees regarding their disaster 
related role(s). 
 D. Identify a schedule for exercising all or portions of the disaster plan on an annual 
 basis. 
 E. Establish procedures for correcting deficiencies noted during training exercises. 
 
APPENDIX 
The following information is required, yet placement in an appendix is optional if the 
material is included in the body of the plan. 
 A. Roster of employees and Companies with key disaster related roles. 
  1. List the names, addresses, and telephone number of all staff with disaster  
  related roles. 
  2. List the name of the company, contact person, telephone number and 
address of emergency service providers such as transportation, emergency power, fuel, 
food, water, police, fire, Red Cross, etc. 
 B. Agreements and Understandings 
 Provide copies of any mutual aid agreement entered into pursuant to the fulfillment 
of this plan. This is to include reciprocal host facility agreements, transportation 
agreements,  current vendor agreements or any agreement needed to ensure the 
operational integrity of this plan. 
 C. Evacuation Route Map 
 A map of the evacuation routes and description of how to get to a receiving facility 
for drivers. 
 D. Support Material 
  1. Any additional material needed to support the information provided in the 
plan. 
  2. Copy of the facility’s fire safety plan that is approved by the local fire  
   department. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AHCA 3110-6006, March, 1994  
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Table 24: Acuity Index Descriptive Analysis 
 Value 
Standard Attributes Position 3 
Label ACUINDEX 
Type Numeric 
Format F12 
Measurement Scale 
Role Input 
N Valid 102 
Missing 0 
Central Tendency and Dispersion Mean 10.77 
Standard Deviation 1.794 
Percentile 25 10.10 
Percentile 50 10.72 
Percentile 75 11.65 
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Table 25: Assistance with Daily Living Index Analysis 
 Value 
Standard Attributes Position 4 
Label ADLINDEX 
Type Numeric 
Format F12 
Measurement Scale 
Role Input 
N Valid 102 
Missing 0 
Central Tendency and 
Dispersion 
Mean 10.47 
Standard Deviation 1.630 
Percentile 25 9.89 
Percentile 50 10.45 
Percentile 75 11.43 
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Table 26: Assistance with Daily Living Score Analysis 
 Value 
Standard Attributes Position 5 
Label ADLSCORE 
Type Numeric 
Format F12 
Measurement Scale 
Role Input 
N Valid 102 
Missing 0 
Central Tendency and 
Dispersion 
Mean 4.12 
Standard Deviation .571 
Percentile 25 3.89 
Percentile 50 4.16 
Percentile 75 4.43 
 
 
  
155 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 27: Certified Nurse Hours 
CERTIFIED NURSE HOURS PER PATIENT PER DAY 
 Value 
Standard Attributes Position 13 
Label CNAHRD 
Type Numeric 
Format F12.2 
Measurement Scale 
Role Input 
N Valid 102 
Missing 0 
Central Tendency and Dispersion Mean 2.7149 
Standard Deviation .64050 
Percentile 25 2.5459 
Percentile 50 2.7211 
Percentile 75 2.9626 
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Table 28: LPN Hours 
LICENSED PRACTCAL NURSE HOURS PER PATIENT PER DAY 
 Value 
Standard Attributes Position 29 
Label LPNhrd 
Type Numeric 
Format F12.2 
Measurement Scale 
Role Input 
N Valid 102 
Missing 0 
Central Tendency and Dispersion Mean .9447 
Standard Deviation .28128 
Percentile 25 .8441 
Percentile 50 .9613 
Percentile 75 1.1132 
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Table 29: RN Hours 
REGISTERED NURSE HOURS PER PATIENT PER DAY  
 Value 
Standard Attributes Position 42 
Label RNHRD 
Type Numeric 
Format F12.2 
Measurement Scale 
Role Input 
N Valid 102 
Missing 0 
Central Tendency and Dispersion Mean .6678 
Standard Deviation .26035 
Percentile 25 .5058 
Percentile 50 .6526 
Percentile 75 .7818 
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Table 30: Profit or Non-Profit Status 
PROFIT  STATUS 
 Value Count Percent 
Standard Attributes Position 38   
Label Profit Status 
  
Type Numeric   
Format F40   
Measurement Scale   
Role Input   
N Valid 102   
Missing 0   
Central Tendency and 
Dispersion 
Mean .65   
Standard Deviation .480   
Percentile 25 .00   
Percentile 50 1.00   
Percentile 75 1.00   
Labeled Values 0 Not-for-Profit 36 35.3% 
1 For-Profit 66 64.7% 
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Table 31: RN Rating Analysis 
 RN  RATING (FIVE IS HIGHEST) 
 Value Count Percent 
Standard 
Attributes 
CASPER Position 43   
Label RNRATING   
Type Numeric   
Format F12   
Measurement Scale   
Role Input   
N Valid 102   
Missing 0   
Central 
Tendency and 
Dispersion 
Mean 2.96   
Standard Deviation 1.116   
Percentile 25 2.00   
Percentile 50 3.00   
Percentile 75 4.00   
Labeled Values 1  Less than adequate 1 12 11.8% 
2  Somewhat adequate 2 21 20.6% 
3  Adequate 3 36 35.3% 
4  Better than adequate 4 25 24.5% 
5  Very adequate 5 8 7.8% 
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Table 32: Staff Rating 
STAFFRATING (SCALE OF FIVE) 
 Value Count Percent 
Standard Attributes Position 49   
Label STAFFRATING   
Type Numeric   
Format F12   
Measurement Scale   
Role Input   
N Valid 102   
Missing 0   
Central Tendency and 
Dispersion 
Mean 3.45   
Standard Deviation 1.021   
Percentile 25 3.00   
Percentile 50 4.00   
Percentile 75 4.00   
Labeled Values 1  Less than adequate 1 8 7.8% 
2  Somewhat adequate 2 10 9.8% 
3  Adequate 3 18 17.6% 
4  Better than adequate 4 60 58.8% 
5  Very adequate 5 6 5.9% 
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Table 33 Aggregated Descriptive Statistics 
 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
# of Fines 0 7 .52 1.069 3.294 .239 14.338 .474 
% Elderly 10.50 34.50 18.5990 6.35280 .378 .239 -.617 .474 
ACUINDEX 0 19 10.77 1.794 -1.280 .239 16.123 .474 
ADLINDEX 0 16 10.47 1.630 -2.452 .239 16.930 .474 
ADLSCORE 0 5 4.12 .571 -3.764 .239 26.087 .474 
Administrator 0 1 .90 .299 -2.744 .239 5.640 .474 
Affiliation  0 1 .81 .391 -1.636 .239 .689 .474 
Association Plan  0 1 .08 .270 3.183 .239 8.294 .474 
Business Age 1 47 26.04 9.921 -.140 .239 .528 .474 
Capital Improvement 0 1 .49 .502 .040 .239 -2.039 .474 
Certified Beds 20 300 116.44 44.423 .793 .239 2.783 .474 
Changed Owner 1 1 1.00 .000 . . . . 
CNAHRD .00 4.95 2.7149 .64050 -1.793 .239 9.018 .474 
Complaints 0 1 .80 .399 -1.554 .239 .423 .474 
CCRC 0 1 .11 .312 2.566 .239 4.678 .474 
Corp Plan template 0 1 .29 .458 .917 .239 -1.182 .474 
Council 0 1 .55 .500 -.200 .239 -2.000 .474 
Dialysis Patients 0 15 2.26 2.346 1.993 .239 7.385 .474 
EMR 0 1 .53 .502 -.120 .239 -2.026 .474 
Evacuation 0 1 .16 .365 1.915 .239 1.702 .474 
Health Department 0 1 .29 .458 .917 .239 -1.182 .474 
Incidents 0 1 .06 .236 3.806 .239 12.737 .474 
Insurance 0 1 .28 .453 .971 .239 -1.079 .474 
License Status 0 1 .95 .217 -4.240 .239 16.298 .474 
LICENSEDHOURS .00 3.17 1.6115 .42013 -.464 .239 7.401 .474 
LPNHRD .00 1.67 .9447 .28128 -.765 .239 2.318 .474 
Non-English 0 39 4.03 7.126 3.206 .239 11.059 .474 
NURSERATIO 0 7 4.29 .981 -2.037 .239 9.607 .474 
OCCUPANCY .02 1.00 .8659 .14811 -3.774 .239 18.571 .474 
OSTOMY 0 41 5.15 7.144 3.099 .239 11.045 .474 
PCTMCAID 0 1 .95 .217 -4.240 .239 16.298 .474 
Penalties 0 1 .32 .470 .766 .239 -1.442 .474 
Plan Approval 0 1 .81 .391 -1.636 .239 .689 .474 
Plan Exercise 1 1 1.00 .000 . . . . 
Profit Status 0 1 .65 .480 -.625 .239 -1.642 .474 
PTHRD .00 .51 .1316 .09143 1.263 .239 2.395 .474 
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Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
QUALITY 1 5 3.91 1.035 -.749 .239 -.099 .474 
RATING 1 5 3.50 1.348 -.606 .239 -.820 .474 
RNHRD .00 1.57 .6678 .26035 .613 .239 1.781 .474 
RNRATING 1 5 2.96 1.116 -.096 .239 -.636 .474 
Rural 0 1 .09 .285 2.947 .239 6.818 .474 
Size 20 300 117.53 41.663 .756 .239 3.307 .474 
Special Focus Facility 0 0 .00 .000 . . . . 
Staff longevity 0 1 .72 .453 -.971 .239 -1.079 .474 
Staff Plan 0 1 .55 .500 -.200 .239 -2.000 .474 
STAFFRATING 1 5 3.45 1.021 -1.118 .239 .525 .474 
Total Residents 2 239 99.90 39.413 .162 .239 1.468 .474 
TOTHRD .00 7.39 4.3254 .97834 -2.029 .239 10.186 .474 
ALTFACILITY 0 1 .90 .299 -2.744 .239 5.640 .474 
POWER 0 1 .92 .270 -3.183 .239 8.294 .474 
FOOD 0 1 .97 .170 -5.654 .239 30.566 .474 
HOTLINE 0 1 .61 .491 -.448 .239 -1.835 .474 
MEDS 0 1 .98 .139 -7.034 .239 48.419 .474 
OPSBUD 0 1 .40 .493 .406 .239 -1.872 .474 
BUDRESERVE 0 1 .33 .474 .718 .239 -1.515 .474 
NIMS 0 1 .23 .420 1.333 .239 -.227 .474 
PRIMCOM 0 1 .92 .270 -3.183 .239 8.294 .474 
ESS 0 1 .87 .335 -2.268 .239 3.205 .474 
ESSPROC 0 1 .71 .458 -.917 .239 -1.182 .474 
TRAVTIME 0 1 .75 .438 -1.142 .239 -.711 .474 
TRAVCAREGIVER 0 1 .84 .365 -1.915 .239 1.702 .474 
TRANS 0 1 .80 .399 -1.554 .239 .423 .474 
ADDSTAFF 0 1 .79 .406 -1.477 .239 .184 .474 
EMPSHELT 0 1 .86 .346 -2.140 .239 2.630 .474 
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Table 34 FL Population Descriptive Statistics 
AGGREGATED FL NH POPULATION DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS in 2012* (N=680) 
 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
ACUINDEX 6 19 10.70 .050 1.303 1.697 .572 .094 4.387 .187 
ADLINDEX 6 16 10.42 .046 1.212 1.469 .010 .094 1.341 .187 
ADLSCORE 2 5 4.18 .016 .424 .180 -.498 .094 .919 .187 
CERTBEDS 15 462 120.82 1.910 49.794 2479.476 1.309 .094 5.867 .187 
CH_OWN 0 10 2.03 .082 2.129 4.532 .930 .094 .232 .187 
DIALYSIS 0 13 2.09 .087 2.263 5.119 1.345 .094 2.006 .187 
NON_ENGL 0 94 4.81 .386 10.068 101.374 4.753 .094 28.147 .187 
OSTOMY 0 52 5.06 .256 6.686 44.703 3.118 .094 13.044 .187 
PCTMCAID 0 100 55.70 .817 21.300 453.679 -.858 .094 .519 .187 
Total Residents 2 406 106.05 1.726 45.011 2025.996 1.114 .094 4.894 .187 
*Source: CASPER 2012 database 
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Table 35: Correlation Matrix for Revised Organizational Complexity (n=102) 
 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 
ACUINDEX 
(X1) 
Pearson 1               
Sig. (2-tailed)                
ADLSCORE 
(X2) 
Pearson  .618** 1             
Sig. (2-tailed) .000              
CNAHRD  
(X3) 
Pearson  .121 .788 1           
Sig. (2-tailed) .224 .059            
LPNHRD  
(X4) 
Pearson  .196* .252* .615** 1         
Sig. (2-tailed) .049 .011 .000          
OCCUPANCY 
(X5) 
Pearson .216* .329** .501** .364** 1       
Sig. (2-tailed) .029 .001 .000 .000        
STAFFRATING 
(X6) 
Pearson  .085 .096 .563** .319** .154 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) .394 .335 .000 .001 .123      
RNRATING 
(X7) 
Pearson -.001 .086 .328** .076 .082 .789** 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .988 .392 .001 .449 .411 .000    
NURSERATIO 
(X8) 
Pearson  .183 .263** .895** .712** .518** .588** .463** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .066 .008 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 36: Correlation Matrix for Revised NH Plan Adequacy (n=102) 
 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 
ALTFACILITY 
(Y1) 
Pearson  1           
Sig. (2-tailed)            
PRIMCOM (Y2) Pearson   .885** 1         
Sig. (2-tailed) .000          
TRANS (Y3) Pearson   .418** .499** 1       
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000        
ADDSTAFF (Y4) Pearson   .484** .573** .298** 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .002      
POWER (Y5) Pearson   .272** .322** .040 .212* 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .006 .001 .693 .032    
MEDS (Y6) Pearson  .191 .222* -.070 .103 .485** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .054 .025 .485 .304 .000  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 37: Correlation Matrix for Revised NH Resiliency (n=102) 
 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 
TRAVCAREGIVER (Y7) Pearson 1 
 
  
Sig. (2-tailed) 
  
  
TRAVTIME (Y8) Pearson .676** 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
 
  
ESSPROC (Y9) Pearson  .313** .215* 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .030 
 
 
ESS (Y10) Pearson .482** .384** .463** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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